engines={image=false textcolor=true vector=false text=true} tetml={filename={D:\drim\repository\projects\drim_83_0\metadata\9\c\9c93e336ef262f5116cc610d55af3c13\9c93e336ef262f5116cc610d55af3c13.para.xml} elements={annotations=false bookmarks=false destinations=false fields=false javascripts=false} } granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 1 1 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Title: T i t l e : Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Document D o c u m e n t no: n o : Contract C o n t r a c t no.: n o . : C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Project: P r o j e c t : Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Distribution: D i s t r i b u t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : Status S t a t u s Final F i n a l Distribution D i s t r i b u t i o n date: d a t e : Rev. R e v . no.: n o . : Copy C o p y no.: n o . : 08/09/2023 0 8 / 0 9 / 2 0 2 3 02 0 2 Author(s)/Source(s): A u t h o r ( s ) / S o u r c e ( s ) : Subjects: S u b j e c t s : Context, C o n t e x t , Hazards, H a z a r d s , Safety S a f e t y in i n design, d e s i g n , Barrier B a r r i e r functions, f u n c t i o n s , Performance P e r f o r m a n c e standards, s t a n d a r d s , safety s a f e t y strategies s t r a t e g i e s Remarks: R e m a r k s : Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Updated: U p d a t e d : 08/09/2023 0 8 / 0 9 / 2 0 2 3 Responsible R e s p o n s i b l e publisher: p u b l i s h e r : Authority A u t h o r i t y to t o approve a p p r o v e deviations: d e v i a t i o n s : Techn. T e c h n . responsible r e s p o n s i b l e (Organisation ( O r g a n i s a t i o n unit u n i t / / Name): N a m e ) : Date/Signature: D a t e / S i g n a t u r e : 28.08.2023 2 8 . 0 8 . 2 0 2 3 Responsible R e s p o n s i b l e (Organisation ( O r g a n i s a t i o n unit/ u n i t / Name): N a m e ) : Date/Signature: D a t e / S i g n a t u r e : 28.08.2023 2 8 . 0 8 . 2 0 2 3 Recommended R e c o m m e n d e d (Organisation ( O r g a n i s a t i o n unit/ u n i t / Name): N a m e ) : Date/Signature: D a t e / S i g n a t u r e : 28.08.2023 2 8 . 0 8 . 2 0 2 3 28.08.2023 2 8 . 0 8 . 2 0 2 3 08.09.2023 0 8 . 0 9 . 2 0 2 3 Approved A p p r o v e d by b y (Organisation ( O r g a n i s a t i o n unit/ u n i t / Name): N a m e ) : Date/Signature: D a t e / S i g n a t u r e : 29.08.2023 2 9 . 0 8 . 2 0 2 3 07.09.2023 0 7 . 0 9 . 2 0 2 3 Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 2 2 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Contents C o n t e n t s 1 1 Objective O b j e c t i v e and a n d Target T a r g e t group..................................................................................................................... g r o u p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 1.1 1 . 1 Objective O b j e c t i v e ................................................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 1.2 1 . 2 Scope S c o p e ........................................................................................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 1.3 1 . 3 Target T a r g e t group g r o u p .............................................................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 1.4 1 . 4 Important I m p o r t a n t information i n f o r m a t i o n about a b o u t current c u r r e n t revision r e v i s i o n ............................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 2 2 Context C o n t e x t ..................................................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 2.1 2 . 1 wind w i n d project p r o j e c t ............................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 2.2 2 . 2 Facility F a c i l i t y description d e s c r i p t i o n offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n ....................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7 2.3 2 . 3 Metocean M e t o c e a n data d a t a ........................................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8 2.3.1 2 . 3 . 1 Wind.......................................................................................................................................................... W i n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9 2.3.2 2 . 3 . 2 Waves W a v e s ..................................................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1 0 2.3.3 2 . 3 . 3 Current C u r r e n t .................................................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1 1 2.4 2 . 4 Snow S n o w and a n d icing i c i n g ........................................................................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1 2 2.5 2 . 5 Sea S e a ice i c e .................................................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1 2 2.6 2 . 6 Third T h i r d party p a r t y activities a c t i v i t i e s nearby n e a r b y the t h e development d e v e l o p m e n t ........................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1 2 2.7 2 . 7 Applicable A p p l i c a b l e rules r u l e s and a n d regulations r e g u l a t i o n s .............................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1 2 3 3 Risk R i s k management m a n a g e m e n t .................................................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1 2 3.1 3 . 1 Safety S a f e t y in i n design d e s i g n principles p r i n c i p l e s ....................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1 2 3.2 3 . 2 Risk R i s k tolerance t o l e r a n c e criteria c r i t e r i a .............................................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1 3 3.3 3 . 3 Barrier B a r r i e r functions f u n c t i o n s ...................................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1 6 4 4 Hazard H a z a r d identification i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ............................................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1 8 5 5 Risk R i s k and a n d consequence c o n s e q u e n c e description d e s c r i p t i o n ...................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1 8 5.1 5 . 1 Ship S h i p collision c o l l i s i o n and a n d vessel v e s s e l loss l o s s of o f position p o s i t i o n .................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1 9 5.2 5 . 2 Explosion E x p l o s i o n hazards h a z a r d s ................................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1 9 5.3 5 . 3 Fire F i r e hazards h a z a r d s ............................................................................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1 9 5.4 5 . 4 Insulation I n s u l a t i o n gas g a s (SF6) ( S F 6 ) hazards h a z a r d s ................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 0 5.5 5 . 5 Other O t h e r hazards.......................................................................................................................................... h a z a r d s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 0 6 6 Offshore O f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n - - Safety S a f e t y strategies s t r a t e g i e s ................................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2 3 6.1 6 . 1 Containment C o n t a i n m e n t (PS ( P S 1) 1 ) ................................................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2 3 6.2 6 . 2 Natural N a t u r a l ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n and a n d HVAC H V A C (PS ( P S 2) 2 ) ........................................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2 4 6.3 6 . 3 Leak L e a k detection d e t e c t i o n (PS ( P S 3) 3 ) .............................................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2 6 6.4 6 . 4 Emergency E m e r g e n c y Shutdown S h u t d o w n system s y s t e m (PS ( P S 4) 4 ) ....................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2 7 6.5 6 . 5 Open O p e n Drain D r a i n system s y s t e m (PS ( P S 5) 5 ) ....................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3 0 6.6 6 . 6 Ignition I g n i t i o n source s o u r c e control c o n t r o l (PS ( P S 6) 6 ) ................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3 2 6.7 6 . 7 Fire F i r e detection d e t e c t i o n (PS ( P S 7) 7 ) ................................................................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3 3 6.8 6 . 8 Active A c t i v e Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n (PS ( P S 9) 9 ) .................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3 9 6.9 6 . 9 Passive P a s s i v e Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n (PS ( P S 10) 1 0 ) ............................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4 1 6.10 6 . 1 0 Emergency E m e r g e n c y Power P o w e r and a n d Lightning L i g h t n i n g (PS ( P S 11) 1 1 ) ................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4 2 6.11 6 . 1 1 Process P r o c e s s Safety S a f e t y (PS ( P S 12)............................................................................................................................ 1 2 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4 5 Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 3 3 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 6.12 6 . 1 2 Alarm A l a r m and a n d Communication C o m m u n i c a t i o n System S y s t e m for f o r use u s e in i n Emergency E m e r g e n c y Situations S i t u a t i o n s (PS ( P S 13) 1 3 ) ............................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4 6 6.13 6 . 1 3 Escape, E s c a p e , Evacuation E v a c u a t i o n and a n d Rescue; R e s c u e ; EER E E R (PS ( P S 14) 1 4 ) ........................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4 8 6.14 6 . 1 4 Layout L a y o u t Design D e s i g n Principles P r i n c i p l e s and a n d Explosion E x p l o s i o n Barriers B a r r i e r s (PS ( P S 15) 1 5 ) ......................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 5 5 6.15 6 . 1 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e cranes c r a n e s (PS ( P S 16A) 1 6 A ) ........................................................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5 7 6.16 6 . 1 6 Avoidance A v o i d a n c e of o f vessel v e s s e l collisions c o l l i s i o n s (PS ( P S 19) 1 9 ) ..................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 5 9 6.17 6 . 1 7 Structural S t r u c t u r a l integrity i n t e g r i t y (PS ( P S 20) 2 0 ) ....................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 6 1 6.18 6 . 1 8 Human H u m a n Machine M a c h i n e Interface I n t e r f a c e and a n d Alarm A l a r m Management M a n a g e m e n t (PS ( P S 22) 2 2 ) ..................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 6 3 6.19 6 . 1 9 Safety S a f e t y & & automation a u t o m a t i o n system s y s t e m security s e c u r i t y (PS ( P S 23) 2 3 ) ........................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 6 5 7 7 Additional A d d i t i o n a l information i n f o r m a t i o n ........................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 6 6 7.1 7 . 1 Abbreviations A b b r e v i a t i o n s and a n d definitions d e f i n i t i o n s ................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 6 6 7.2 7 . 2 Definitions D e f i n i t i o n s ............................................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 6 7 7.3 7 . 3 Changes C h a n g e s from f r o m previous p r e v i o u s version v e r s i o n ................................................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 6 7 8 8 References R e f e r e n c e s ............................................................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 6 8 9 9 Appendices A p p e n d i c e s ............................................................................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6 9 9.1 9 . 1 Appendix A p p e n d i x A A - - Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n for f o r active a c t i v e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n systems s y s t e m s ..................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6 9 9.2 9 . 2 Appendix A p p e n d i x B B - - Emergency E m e r g e n c y shutdown s h u t d o w n philosophy p h i l o s o p h y and a n d shutdown s h u t d o w n hierarchy h i e r a r c h y .................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 7 1 9.2.1 9 . 2 . 1 Introduction I n t r o d u c t i o n ............................................................................................................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 7 1 9.2.2 9 . 2 . 2 Control C o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system.................................................................................................................. s y s t e m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 7 1 9.2.3 9 . 2 . 3 Safety S a f e t y functions f u n c t i o n s for f o r emergency e m e r g e n c y events e v e n t s ..................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 7 1 9.2.4 9 . 2 . 4 Shutdown S h u t d o w n principles................................................................................................................................. p r i n c i p l e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 7 2 9.3 9 . 3 Appendix A p p e n d i x C C – – Assessment A s s e s s m e n t of o f emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r and a n d UPS U P S ........................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 7 7 Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 4 4 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 1 1 Objective O b j e c t i v e and a n d Target T a r g e t group g r o u p 1.1 1 . 1 Objective O b j e c t i v e This T h i s document d o c u m e n t describes d e s c r i b e s the t h e safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation. s u b s t a t i o n . The T h e safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y is i s input i n p u t to t o the t h e development d e v e l o p m e n t of o f the t h e substation s u b s t a t i o n and a n d shall s h a l l be b e further f u r t h e r detailed d e t a i l e d during d u r i n g the t h e engineering e n g i n e e r i n g phase p h a s e to t o document d o c u m e n t conclusions c o n c l u s i o n s on o n safety s a f e t y aspects a s p e c t s relevant r e l e v a n t for f o r the t h e development d e v e l o p m e n t of o f the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n and a n d interface i n t e r f a c e with w i t h the t h e wind w i n d farm. f a r m . The T h e safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y describes d e s c r i b e s how h o w risks r i s k s are a r e to t o be b e managed m a n a g e d based b a s e d on o n the t h e outcome o u t c o m e of o f a a systematic s y s t e m a t i c identification i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and a n d evaluation e v a l u a t i o n of o f the t h e hazards h a z a r d s and a n d effects e f f e c t s which w h i c h may m a y arise a r i s e on o n the t h e specific s p e c i f i c installation. i n s t a l l a t i o n . The T h e aim a i m of o f developing d e v e l o p i n g the t h e specific s p e c i f i c safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y is i s to t o identify i d e n t i f y installation i n s t a l l a t i o n specific s p e c i f i c philosophies, p h i l o s o p h i e s , strategies s t r a t e g i e s and a n d requirements. r e q u i r e m e n t s . This T h i s information i n f o r m a t i o n shall s h a l l outline o u t l i n e the t h e design d e s i g n principles p r i n c i p l e s for f o r layout, l a y o u t , configuration, c o n f i g u r a t i o n , arrangement, a r r a n g e m e n t , the t h e selection s e l e c t i o n and a n d role r o l e of o f safety s a f e t y barriers b a r r i e r s to t o manage m a n a g e risk r i s k on o n the t h e installation. i n s t a l l a t i o n . Further F u r t h e r the t h e safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y shall s h a l l define d e f i n e initial i n i t i a l performance p e r f o r m a n c e requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s and a n d design d e s i g n requirements. r e q u i r e m e n t s . In I n general, g e n e r a l , requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s in i n DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e Substations S u b s t a t i o n s shall s h a l l apply, a p p l y , but b u t this t h i s Safety S a f e t y Strategy S t r a t e g y provides p r o v i d e s supplementary s u p p l e m e n t a r y requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s and a n d clarification c l a r i f i c a t i o n of o f safety s a f e t y barrier b a r r i e r strategies s t r a t e g i e s applicable a p p l i c a b l e to t o the t h e Wind W i n d project. p r o j e c t . In I n case c a s e of o f conflicting c o n f l i c t i n g requirements, r e q u i r e m e n t s , the t h e requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s in i n this t h i s safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y shall s h a l l prevail. p r e v a i l . The T h e document d o c u m e n t shall s h a l l be b e used u s e d as a s specification s p e c i f i c a t i o n for f o r safety s a f e t y related r e l a t e d aspects a s p e c t s including i n c l u d i n g detection d e t e c t i o n and a n d mitigation m i t i g a t i o n hazardous h a z a r d o u s situations s i t u a t i o n s and a n d events. e v e n t s . This T h i s document d o c u m e n t shall s h a l l however h o w e v e r not n o t restrict r e s t r i c t designers d e s i g n e r s in i n developing d e v e l o p i n g the t h e most m o s t optimized o p t i m i z e d design. d e s i g n . The T h e safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y shall s h a l l be b e updated u p d a t e d by b y Company C o m p a n y during d u r i n g the t h e engineering e n g i n e e r i n g phases. p h a s e s . Contractors C o n t r a c t o r s who w h o perform p e r f o r m design d e s i g n of o f the t h e OSS O S S shall s h a l l contribute c o n t r i b u t e with w i t h input i n p u t to t o the t h e strategy s t r a t e g y document, d o c u m e n t , addressing a d d r e s s i n g specifics s p e c i f i c s related r e l a t e d to t o their t h e i r proposed p r o p o s e d concept. c o n c e p t . If I f solutions s o l u t i o n s chosen c h o s e n / / proposed p r o p o s e d by b y Contractor C o n t r a c t o r conflicts c o n f l i c t s with w i t h this t h i s document, d o c u m e n t , Company C o m p a n y shall s h a l l be b e consulted. c o n s u l t e d . The T h e safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y is i s structured s t r u c t u r e d according a c c o r d i n g to t o the t h e Company C o m p a n y defined d e f i n e d barrier b a r r i e r systems, s y s t e m s , with w i t h the t h e objective o b j e c t i v e to: t o : • • Describe D e s c r i b e the t h e need n e e d for f o r and a n d role r o l e of o f barriers b a r r i e r s that t h a t are a r e established e s t a b l i s h e d to t o manage m a n a g e risk r i s k related r e l a t e d to t o major m a j o r accidents. a c c i d e n t s . • • Visualize V i s u a l i z e the t h e connection c o n n e c t i o n between b e t w e e n risk r i s k and a n d hazard h a z a r d evaluations e v a l u a t i o n s specific s p e c i f i c to t o the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n and a n d the t h e wind w i n d farm f a r m hazards h a z a r d s • • Establish E s t a b l i s h adequate a d e q u a t e understanding u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o f the t h e barriers b a r r i e r s in i n order o r d e r to t o make m a k e correct c o r r e c t decisions d e c i s i o n s and a n d understand u n d e r s t a n d their t h e i r role. r o l e . • • Form F o r m a a basis b a s i s which w h i c h can c a n be b e used u s e d as a s a a management m a n a g e m e n t tool t o o l to t o keep k e e p the t h e integrity i n t e g r i t y of o f the t h e barriers b a r r i e r s intact i n t a c t during d u r i n g operation o p e r a t i o n and a n d modifications. m o d i f i c a t i o n s . The T h e safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y is i s a a lifecycle l i f e c y c l e document d o c u m e n t and a n d shall s h a l l follow f o l l o w the t h e installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s into i n t o the t h e operation o p e r a t i o n as a s documentation d o c u m e n t a t i o n of o f the t h e safety s a f e t y barriers b a r r i e r s and a n d for f o r follow-up f o l l o w - u p of o f the t h e safety s a f e t y barriers. b a r r i e r s . This T h i s safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y is i s established e s t a b l i s h e d for f o r the t h e project p r o j e c t phase p h a s e intended i n t e n d e d to t o suite s u i t e engineering e n g i n e e r i n g and a n d construction c o n s t r u c t i o n work. w o r k . This T h i s document d o c u m e n t describes d e s c r i b e s Company C o m p a n y minimum m i n i m u m requirements. r e q u i r e m e n t s . However, H o w e v e r , if i f national n a t i o n a l authority a u t h o r i t y requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s are a r e stricter s t r i c t e r these t h e s e shall s h a l l prevail. p r e v a i l . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 5 5 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 1.2 1 . 2 Scope S c o p e This T h i s safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y covers c o v e r s the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n (structures, ( s t r u c t u r e s , equipment e q u i p m e n t and a n d control c o n t r o l of o f the t h e OSS) O S S ) and a n d subsea s u b s e a installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s within w i t h i n the t h e scour s c o u r protection p r o t e c t i o n area a r e a around a r o u n d the t h e jacket. j a c k e t . 1.3 1 . 3 Target T a r g e t group g r o u p Target T a r g e t group g r o u p for f o r this t h i s document d o c u m e n t is i s the t h e Company C o m p a n y project p r o j e c t organization, o r g a n i z a t i o n , Company C o m p a n y operations o p e r a t i o n s organization o r g a n i z a t i o n and a n d project p r o j e c t engineering, e n g i n e e r i n g , design d e s i g n Contractors C o n t r a c t o r s and a n d authorities. a u t h o r i t i e s . Furthermore, F u r t h e r m o r e , the t h e document d o c u m e n t can c a n be b e used u s e d as a s supporting s u p p o r t i n g documentation d o c u m e n t a t i o n to t o Authority A u t h o r i t y submissions. s u b m i s s i o n s . 1.4 1 . 4 Important I m p o r t a n t information i n f o r m a t i o n about a b o u t current c u r r e n t revision r e v i s i o n FEED F E E D documents d o c u m e n t s with w i t h document d o c u m e n t number n u m b e r type t y p e C274-RA-x-xx-nnnnn C 2 7 4 - R A - x - x x - n n n n n added a d d e d as a s reference r e f e r e n c e document d o c u m e n t in i n section s e c t i o n 6 6 represent r e p r e s e n t the t h e status s t a t u s of o f the t h e FEED F E E D phase p h a s e and a n d shall s h a l l be b e considered c o n s i d e r e d as a s guidance g u i d a n c e only. o n l y . The T h e solutions s o l u t i o n s presented p r e s e n t e d in i n the t h e referred r e f e r r e d FEED F E E D documentation d o c u m e n t a t i o n shall s h a l l not n o t prevent p r e v e n t Contractors C o n t r a c t o r s from f r o m further f u r t h e r improvements i m p r o v e m e n t s and a n d development d e v e l o p m e n t of o f the t h e proposed p r o p o s e d design. d e s i g n . 2 2 Context C o n t e x t 2.1 2 . 1 wind w i n d project p r o j e c t The T h e areas a r e a s of o f interest i n t e r e s t are a r e in i n the t h e southwestern s o u t h w e s t e r n Baltic B a l t i c Sea S e a within w i t h i n Polish P o l i s h waters w a t e r s with w i t h water w a t e r depths d e p t h s ranging r a n g i n g from f r o m 20m 2 0 m to t o 45m. 4 5 m . The T h e total t o t a l area a r e a of o f is i s 122 1 2 2 km k m 2 2 and a n d the t h e total t o t a l area a r e a of o f is i s 117 1 1 7 km k m 2 2 . . are a r e located l o c a t e d 55 5 5 and a n d 60 6 0 km k m respectively r e s p e c t i v e l y from f r o m the t h e windfarm w i n d f a r m boundary b o u n d a r y to t o the t h e landfall l a n d f a l l location l o c a t i o n near n e a r Ustka, U s t k a , and a n d a a further f u r t h e r 10 1 0 km k m from f r o m the t h e landfall l a n d f a l l point p o i n t to t o the t h e Onshore O n s h o r e Sub S u b Station S t a t i o n (ONS) ( O N S ) at a t Slupsk S l u p s k (distances ( d i s t a n c e s calculated c a l c u l a t e d along a l o n g the t h e export e x p o r t cable c a b l e corridor). c o r r i d o r ) . Closest C l o s e s t straight-line s t r a i g h t - l i n e distance d i s t a n c e to t o shore s h o r e is i s 36 3 6 km k m from f r o m the t h e perimeter p e r i m e t e r of o f and a n d 22 2 2 km k m for f o r . . Both B o t h project´s p r o j e c t ´ s cable c a b l e arrays a r r a y s shall s h a l l have h a v e a a dedicated d e d i c a t e d Offshore O f f s h o r e Sub S u b Station S t a t i o n (OSS), ( O S S ) , centrally c e n t r a l l y located l o c a t e d in i n each e a c h park, p a r k , directing d i r e c t i n g export e x p o r t cables c a b l e s through t h r o u g h a a single s i n g l e route r o u t e to t o shore. s h o r e . Potential P o t e n t i a l future f u t u r e wind w i n d farms f a r m s are a r e being b e i n g developed d e v e l o p e d around a r o u n d and a n d between b e t w e e n the t h e area a r e a of o f as a s shown s h o w n in i n Figure F i g u r e 1. 1 . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 6 6 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Figure F i g u r e 1 1 - - Neighbouring N e i g h b o u r i n g future f u t u r e offshore o f f s h o r e wind w i n d farms f a r m s The T h e scope s c o p e of o f the t h e wind w i n d farm f a r m development d e v e l o p m e n t encompasses e n c o m p a s s e s wind w i n d turbines t u r b i n e s (WTGs), ( W T G s ) , their t h e i r foundations, f o u n d a t i o n s , inter-array i n t e r - a r r a y cabling, c a b l i n g , one o n e offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n per p e r wind w i n d farm, f a r m , an a n export e x p o r t cable c a b l e system, s y s t e m , a a landfall, l a n d f a l l , two t w o separate s e p a r a t e substations s u b s t a t i o n s in i n one o n e common c o m m o n area a r e a and a n d the t h e connection c o n n e c t i o n to t o a a transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n grid g r i d substation s u b s t a t i o n where w h e r e the t h e electricity e l e c t r i c i t y will w i l l be b e exported e x p o r t e d to t o the t h e Polish P o l i s h power p o w e r grid. g r i d . The T h e two t w o projects p r o j e c t s have h a v e according a c c o r d i n g to t o the t h e Polish P o l i s h regulatory r e g u l a t o r y requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s a a combined c o m b i n e d maximum m a x i m u m capacity c a p a c i t y of o f 1440 1 4 4 0 MW, M W , 720 7 2 0 MW M W per p e r wind w i n d farm. f a r m . A A schematic s c h e m a t i c visualization v i s u a l i z a t i o n of o f the t h e project p r o j e c t scope s c o p e is i s shown s h o w n in i n Figure F i g u r e 2. 2 . Figure F i g u r e 2 2 - - project p r o j e c t schematic s c h e m a t i c visualization v i s u a l i z a t i o n 2.2 2 . 2 Facility F a c i l i t y description d e s c r i p t i o n offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n The T h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n (OSS) ( O S S ) will w i l l be b e normally n o r m a l l y unmanned u n m a n n e d and a n d visited v i s i t e d for f o r inspection i n s p e c t i o n and a n d maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e activities. a c t i v i t i e s . The T h e control c o n t r o l of o f the t h e substation s u b s t a t i o n and a n d the t h e wind w i n d farm f a r m will w i l l be b e from f r o m a a permanently p e r m a n e n t l y manned m a n n e d control c o n t r o l room r o o m within w i t h i n the t h e maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e base b a s e located l o c a t e d onshore. o n s h o r e . Emergency E m e r g e n c y offshore o f f s h o r e shelter s h e l t e r at a t OSS O S S shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d for f o r 12 1 2 persons p e r s o n s onboard o n b o a r d (PoB) ( P o B ) during d u r i n g normal n o r m a l operation. o p e r a t i o n . During D u r i n g offshore o f f s h o r e hook-up h o o k - u p and a n d commissioning c o m m i s s i o n i n g and a n d planned p l a n n e d maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e operations o p e r a t i o n s it i t should s h o u l d be b e possible p o s s i b l e to t o temporarily t e m p o r a r i l y support s u p p o r t up u p to t o 36 3 6 PoB P o B when w h e n based b a s e d on o n the t h e vessel v e s s e l spread s p r e a d used u s e d to t o support s u p p o r t the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n and a n d commissioning c o m m i s s i o n i n g The T h e OSS O S S will w i l l be b e supported s u p p o r t e d by b y a a jacket j a c k e t structure s t r u c t u r e and a n d is i s envisaged e n v i s a g e d to t o be b e comprised c o m p r i s e d of o f a a cellar/cable c e l l a r / c a b l e deck d e c k (lower ( l o w e r level), l e v e l ) , main m a i n deck, d e c k , utility u t i l i t y deck d e c k and a n d a a roof r o o f level. l e v e l . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 7 7 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : The T h e powerproduction p o w e r p r o d u c t i o n from f r o m the t h e WTG’sis W T G ’ s i s split s p l i t into i n t o two t w o separate s e p a r a t e power p o w e r productiontrains, p r o d u c t i o n t r a i n s , A A and a n d train. t r a i n . The T h e twotrains t w o t r a i n s are a r e physical p h y s i c a l segregated s e g r e g a t e d from f r o m each e a c h other o t h e r to t o avoid a v o i d accidents a c c i d e n t s in i n onetrain o n e t r a i n to t o influence i n f l u e n c e the t h e othertrain. o t h e r t r a i n . The T h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n will w i l l typically t y p i c a l l y contain: c o n t a i n : e e Twooperational T w o o p e r a t i o n a l trains t r a i n s e e §=©Auxiliary § = © A u x i l i a r y LV L V rooms r o o m s e e HV H V and a n d MV M V GIS G I S switchgear s w i t c h g e a r rooms, r o o m s , e e Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r and a n d cooler c o o l e r area a r e a e e Auxiliary A u x i l i a r y generator g e n e r a t o r e e Fire F i r e suppression, s u p p r e s s i o n , HVAC, H V A C , and a n d battery b a t t e r y rooms r o o m s e e Lockerarea/toilet L o c k e r a r e a / t o i l e t room r o o m e e Cranes C r a n e s for f o r material m a t e r i a l handling h a n d l i n g e e Roof R o o f with w i t h possibility p o s s i b i l i t y for f o r Heli H e l i hoist h o i s t (medevac ( m e d e v a c or o r special s p e c i a l lifts) l i f t s ) e e Control, C o n t r o l , automation, a u t o m a t i o n , and a n d telecom t e l e c o m rooms r o o m s e e ~=Public ~ = P u b l i c room r o o m e e Workshopand W o r k s h o p a n d storage s t o r a g e container c o n t a i n e r Base B a s e case c a s e for f o r access a c c e s s to t o the t h e OSSis O S S i s by b y CTV C T V during d u r i n g the t h e operations o p e r a t i o n s phasevia p h a s e v i a accessladders a c c e s s l a d d e r s from f r o m sealevel. s e a l e v e l . In I n addition, a d d i t i o n , landing l a n d i n g areas a r e a s for f o r use u s e of o f service s e r v i c e offshore o f f s h o r e vessel v e s s e l (SOV) ( S O V ) and a n d walk w a l k to t o work w o r k bridge b r i d g e shall s h a l l be b e installed. i n s t a l l e d . The T h e SOV S O V size s i z e can c a n be b e up u p to t o 6000 6 0 0 0 tons t o n s displacement. d i s p l a c e m e n t . The T h e SOV S O V or o r the t h e CTV C T V will w i l l not n o t stay s t a y connected c o n n e c t e d when w h e n personnel p e r s o n n e l are a r e onboard o n b o a r d but b u t located l o c a t e d in i n the t h e field f i e l d at a t a a distance d i s t a n c e outside o u t s i d e the t h e safety s a f e t y zone. z o n e . The T h e OSSwill O S S w i l l be b e visited v i s i t e d approximately a p p r o x i m a t e l y once o n c e a a year y e a r for f o r routine r o u t i n e inspection i n s p e c t i o n and a n d maintenanceactivities m a i n t e n a n c e a c t i v i t i e s and a n d every e v e r y three t h r e e years y e a r s for f o r a a planned p l a n n e d outage o u t a g e maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e campaign. c a m p a i g n . 2.3 2 . 3 Metocean M e t o c e a n data d a t a The T h e below b e l o w information i n f o r m a t i o n is i s extracted e x t r a c t e d from f r o m ref. r e f . e e C274-EQ-Z-SP-00001_05 C 2 7 4 - E Q - Z - S P - 0 0 0 0 1 _ 0 5 (MAD ( M A D RE2019-006 R E 2 0 1 9 - 0 0 6 rev r e v 4) 4 ) - - Metocean M e t o c e a n Design D e s i g n Basis B a s i s e e C275-EQ-Z-SP-00001_05 C 2 7 5 - E Q - Z - S P - 0 0 0 0 1 _ 0 5 (MAD ( M A D RE2019-007 R E 2 0 1 9 - 0 0 7 rev r e v 4) 4 ) - - Metocean M e t o c e a n Design D e s i g n Basis. B a s i s . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 8 8 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 2.3.1 2 . 3 . 1 Wind W i n d All-year A l l - y e a r wind w i n d rose r o s e 10 1 0 m m abovesea a b o v e s e a level l e v e l are a r e shownin s h o w n i n Figure F i g u r e 3 3 for f o r and a n d figure f i g u r e 3 3 for f o r BaltykIl B a l t y k I l - - All A l l year y e a r NORTH N O R T H EAST E A S T ooooggees o o o o g g e e s = = ind i n d speed s p e e d (m/s) ( m / s ) > > he h e ¥ ¥ yee y e e k k Re R e eS e S S S 2S 2 S Oo O o Baad B a a d a a oo o o 8 8 ® ® @ @ "Re " R e a a SOUTH S O U T H Figure F i g u r e 3 3 - - All-year A l l - y e a r wind w i n d rose r o s e for f o r for f o r the t h e period p e r i o d 1980-2018 1 9 8 0 - 2 0 1 8 BaltykIll B a l t y k I l l - - All A l l year y e a r NORTH N O R T H Wind W i n d speed s p e e d (més ( m é s 15% 1 5 % m@>-2s m @ > - 2 s Mx M x -2 - 2 Gu G u .x . x 24 2 4 EAST E A S T O08 O 0 8 6-18 6 - 1 8 Ow... O w . . . sunaooo s u n a o o o Ia I a Do D o 2-4 2 - 4 Figure F i g u r e 4 4 - - All-year A l l - y e a r wind w i n d rosefor r o s e f o r for f o r the t h e period p e r i o d 1980-2018 1 9 8 0 - 2 0 1 8 Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 9 9 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 2.3.2 2 . 3 . 2 Waves W a v e s All-year A l l - y e a r wave w a v e rose r o s e for f o r are a r e shown s h o w n in i n Figure F i g u r e 5 5 and a n d Figure F i g u r e 6 6 respectively. r e s p e c t i v e l y . Figure F i g u r e 5 5 - - All-year A l l - y e a r wave w a v e rose r o s e for f o r for f o r the t h e period p e r i o d 1979-2018 1 9 7 9 - 2 0 1 8 Figure F i g u r e 6- 6 - All-year A l l - y e a r wave w a v e rose r o s e for f o r for f o r the t h e period p e r i o d 1979-2018 1 9 7 9 - 2 0 1 8 Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 10 1 0 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 2.3.3 2 . 3 . 3 Current C u r r e n t The T h e current c u r r e n t rose r o s e at a t surface s u r f a c e for f o r are a r e shown s h o w n in i n Figure F i g u r e 7 7 and a n d Figure F i g u r e 8 8 respectively. r e s p e c t i v e l y . Figure F i g u r e 7 7 - - Current C u r r e n t rose r o s e at a t surface s u r f a c e at a t Figure F i g u r e 8 8 - - Current C u r r e n t rose r o s e at a t surface s u r f a c e at a t Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 11 1 1 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 2.4 2 . 4 Snow S n o w and a n d icing i c i n g Wet W e t snow s n o w may m a y accumulate a c c u m u l a t e on o n surfaces s u r f a c e s and a n d vertical v e r t i c a l structures, s t r u c t u r e s , e.g. e . g . communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n mast. m a s t . Atmospheric A t m o s p h e r i c icing i c i n g is i s possible. p o s s i b l e . Estimated E s t i m a t e d ice i c e thickness t h i c k n e s s (data ( d a t a for f o r 50 5 0 yrs y r s available) a v a i l a b l e ) at a t 100 1 0 0 meters m e t e r s on o n cylinders c y l i n d e r s and a n d non-rotating n o n - r o t a t i n g structure s t r u c t u r e elements e l e m e n t s is i s approx. a p p r o x . 30 3 0 mm. m m . Specific S p e c i f i c assessment a s s e s s m e n t atmospheric a t m o s p h e r i c icing i c i n g on o n OSS O S S is i s not n o t performed. p e r f o r m e d . Sea S e a spray s p r a y icing i c i n g is i s caused c a u s e d by b y freezing f r e e z i n g sea s e a spray. s p r a y . Sea S e a spray s p r a y icing i c i n g can c a n be b e expected e x p e c t e d up u p to t o 25 2 5 meters m e t e r s above a b o v e sea s e a level l e v e l and a n d with w i t h the t h e thickest t h i c k e s t ice i c e layer l a y e r of o f up u p to t o 80 8 0 mm m m (100 ( 1 0 0 yrs) y r s ) between b e t w e e n 5-10 5 - 1 0 meter. m e t e r . There T h e r e will w i l l also a l s o be b e ice i c e accumulation a c c u m u l a t i o n below b e l o w 5 5 m m but b u t not n o t during d u r i n g extreme e x t r e m e storm s t o r m when w h e n large l a r g e waves w a v e s will w i l l transport t r a n s p o r t heat h e a t to t o the t h e lower l o w e r region r e g i o n of o f the t h e structure s t r u c t u r e and a n d the t h e ice i c e is i s exposed e x p o s e d to t o thermal t h e r m a l and a n d mechanical m e c h a n i c a l deterioration. d e t e r i o r a t i o n . These T h e s e values v a l u e s are a r e equal e q u a l for f o r . . 2.5 2 . 5 Sea S e a ice i c e Sea S e a ice i c e can c a n occur o c c u r at a t and a n d an a n average a v e r a g e ice i c e season s e a s o n is i s in i n range r a n g e of o f 10-20 1 0 - 2 0 days d a y s while w h i l e maximum m a x i m u m duration d u r a t i o n is i s about a b o u t 40 4 0 days. d a y s . Expected E x p e c t e d annual a n n u a l probability p r o b a b i l i t y of o f occurrence o c c u r r e n c e of o f ice i c e is i s approximately a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10 1 0 -1 - 1 . . The T h e sea s e a ice i c e thickness t h i c k n e s s at a t 100 1 0 0 years y e a r s return r e t u r n period p e r i o d is i s estimated e s t i m a t e d in i n ref r e f /C256-EQ-Z-CA-00001_05 / C 2 5 6 - E Q - Z - C A - 0 0 0 0 1 _ 0 5 / / to t o be b e 0,38 0 , 3 8 m m for f o r and a n d 0,39m 0 , 3 9 m for f o r . . 2.6 2 . 6 Third T h i r d party p a r t y activities a c t i v i t i e s nearby n e a r b y the t h e development d e v e l o p m e n t There T h e r e are a r e fishing f i s h i n g activities a c t i v i t i e s within w i t h i n both b o t h wind w i n d farms f a r m s and a n d along a l o n g the t h e route r o u t e for f o r the t h e export e x p o r t power p o w e r cables. c a b l e s . Within W i t h i n the t h e wind w i n d farms f a r m s the t h e type t y p e of o f fishing f i s h i n g gear g e a r used u s e d is i s bottom b o t t o m nets. n e t s . There T h e r e are a r e also a l s o fishing f i s h i n g vessels v e s s e l s passing p a s s i n g through t h r o u g h the t h e wind w i n d farms f a r m s as a s there t h e r e is i s an a n area a r e a for f o r trawl t r a w l fishing f i s h i n g north n o r t h of o f the t h e wind w i n d farm f a r m areas. a r e a s . There T h e r e are a r e ship s h i p navigation n a v i g a t i o n routes r o u t e s both b o t h south s o u t h of o f and a n d north n o r t h of o f the t h e wind w i n d farms. f a r m s . AIS A I S data d a t a show s h o w very v e r y low l o w density d e n s i t y of o f ship s h i p traffic t r a f f i c in i n the t h e vicinity v i c i n i t y of o f the t h e wind w i n d farms f a r m s as a s per p e r today. t o d a y . When W h e n WTGs W T G s are a r e present p r e s e n t in i n the t h e future f u t u r e and a n d the t h e sea s e a maps m a p s are a r e marked, m a r k e d , the t h e ship s h i p traffic t r a f f i c is i s expected e x p e c t e d to t o be b e even e v e n lower. l o w e r . The T h e OSS O S S is i s located l o c a t e d within w i t h i n the t h e windfarm w i n d f a r m surrounded s u r r o u n d e d by b y the t h e WTGs. W T G s . 2.7 2 . 7 Applicable A p p l i c a b l e rules r u l e s and a n d regulations r e g u l a t i o n s Reference R e f e r e n c e is i s given g i v e n to t o Appendix A p p e n d i x E E of o f the t h e Contract. C o n t r a c t . 3 3 Risk R i s k management m a n a g e m e n t 3.1 3 . 1 Safety S a f e t y in i n design d e s i g n principles p r i n c i p l e s In I n general, g e n e r a l , systems s y s t e m s that t h a t are a r e easy e a s y to t o design, d e s i g n , operate o p e r a t e and a n d maintain m a i n t a i n will w i l l be b e safer s a f e r than t h a n more m o r e complex c o m p l e x designs. d e s i g n s . This T h i s is i s also a l s o valid v a l i d for f o r design d e s i g n of o f safety s a f e t y systems. s y s t e m s . In I n priority p r i o r i t y it i t is i s recommended r e c o m m e n d e d to t o develop d e v e l o p our o u r plant p l a n t designs d e s i g n s in i n the t h e following f o l l o w i n g order, o r d e r , ref r e f Figure F i g u r e 9: 9 : Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 12 1 2 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Figure F i g u r e 9 9 - - Safety S a f e t y in i n design d e s i g n principles p r i n c i p l e s 3.2 3 . 2 Risk R i s k tolerance t o l e r a n c e criteria c r i t e r i a Personnel P e r s o n n e l and a n d asset a s s e t risk r i s k shall s h a l l meet m e e t the t h e risk r i s k tolerance t o l e r a n c e criteria c r i t e r i a provided p r o v i d e d by b y s s risk r i s k matrix m a t r i x shown s h o w n in i n Figure F i g u r e 10. 1 0 . The T h e consequence c o n s e q u e n c e categories c a t e g o r i e s are a r e described d e s c r i b e d in i n Table T a b l e 1. 1 . The T h e interpretation i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of o f colours c o l o u r s is i s described d e s c r i b e d in i n Table T a b l e 2. 2 . Consequence C o n s e q u e n c e category c a t e g o r y 1-3 1 - 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 Probability P r o b a b i l i t y category c a t e g o r y 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 <0.001% < 0 . 0 0 1 % 0.001-0.01% 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 % 0.01-0.1% 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 1 % 0.1-1% 0 . 1 - 1 % 5- 5 - 25- 2 5 - 1-5% 1 - 5 % >50% > 5 0 % (<10 ( < 1 0 -5 - 5 /yr) / y r ) (10 ( 1 0 -5 - 5 -10 - 1 0 -4 - 4 /yr) / y r ) (10 ( 1 0 -4 - 4 -10 - 1 0 -3 - 3 /yr) / y r ) (10 ( 1 0 -3 - 3 -10 - 1 0 -2 - 2 /yr) / y r ) 25% 2 5 % 50% 5 0 % Figure F i g u r e 10 1 0 - - Risk R i s k Tolerance T o l e r a n c e Criteria, C r i t e r i a , 9x8 9 x 8 matrix m a t r i x for f o r activities a c t i v i t i e s with w i t h major m a j o r accident a c c i d e n t potential p o t e n t i a l outcome o u t c o m e (internal ( i n t e r n a l reference r e f e r e n c e R-105890, R - 1 0 5 8 9 0 , RM100) R M 1 0 0 ) Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 13 1 3 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Table T a b l e 1 1 Description D e s c r i p t i o n of o f consequence c o n s e q u e n c e (impact) ( i m p a c t ) categories c a t e g o r i e s (Internal ( I n t e r n a l reference r e f e r e n c e R-24383, R - 2 4 3 8 3 , RM100) R M 1 0 0 ) Consequence C o n s e q u e n c e Category C a t e g o r y People’s P e o p l e ’ s health h e a l t h and a n d safety s a f e t y Environment E n v i r o n m e n t 1 1 – – 3 3 / / Minor M i n o r Medical M e d i c a l treatment, t r e a t m e n t , injury, i n j u r y , event e v e n t or o r work-related w o r k - r e l a t e d illness i l l n e s s with w i t h need n e e d for f o r treatment t r e a t m e n t or o r with w i t h temporary t e m p o r a r y health h e a l t h effect e f f e c t 4 4 / / Moderate M o d e r a t e Injury, I n j u r y , event e v e n t or o r work- w o r k - related r e l a t e d illness i l l n e s s that t h a t result r e s u l t in i n brief b r i e f absence a b s e n c e or o r restricted r e s t r i c t e d / / substitute s u b s t i t u t e work w o r k or o r some s o m e functional f u n c t i o n a l impairment. i m p a i r m e n t . Medically M e d i c a l l y manageable m a n a g e a b l e 5 5 / / Serious S e r i o u s Serious S e r i o u s injury, i n j u r y , event e v e n t or o r work-related w o r k - r e l a t e d illness i l l n e s s with w i t h absence a b s e n c e from f r o m work, w o r k , restricted r e s t r i c t e d work w o r k or o r permanent p e r m a n e n t health h e a l t h effects. e f f e c t s . High H i g h level l e v e l of o f medical m e d i c a l treatment, t r e a t m e n t , serious s e r i o u s functional f u n c t i o n a l impairment i m p a i r m e n t 6 6 / / Severe S e v e r e 1-3 1 - 3 fatalities f a t a l i t i e s or o r work- w o r k - related r e l a t e d illness i l l n e s s / / exposure e x p o s u r e with w i t h significant s i g n i f i c a n t life l i f e shortening s h o r t e n i n g effects e f f e c t s 7* 7 * / / Major M a j o r 4-20 4 - 2 0 fatalities f a t a l i t i e s or o r illness/ i l l n e s s / exposure e x p o s u r e cases c a s e s with w i t h significant s i g n i f i c a n t life l i f e shortening s h o r t e n i n g effects e f f e c t s and/ a n d / or o r larger l a r g e r parts p a r t s of o f installation/ i n s t a l l a t i o n / plant/ p l a n t / office. o f f i c e . 8* 8 * / / Catastrophic C a t a s t r o p h i c 20-200 2 0 - 2 0 0 fatalities f a t a l i t i e s or o r illness/ i l l n e s s / exposure e x p o s u r e cases c a s e s with w i t h significant s i g n i f i c a n t life l i f e shortening s h o r t e n i n g effects e f f e c t s and/ a n d / or o r main m a i n part p a r t of o f installation/ i n s t a l l a t i o n / plant/ p l a n t / office. o f f i c e . Very V e r y limited l i m i t e d impacts i m p a c t s (restitution ( r e s t i t u t i o n time t i m e < < 1 1 month) m o n t h ) on o n populations p o p u l a t i o n s (local), ( l o c a l ) , ecosystems e c o s y s t e m s or o r environmentally e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y sensitive s e n s i t i v e areas a r e a s of o f local l o c a l importance. i m p o r t a n c e . Local L o c a l impact i m p a c t on o n individual i n d i v i d u a l organism o r g a n i s m level l e v e l Short S h o r t term t e r m impacts i m p a c t s (restitution ( r e s t i t u t i o n time t i m e <1 < 1 year) y e a r ) on o n populations p o p u l a t i o n s (local), ( l o c a l ) , ecosystems e c o s y s t e m s or o r environmentally e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y sensitive s e n s i t i v e areas a r e a s of o f local l o c a l importance i m p o r t a n c e -Short - S h o r t term t e r m impacts i m p a c t s (restitution ( r e s t i t u t i o n time t i m e <1 < 1 year) y e a r ) on o n populations p o p u l a t i o n s (national ( n a t i o n a l or o r regional), r e g i o n a l ) , ecosystems e c o s y s t e m s or o r environmentally e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y sensitive s e n s i t i v e areas a r e a s of o f national n a t i o n a l or o r regional r e g i o n a l importance i m p o r t a n c e -Medium - M e d i u m term t e r m impacts i m p a c t s (restitution ( r e s t i t u t i o n time t i m e 1-3 1 - 3 years) y e a r s ) on o n populations p o p u l a t i o n s (local), ( l o c a l ) , ecosystems e c o s y s t e m s or o r environmentally e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y sensitive s e n s i t i v e areas a r e a s of o f local l o c a l importance i m p o r t a n c e -Medium - M e d i u m term t e r m impacts i m p a c t s (restitution ( r e s t i t u t i o n time t i m e 1-3 1 - 3 years) y e a r s ) on o n populations p o p u l a t i o n s (national ( n a t i o n a l or o r regional), r e g i o n a l ) , ecosystems e c o s y s t e m s or o r environmentally e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y sensitive s e n s i t i v e areas a r e a s of o f national n a t i o n a l or o r regional r e g i o n a l importance i m p o r t a n c e -Long - L o n g term t e r m impacts i m p a c t s (restitution ( r e s t i t u t i o n time t i m e 3-10 3 - 1 0 years) y e a r s ) on o n populations p o p u l a t i o n s (local), ( l o c a l ) , ecosystems e c o s y s t e m s or o r environmentally e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y sensitive s e n s i t i v e areas a r e a s of o f national n a t i o n a l importance i m p o r t a n c e -Large - L a r g e oil o i l spill s p i l l in i n populated p o p u l a t e d area a r e a -Long - L o n g term t e r m impacts i m p a c t s (restitution ( r e s t i t u t i o n time t i m e 3-10 3 - 1 0 years) y e a r s ) on o n populations p o p u l a t i o n s (national ( n a t i o n a l or o r global), g l o b a l ) , ecosystems e c o s y s t e m s or o r environmentally e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y sensitive s e n s i t i v e areas a r e a s of o f global g l o b a l or o r national n a t i o n a l importance i m p o r t a n c e -Very - V e r y long l o n g or o r permanent p e r m a n e n t impacts i m p a c t s (restitution ( r e s t i t u t i o n time t i m e > > 10 1 0 years) y e a r s ) on o n populations p o p u l a t i o n s (regional), ( r e g i o n a l ) , ecosystems e c o s y s t e m s or o r environmentally e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y sensitive s e n s i t i v e areas a r e a s of o f regional r e g i o n a l importance i m p o r t a n c e -Large - L a r g e oil o i l spill s p i l l in i n densely d e n s e l y populated p o p u l a t e d area a r e a -Very - V e r y long l o n g or o r permanent p e r m a n e n t impacts i m p a c t s (restitution ( r e s t i t u t i o n time t i m e >10 > 1 0 years) y e a r s ) on o n populations p o p u l a t i o n s (national ( n a t i o n a l or o r global), g l o b a l ) , ecosystems e c o s y s t e m s or o r environmentally e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y sensitive s e n s i t i v e areas a r e a s of o f global g l o b a l or o r national n a t i o n a l importance i m p o r t a n c e 9* 9 * / / Extreme E x t r e m e More M o r e than t h a n 200 2 0 0 fatalities f a t a l i t i e s illness/ i l l n e s s / exposure e x p o s u r e cases c a s e s with w i t h significant s i g n i f i c a n t life l i f e shortening s h o r t e n i n g effects e f f e c t s and/or a n d / o r loss l o s s of o f installation/plant/office i n s t a l l a t i o n / p l a n t / o f f i c e * * Consequence C o n s e q u e n c e category c a t e g o r y 7, 7 , 8 8 and a n d 9 9 are a r e considered c o n s i d e r e d major m a j o r accidents a c c i d e n t s in i n -Large - L a r g e and a n d long-lasting l o n g - l a s t i n g oil o i l spill s p i l l close c l o s e to t o densely d e n s e l y populated p o p u l a t e d shoreline. s h o r e l i n e . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 14 1 4 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s III I I I Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Table T a b l e 2 2 Interpretation I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of o f colours c o l o u r s in i n design d e s i g n phase p h a s e (internal ( i n t e r n a l reference r e f e r e n c e R-11452, R - 1 1 4 5 2 , RM100) R M 1 0 0 ) Risk R i s k level l e v e l RED R E D Mitigation M i t i g a t i o n and a n d sharing s h a r i n g of o f risk r i s k Single S i n g l e red r e d risk r i s k is i s generally g e n e r a l l y intolerable i n t o l e r a b l e and a n d far f a r beyond b e y o n d the t h e Group's G r o u p ' s risk r i s k tolerance t o l e r a n c e criteria. c r i t e r i a . Mitigating M i t i g a t i n g actions a c t i o n s must m u s t be b e implemented i m p l e m e n t e d as a s soon s o o n as a s possible. p o s s i b l e . ORANGE O R A N G E Single S i n g l e orange o r a n g e risk r i s k is i s generally g e n e r a l l y intolerable, i n t o l e r a b l e , and a n d mitigating m i t i g a t i n g actions a c t i o n s must m u s t be b e implemented. i m p l e m e n t e d . YELLOW Y E L L O W Mitigating M i t i g a t i n g actions a c t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e identified i d e n t i f i e d based b a s e d on o n the t h e ALARP A L A R P (As ( A s Low L o w As A s Reasonably R e a s o n a b l y Practicable)/ P r a c t i c a b l e ) / BAT B A T (Best ( B e s t Available A v a i l a b l e Technology) T e c h n o l o g y ) principle p r i n c i p l e or o r other o t h e r applicable a p p l i c a b l e principles p r i n c i p l e s subject s u b j e c t to t o relevant r e l e v a n t jurisdiction(s). j u r i s d i c t i o n ( s ) . GREEN G R E E N Risks R i s k s in i n the t h e green g r e e n zone z o n e are a r e generally g e n e r a l l y tolerable t o l e r a b l e and a n d actions a c t i o n s are a r e normally n o r m a l l y not n o t required. r e q u i r e d . The T h e following f o l l o w i n g main m a i n safety s a f e t y functions f u n c t i o n s are a r e further f u r t h e r defined d e f i n e d for f o r the t h e OSS: O S S : • • The T h e main m a i n load l o a d carrying c a r r y i n g capacity c a p a c i t y (structure) ( s t r u c t u r e ) shall s h a l l be b e intact i n t a c t until u n t i l the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n has h a s been b e e n evacuated e v a c u a t e d (in ( i n manned m a n n e d scenarios), s c e n a r i o s ) , which w h i c h means m e a n s that t h a t there t h e r e must m u s t not n o t be b e extensive e x t e n s i v e deformation d e f o r m a t i o n or o r collapse c o l l a p s e of o f the t h e whole w h o l e or o r considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e parts p a r t s of o f the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n before b e f o r e evacuation. e v a c u a t i o n . • • Installation I n s t a l l a t i o n parts p a r t s with w i t h functions f u n c t i o n s that t h a t are a r e vital v i t a l to t o combat c o m b a t accidents a c c i d e n t s and/or a n d / o r ensure e n s u r e safe s a f e shutdown s h u t d o w n shall s h a l l be b e intact i n t a c t until u n t i l the t h e emergency e m e r g e n c y activity a c t i v i t y has h a s been b e e n completed c o m p l e t e d or o r the t h e facility f a c i l i t y has h a s been b e e n evacuated. e v a c u a t e d . • • Mustering M u s t e r i n g areas, a r e a s , evacuation e v a c u a t i o n means, m e a n s , and a n d other o t h e r areas a r e a s defined d e f i n e d as a s “safe “ s a f e areas” a r e a s ” shall s h a l l be b e protected p r o t e c t e d so s o that t h a t they t h e y remain r e m a i n intact i n t a c t until u n t i l the t h e facility f a c i l i t y has h a s been b e e n evacuated. e v a c u a t e d . • • At A t least l e a s t one o n e escape e s c a p e route r o u t e for f o r personnel p e r s o n n e l in i n other o t h e r areas a r e a s than t h a n the t h e area(s) a r e a ( s ) exposed e x p o s e d to t o the t h e initial i n i t i a l accidental a c c i d e n t a l event e v e n t shall s h a l l be b e intact i n t a c t until u n t i l all a l l personnel p e r s o n n e l have h a v e escaped e s c a p e d to t o safe s a f e area. a r e a . The T h e annual a n n u a l probability p r o b a b i l i t y of o f loss l o s s of o f the t h e main m a i n safety s a f e t y functions f u n c t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e lower l o w e r than t h a n 1 1 x x 10 1 0 -4 - 4 for f o r each e a c h of o f the t h e following f o l l o w i n g accidental a c c i d e n t a l loads: l o a d s : • • Heat H e a t loads l o a d s (e.g. ( e . g . due d u e to t o fires f i r e s in i n combustible c o m b u s t i b l e materials m a t e r i a l s such s u c h as a s transformer t r a n s f o r m e r oil, o i l , diesel d i e s e l etc.) e t c . ) • • Smoke S m o k e and a n d toxic t o x i c loads l o a d s (e.g. ( e . g . due d u e fires f i r e s in i n combustible c o m b u s t i b l e materials m a t e r i a l s such s u c h as a s transformer t r a n s f o r m e r oil, o i l , diesel d i e s e l etc.) e t c . ) • • Explosion E x p l o s i o n loads l o a d s (e.g. ( e . g . related r e l a t e d to t o transformer t r a n s f o r m e r failure) f a i l u r e ) • • Impact I m p a c t loads l o a d s (e.g. ( e . g . collision c o l l i s i o n loads l o a d s from f r o m vessels, v e s s e l s , dropped d r o p p e d object o b j e c t loads l o a d s from f r o m lifting l i f t i n g operations, o p e r a t i o n s , etc.) e t c . ) • • Extreme E x t r e m e environmental e n v i r o n m e n t a l loads, l o a d s , such s u c h as a s o o Wind, W i n d , wave, w a v e , current c u r r e n t o o Sea S e a ice i c e o o Icing I c i n g o o Earthquake E a r t h q u a k e Based B a s e d on o n a a perceived p e r c e i v e d well w e l l known k n o w n and a n d controllable c o n t r o l l a b l e risk r i s k picture, p i c t u r e , these t h e s e quantitative q u a n t i t a t i v e criteria c r i t e r i a may m a y be b e assumed a s s u m e d complied c o m p l i e d with w i t h by b y using u s i n g the t h e following f o l l o w i n g minimum m i n i m u m design d e s i g n criteria: c r i t e r i a : • • Platform P l a t f o r m structural s t r u c t u r a l integrity i n t e g r i t y and a n d robust r o b u s t layout l a y o u t shall s h a l l secure s e c u r e safe s a f e escape e s c a p e from f r o m all a l l areas a r e a s of o f the t h e platform p l a t f o r m during d u r i n g an a n incident, i n c i d e n t , maintaining m a i n t a i n i n g the t h e main m a i n safety s a f e t y functions f u n c t i o n s • • The T h e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n design d e s i g n shall s h a l l ensure e n s u r e that t h a t a a fire f i r e or o r explosion e x p l o s i o n in i n the t h e equipment e q u i p m e n t is i s contained c o n t a i n e d and a n d will w i l l not n o t lead l e a d to t o escalation e s c a l a t i o n to t o other o t h e r areas a r e a s or o r parts p a r t s of o f the t h e electrical e l e c t r i c a l system. s y s t e m . Segregation S e g r e g a t i o n of o f transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s and a n d other o t h e r critical c r i t i c a l Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 15 1 5 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : equipment e q u i p m e n t shall s h a l l be b e ensured e n s u r e d so s o that t h a t a a fire f i r e or o r explosion e x p l o s i o n in i n one o n e transformer t r a n s f o r m e r does d o e s not n o t lead l e a d to t o complete c o m p l e t e loss l o s s of o f production p r o d u c t i o n • • A A fire- f i r e - and a n d explosion e x p l o s i o n analysis a n a l y s i s is i s required r e q u i r e d to t o document d o c u m e n t the t h e design d e s i g n and a n d ALARP A L A R P evaluations e v a l u a t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e made. m a d e . o o Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r Fire: F i r e : The T h e dimensioning d i m e n s i o n i n g fire f i r e load l o a d for f o r oil-filled o i l - f i l l e d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s are a r e determined d e t e r m i n e d by b y the t h e pool p o o l fire f i r e subsequent s u b s e q u e n t to t o a a transformer t r a n s f o r m e r explosion e x p l o s i o n scenario s c e n a r i o (an ( a n explosion e x p l o s i o n will w i l l rupture r u p t u r e the t h e transformer t r a n s f o r m e r resulting r e s u l t i n g in i n loss l o s s of o f transformer t r a n s f o r m e r oil o i l to t o the t h e surroundings). s u r r o u n d i n g s ) . The T h e size s i z e of o f the t h e pool p o o l is i s determined d e t e r m i n e d by b y the t h e size s i z e of o f the t h e bunding, b u n d i n g , or o r containment c o n t a i n m e n t area a r e a and a n d a a typical t y p i c a l heat h e a t flux f l u x can c a n be b e of o f the t h e order o r d e r of o f 150 1 5 0 kW/m2. k W / m 2 . The T h e duration d u r a t i o n of o f the t h e pool p o o l fire f i r e will w i l l be b e determined d e t e r m i n e d by b y the t h e evaporation e v a p o r a t i o n rate r a t e (typical ( t y p i c a l 50 5 0 g/m2/s) g / m 2 / s ) and a n d the t h e drain d r a i n capacity c a p a c i t y in i n the t h e area. a r e a . o o Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r Explosion: E x p l o s i o n : The T h e dimensioning d i m e n s i o n i n g explosion e x p l o s i o n load l o a d for f o r oil-filled* o i l - f i l l e d * transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s are a r e determined d e t e r m i n e d by b y an a n internal i n t e r n a l electrical e l e c t r i c a l arc, a r c , leading l e a d i n g to t o a a transformer t r a n s f o r m e r rupture r u p t u r e resulting r e s u l t i n g in i n an a n ignited i g n i t e d gas g a s cloud c l o u d (containing ( c o n t a i n i n g both b o t h oil o i l mist m i s t and a n d pyrolysis p y r o l y s i s reaction r e a c t i o n products). p r o d u c t s ) . The T h e energy e n e r g y involved i n v o l v e d (for ( f o r gas g a s cloud c l o u d size) s i z e ) is i s determined d e t e r m i n e d by b y the t h e circuit c i r c u i t breaker b r e a k e r time t i m e and a n d the t h e transformer t r a n s f o r m e r rating. r a t i n g . • • Impact I m p a c t loads l o a d s - - vessels: v e s s e l s : The T h e structure s t r u c t u r e shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d to t o withstand w i t h s t a n d a a collision c o l l i s i o n from f r o m SOV S O V with w i t h displacement d i s p l a c e m e n t of o f 6000 6 0 0 0 t t and a n d vessel v e s s e l speed s p e e d minimum m i n i m u m 2 2 m/s m / s as a s per p e r requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s in i n DNV-ST-0145. D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 . • • Extreme E x t r e m e Weather: W e a t h e r : The T h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n is i s designed d e s i g n e d to t o as a s minimum m i n i m u m withstand w i t h s t a n d the t h e 100-year 1 0 0 - y e a r return r e t u r n period p e r i o d storm s t o r m conditions c o n d i t i o n s without w i t h o u t experiencing e x p e r i e n c i n g any a n y impairment i m p a i r m e n t of o f the t h e safety s a f e t y functions f u n c t i o n s or o r integrity i n t e g r i t y of o f the t h e installation. i n s t a l l a t i o n . The T h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n is i s unmanned u n m a n n e d in i n extreme e x t r e m e weather, w e a t h e r , but b u t it i t shall s h a l l as a s minimum m i n i m u m be b e designed d e s i g n e d for f o r a a 1000-year 1 0 0 0 - y e a r return r e t u r n period p e r i o d ALS A L S event. e v e n t . If I f the t h e above a b o v e points p o i n t s are a r e adhered a d h e r e d to, t o , further f u r t h e r quantification q u a n t i f i c a t i o n is i s deemed d e e m e d unnecessary. u n n e c e s s a r y . Otherwise, O t h e r w i s e , normal n o r m a l quantitative q u a n t i t a t i v e risk r i s k analysis a n a l y s i s shall s h a l l be b e performed. p e r f o r m e d . 3.3 3 . 3 Barrier B a r r i e r functions f u n c t i o n s Barriers B a r r i e r s shall s h a l l be b e in i n place p l a c e to t o prevent p r e v e n t a a single s i n g l e event e v e n t to t o developing d e v e l o p i n g into i n t o major m a j o r accidents. a c c i d e n t s . A A traditional t r a d i t i o n a l barrier b a r r i e r diagram d i a g r a m illustrating i l l u s t r a t i n g the t h e principle p r i n c i p l e of o f barrier b a r r i e r functions f u n c t i o n s to t o prevent p r e v e n t unwanted u n w a n t e d events e v e n t s and a n d consequences c o n s e q u e n c e s are a r e shown s h o w n in i n Figure F i g u r e 11 1 1 Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 16 1 6 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Figure F i g u r e 11 1 1 - - Barrier B a r r i e r diagram d i a g r a m indicating i n d i c a t i n g barrier b a r r i e r functions f u n c t i o n s (shown ( s h o w n in i n red) r e d ) to t o prevent p r e v e n t unwanted u n w a n t e d events e v e n t s and a n d consequences. c o n s e q u e n c e s . Company C o m p a n y has, h a s , based b a s e d on o n systematic s y s t e m a t i c review r e v i e w of o f different d i f f e r e n t hazard h a z a r d and a n d accident a c c i d e n t scenarios, s c e n a r i o s , internal i n t e r n a l and a n d external e x t e r n a l requirements, r e q u i r e m e n t s , international i n t e r n a t i o n a l standards s t a n d a r d s and a n d best b e s t practices, p r a c t i c e s , established e s t a b l i s h e d company c o m p a n y requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s to t o barriers b a r r i e r s for f o r O&G O & G facilities f a c i l i t i e s classified c l a s s i f i e d as a s performance p e r f o r m a n c e requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s and a n d sorted s o r t e d by b y performance p e r f o r m a n c e standards s t a n d a r d s (PS). ( P S ) . The T h e company c o m p a n y performance p e r f o r m a n c e standards s t a n d a r d s for f o r O&G O & G offshore o f f s h o r e facilities f a c i l i t i e s are a r e provided p r o v i d e d in i n TR1055. T R 1 0 5 5 . Relevant R e l e v a n t performance p e r f o r m a n c e standard s t a n d a r d definitions d e f i n i t i o n s are a r e used u s e d in i n this t h i s safety s a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r the t h e OSS O S S in i n order o r d e r to t o provide p r o v i d e a a comparable c o m p a r a b l e basis b a s i s towards t o w a r d s the t h e standardized s t a n d a r d i z e d barrier b a r r i e r definitions d e f i n i t i o n s within w i t h i n the t h e Company, C o m p a n y , see s e e Table T a b l e 3. 3 . The T h e role r o l e and a n d need n e e d for f o r barriers b a r r i e r s according a c c o r d i n g to t o this t h i s structure s t r u c t u r e are a r e provided p r o v i d e d in i n chapter c h a p t e r 6. 6 . Table T a b l e 3 3 Performance P e r f o r m a n c e Standards S t a n d a r d s (PS) ( P S ) for f o r the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n # # Barriers B a r r i e r s # # Barriers B a r r i e r s PS1 P S 1 Containment C o n t a i n m e n t PS13 P S 1 3 Alarm A l a r m and a n d Communication C o m m u n i c a t i o n System S y s t e m for f o r use u s e in i n Emergency E m e r g e n c y Situations S i t u a t i o n s PS2 P S 2 Natural N a t u r a l ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n and a n d HVAC H V A C PS14 P S 1 4 Escape, E s c a p e , Evacuation E v a c u a t i o n and a n d Rescue R e s c u e (EER) ( E E R ) PS3 P S 3 Leak L e a k detection d e t e c t i o n PS15 P S 1 5 Layout L a y o u t Design D e s i g n Principles P r i n c i p l e s and a n d Explosion E x p l o s i o n Barriers B a r r i e r s PS4 P S 4 Emergency E m e r g e n c y Shut S h u t Down D o w n (ESD) ( E S D ) PS16A P S 1 6 A Offshore O f f s h o r e cranes c r a n e s PS5 P S 5 Open O p e n drain d r a i n PS16B P S 1 6 B N/A N / A PS6 P S 6 Ignition I g n i t i o n source s o u r c e control c o n t r o l PS17A P S 1 7 A N/A N / A PS7 P S 7 Fire F i r e Detection D e t e c t i o n PS17B P S 1 7 B N/A N / A PS8 P S 8 N/A N / A PS18 P S 1 8 N/A N / A PS9 P S 9 Active A c t i v e Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n PS19 P S 1 9 Avoidance A v o i d a n c e of o f vessel v e s s e l collisions c o l l i s i o n s PS10 P S 1 0 Passive P a s s i v e Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n PS20 P S 2 0 Structural S t r u c t u r a l integrity i n t e g r i t y PS11 P S 1 1 Emergency E m e r g e n c y Power P o w e r and a n d Lightning L i g h t n i n g PS22 P S 2 2 Human H u m a n Machine M a c h i n e Interface I n t e r f a c e and a n d Alarm A l a r m Management M a n a g e m e n t PS12 P S 1 2 Process P r o c e s s Safety S a f e t y PS23 P S 2 3 Safety S a f e t y & & automation a u t o m a t i o n system s y s t e m security s e c u r i t y Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 17 1 7 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 4 4 Hazard H a z a r d identification i d e n t i f i c a t i o n The T h e following f o l l o w i n g hazards h a z a r d s have h a v e been b e e n identified i d e n t i f i e d at a t current c u r r e n t stage s t a g e of o f the t h e project, p r o j e c t , ref r e f Table T a b l e 4. 4 . The T h e hazards h a z a r d s are a r e further f u r t h e r detailed d e t a i l e d and a n d evaluated e v a l u a t e d in i n doc.ref. d o c . r e f . C274-RA-S-RA-01002 C 2 7 4 - R A - S - R A - 0 1 0 0 2 – – FEED F E E D HAZID H A Z I D report. r e p o r t . The T h e hazards h a z a r d s in i n the t h e FEED F E E D report r e p o r t are a r e referenced r e f e r e n c e d to t o as a s “FEED “ F E E D [n]” [ n ] ” in i n table t a b l e 4 4 hazard h a z a r d description. d e s c r i p t i o n . Table T a b l e 4 4 Hazard H a z a r d identification i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ID I D Hazard H a z a r d PS P S 1 1 Ship S h i p collision c o l l i s i o n with w i t h Service S e r v i c e Operation O p e r a t i o n Vessel V e s s e l (SOV), ( S O V ) , Crew C r e w Transfer T r a n s f e r Vessel V e s s e l (CTV), ( C T V ) , fishing f i s h i n g vessel v e s s e l or o r 19, 1 9 , 20 2 0 passing p a s s i n g merchant m e r c h a n t vessel v e s s e l - - FEED F E E D [3, [ 3 , 48] 4 8 ] 2 2 SOV S O V loss l o s s position p o s i t i o n causing c a u s i n g gangway g a n g w a y impact i m p a c t to t o critical c r i t i c a l equipment/structures e q u i p m e n t / s t r u c t u r e s or o r personnel p e r s o n n e l – – FEED F E E D 15, 1 5 , 19 1 9 [25] [ 2 5 ] 3 3 Explosion E x p l o s i o n as a s result r e s u l t of o f internal i n t e r n a l arcing a r c i n g fault f a u l t in i n oil o i l filled f i l l e d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s and a n d rupture/release r u p t u r e / r e l e a s e of o f explosive e x p l o s i v e 15 1 5 gas g a s and a n d oil o i l mist m i s t – – FEED F E E D [1, [ 1 , 10, 1 0 , 11, 1 1 , 12, 1 2 , 21, 2 1 , 22, 2 2 , 41] 4 1 ] 4 4 Fire F i r e in i n or o r around a r o u n d oil o i l filled f i l l e d transformers. t r a n s f o r m e r s . Heat H e a t or o r toxic t o x i c smoke s m o k e exposure e x p o s u r e to t o personnel p e r s o n n e l – – FEED F E E D [1, [ 1 , 29, 2 9 , 5, 5 , 7, 7 , 10, 1 0 , 30] 3 0 ] 14, 1 4 , 15 1 5 5 5 Fire F i r e in i n electrical e l e c t r i c a l systems s y s t e m s (short ( s h o r t circuit, c i r c u i t , overload, o v e r l o a d , malfunction m a l f u n c t i o n of o f equipment). e q u i p m e n t ) . Heat H e a t or o r toxic t o x i c smoke s m o k e 7, 7 , 10, 1 0 , 12, 1 2 , exposure e x p o s u r e to t o personnel p e r s o n n e l - - FEED F E E D [7, [ 7 , 10, 1 0 , 11, 1 1 , 12, 1 2 , 22, 2 2 , 29, 2 9 , 30, 3 0 , 39, 3 9 , 40, 4 0 , 41] 4 1 ] 14,15 1 4 , 1 5 6 6 Fire F i r e in i n hydrocarbon h y d r o c a r b o n systems s y s t e m s (Hydraulic ( H y d r a u l i c Oils, O i l s , diesel d i e s e l engine, e n g i n e , etc.). e t c . ) . Heat H e a t or o r toxic t o x i c smoke s m o k e exposure e x p o s u r e to t o 5, 5 , 7, 7 , 10, 1 0 , personnel p e r s o n n e l – – FEED F E E D [17, [ 1 7 , 29, 2 9 , 30, 3 0 , 36] 3 6 ] 12, 1 2 , 15 1 5 7 7 Explosion E x p l o s i o n due d u e to t o explosive e x p l o s i v e atmosphere a t m o s p h e r e from f r o m battery b a t t e r y hydrogen h y d r o g e n release r e l e a s e – – FEED F E E D [20] [ 2 0 ] 2, 2 , 3, 3 , 6 6 8 8 Oxygen O x y g e n deprivation d e p r i v a t i o n / / asphyxia a s p h y x i a and a n d greenhouse g r e e n h o u s e gas g a s release r e l e a s e due d u e to t o leaks l e a k s of o f SF6 S F 6 from f r o m gas-insulated g a s - i n s u l a t e d 2, 2 , 3 3 switchgear s w i t c h g e a r (GIS) ( G I S ) and a n d gas-insulated g a s - i n s u l a t e d busbars b u s b a r s (GIB), ( G I B ) , e.g. e . g . inert i n e r t gas g a s for f o r fire f i r e suppression. s u p p r e s s i o n . – – FEED F E E D [13] [ 1 3 ] 9 9 Handling H a n d l i n g / / exposure e x p o s u r e to t o SF6 S F 6 decomposition d e c o m p o s i t i o n products p r o d u c t s after a f t e r internal i n t e r n a l arc a r c fault. f a u l t . – – FEED F E E D [13] [ 1 3 ] 2 2 10 1 0 Dropped D r o p p e d objects o b j e c t s – – FEED F E E D [4, [ 4 , 5, 5 , 6] 6 ] 15, 1 5 , 16A 1 6 A 11 1 1 Man M a n overboard o v e r b o a r d – – FEED F E E D [11] [ 1 1 ] 14 1 4 12 1 2 Loss L o s s of o f containment c o n t a i n m e n t / / spills s p i l l s to t o environment e n v i r o n m e n t – – FEED F E E D [17, [ 1 7 , 37] 3 7 ] 1, 1 , 3 3 13 1 3 Hurricane H u r r i c a n e / / adverse a d v e r s e weather w e a t h e r - - FEED F E E D [49] [ 4 9 ] 20 2 0 14 1 4 Accumulation A c c u m u l a t i o n of o f snow s n o w and a n d ice i c e – – FEED F E E D [44, [ 4 4 , 49, 4 9 , 50] 5 0 ] 2 2 15 1 5 Security S e c u r i t y incidents i n c i d e n t s – – FEED F E E D [27] [ 2 7 ] 15, 1 5 , 23 2 3 16 1 6 Global G l o b a l structural s t r u c t u r a l failure f a i l u r e 20 2 0 17 1 7 Personnel P e r s o n n e l injury i n j u r y due d u e to t o electric e l e c t r i c shock s h o c k – – FEED F E E D [7, [ 7 , 10, 1 0 , 11, 1 1 , 12, 1 2 , 27] 2 7 ] 14 1 4 18 1 8 Personnel P e r s o n n e l injury i n j u r y due d u e to t o material m a t e r i a l handling h a n d l i n g - - FEED F E E D [4, [ 4 , 5, 5 , 6] 6 ] 15 1 5 19 1 9 Excessive E x c e s s i v e buildup b u i l d u p of o f bird b i r d guano g u a n o – – FEED F E E D [45] [ 4 5 ] 14, 1 4 , 20 2 0 20 2 0 Helicopter H e l i c o p t e r winching w i n c h i n g incidents i n c i d e n t s – – FEED F E E D [26] [ 2 6 ] 15 1 5 21 2 1 Loss L o s s of o f communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n systems s y s t e m s – – FEED F E E D [31] [ 3 1 ] 4, 4 , 22 2 2 22 2 2 Failure F a i l u r e of o f alarm a l a r m management m a n a g e m e n t – – FEED F E E D [42] [ 4 2 ] 22 2 2 5 5 Risk R i s k and a n d consequence c o n s e q u e n c e description d e s c r i p t i o n This T h i s section s e c t i o n provides p r o v i d e s a a description d e s c r i p t i o n of o f the t h e risks r i s k s and a n d consequences c o n s e q u e n c e s related r e l a t e d to t o the t h e hazards h a z a r d s identified i d e n t i f i e d in i n section s e c t i o n 4. 4 . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 18 1 8 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 5.1 5 . 1 Ship S h i p collision c o l l i s i o n and a n d vessel v e s s e l loss l o s s of o f position p o s i t i o n Ship S h i p collision c o l l i s i o n with w i t h Service S e r v i c e Operation O p e r a t i o n Vessel V e s s e l (SOV), ( S O V ) , Crew C r e w Transfer T r a n s f e r Vessel V e s s e l (CTV), ( C T V ) , fishing f i s h i n g vessel v e s s e l or o r passing p a s s i n g merchant m e r c h a n t vessel. v e s s e l . Collision C o l l i s i o n may m a y happen h a p p e n during d u r i n g vessel v e s s e l approach a p p r o a c h to t o transfer t r a n s f e r people p e o p l e via v i a walk w a l k to t o work w o r k bridge, b r i d g e , boat b o a t landing l a n d i n g or o r for f o r cargo c a r g o handling. h a n d l i n g . Reason R e a s o n for f o r collision c o l l i s i o n may m a y be b e operator o p e r a t o r failure, f a i l u r e , failure f a i l u r e of o f dynamic d y n a m i c position p o s i t i o n system, s y s t e m , vessel v e s s e l steering s t e e r i n g system s y s t e m or o r propulsion p r o p u l s i o n system, s y s t e m , e.g. e . g . black-out b l a c k - o u t of o f machinery. m a c h i n e r y . Consequences C o n s e q u e n c e s may m a y be b e damage d a m a g e to t o CTV/SOV C T V / S O V which w h i c h may m a y affect a f f e c t stability s t a b i l i t y and a n d floatability f l o a t a b i l i t y of o f the t h e CTV/SOV. C T V / S O V . Personnel P e r s o n n e l injuries i n j u r i e s and a n d personnel p e r s o n n e l into i n t o water w a t e r may m a y be b e a a result. r e s u l t . CTV’s/SOV C T V ’ s / S O V (minimum ( m i n i m u m of o f 3 3 CTVs C T V s across a c r o s s the t h e two t w o sites) s i t e s ) will w i l l usually u s u a l l y be b e the t h e only o n l y vessels v e s s e l s from f r o m the t h e operator o p e r a t o r on o n the t h e field f i e l d and a n d assistance a s s i s t a n c e may m a y be b e left l e f t to t o randomly r a n d o m l y passing p a s s i n g vessels v e s s e l s and a n d national n a t i o n a l rescue r e s c u e organization(s). o r g a n i z a t i o n ( s ) . SOV S O V loss l o s s of o f position p o s i t i o n causing c a u s i n g gangway g a n g w a y impact i m p a c t to t o critical c r i t i c a l equipment/structures e q u i p m e n t / s t r u c t u r e s or o r personnel p e r s o n n e l Loss L o s s of o f position p o s i t i o n before b e f o r e the t h e gangway g a n g w a y is i s in i n position p o s i t i o n may m a y cause c a u s e hit h i t of o f structure s t r u c t u r e which w h i c h may m a y be b e damaged. d a m a g e d . It I t may m a y be b e risk r i s k that t h a t the t h e W2W W 2 W bridge b r i d g e is i s impacted i m p a c t e d too. t o o . If I f vessel v e s s e l loss l o s s of o f position p o s i t i o n occurs o c c u r s when w h e n bridge b r i d g e is i s in i n position p o s i t i o n it i t can c a n be b e risk r i s k to t o personnel p e r s o n n e l using u s i n g the t h e bridge b r i d g e or o r entering e n t e r i n g the t h e bridge. b r i d g e . 5.2 5 . 2 Explosion E x p l o s i o n hazards h a z a r d s Explosion E x p l o s i o n as a s result r e s u l t of o f internal i n t e r n a l arcing a r c i n g fault f a u l t in i n oil o i l filled f i l l e d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s and a n d rupture/release r u p t u r e / r e l e a s e of o f explosive e x p l o s i v e gas g a s and a n d oil o i l mist m i s t Internal I n t e r n a l electrical e l e c t r i c a l fault f a u l t creates c r e a t e s a a high h i g h heat h e a t spot s p o t decomposing d e c o m p o s i n g mineral m i n e r a l cooling c o o l i n g oil o i l into i n t o flammable f l a m m a b l e gas g a s products. p r o d u c t s . The T h e explosion e x p l o s i o n pressure p r e s s u r e of o f ignited i g n i t e d released r e l e a s e d gas g a s and a n d oil o i l mist m i s t has h a s the t h e potential p o t e n t i a l to t o influence i n f l u e n c e the t h e building b u i l d i n g structure s t r u c t u r e surrounding s u r r o u n d i n g the t h e transformers. t r a n s f o r m e r s . Liquid L i q u i d leaks l e a k s from f r o m the t h e transformer t r a n s f o r m e r can c a n be b e expected. e x p e c t e d . Explosion E x p l o s i o n due d u e to t o explosive e x p l o s i v e atmosphere a t m o s p h e r e from f r o m battery b a t t e r y hydrogen h y d r o g e n release r e l e a s e Charging C h a r g i n g of o f batteries b a t t e r i e s can c a n cause c a u s e release r e l e a s e of o f hydrogen. h y d r o g e n . The T h e potential p o t e n t i a l for f o r release r e l e a s e is i s dependent d e p e n d e n t on o n battery b a t t e r y type. t y p e . Ignition I g n i t i o n of o f hydrogen h y d r o g e n gas g a s leads l e a d s to t o explosion e x p l o s i o n inside i n s i d e the t h e battery b a t t e r y room. r o o m . Explosion E x p l o s i o n due d u e to t o faults f a u l t s in i n electrical e l e c t r i c a l equipment e q u i p m e n t Faults F a u l t s in i n high-voltage h i g h - v o l t a g e equipment e q u i p m e n t can c a n be b e developing d e v e l o p i n g fast f a s t and a n d cause c a u s e an a n explosion e x p l o s i o n damaging d a m a g i n g equipment e q u i p m e n t and a n d harm h a r m people. p e o p l e . 5.3 5 . 3 Fire F i r e hazards h a z a r d s Fire F i r e in i n or o r around a r o u n d oil o i l filled f i l l e d transformers. t r a n s f o r m e r s . Heat H e a t or o r toxic t o x i c smoke s m o k e exposure e x p o s u r e to t o personnel p e r s o n n e l Fire F i r e may m a y start s t a r t in i n transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s cooling c o o l i n g liquid l i q u i d (oil) ( o i l ) as a s result r e s u l t of o f internal i n t e r n a l arcing a r c i n g fault. f a u l t . Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r fires f i r e s may m a y be b e more m o r e rapid r a p i d and a n d develop d e v e l o p quickly, q u i c k l y , mainly m a i n l y because b e c a u s e of o f the t h e high h i g h voltage v o l t a g e and a n d that t h a t the t h e cooling c o o l i n g liquid l i q u i d is i s involved. i n v o l v e d . Fire F i r e in i n electrical e l e c t r i c a l systems s y s t e m s (short ( s h o r t circuit, c i r c u i t , overload, o v e r l o a d , malfunction m a l f u n c t i o n of o f equipment). e q u i p m e n t ) . Heat H e a t or o r toxic t o x i c smoke s m o k e exposure e x p o s u r e to t o personnel p e r s o n n e l A A fire f i r e may m a y start s t a r t due d u e to t o development d e v e l o p m e n t of o f high h i g h temperature t e m p e r a t u r e in i n components, c o m p o n e n t s , faults f a u l t s or o r short-circuit. s h o r t - c i r c u i t . Some S o m e fires f i r e s may m a y start s t a r t slowly s l o w l y and a n d take t a k e some s o m e time t i m e to t o develop. d e v e l o p . Faults F a u l t s in i n high-voltage h i g h - v o l t a g e equipment e q u i p m e n t can c a n be b e developing d e v e l o p i n g fast. f a s t . The T h e OSS O S S is i s configured c o n f i g u r e d in i n a a 2 2 x x 50% 5 0 % configuration. c o n f i g u r a t i o n . If I f a a fire f i r e is i s contained c o n t a i n e d within w i t h i n one o n e train t r a i n the t h e power p o w e r export e x p o r t can c a n continue c o n t i n u e with w i t h reduced r e d u c e d capacity c a p a c i t y from f r o m the t h e other o t h e r power p o w e r train t r a i n which w h i c h is i s not n o t affected a f f e c t e d by b y the t h e fire. f i r e . Spread S p r e a d of o f a a fire f i r e on o n the t h e OSS O S S will w i l l stop s t o p the t h e power p o w e r export e x p o r t from f r o m the t h e OSS O S S and a n d from f r o m the t h e whole w h o l e wind w i n d farm. f a r m . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 19 1 9 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : The T h e OSS’s O S S ’ s are a r e remotely r e m o t e l y operated o p e r a t e d from f r o m the t h e onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l centre c e n t r e by b y the t h e SCADA S C A D A system. s y s t e m . The T h e OSS O S S may m a y have h a v e accessibility a c c e s s i b i l i t y limitations l i m i t a t i o n s depending d e p e n d i n g on o n weather w e a t h e r conditions. c o n d i t i o n s . This T h i s may m a y cause c a u s e delays d e l a y s in i n entering, e n t e r i n g , inspecting i n s p e c t i n g and a n d rectifying r e c t i f y i n g damages d a m a g e s caused c a u s e d by b y even e v e n a a small s m a l l fire. f i r e . Fire F i r e in i n hydrocarbon h y d r o c a r b o n systems s y s t e m s (Hydraulic ( H y d r a u l i c Oils, O i l s , diesel d i e s e l engine, e n g i n e , etc.). e t c . ) . Other O t h e r causes c a u s e s of o f fire f i r e are a r e fire f i r e in i n diesel d i e s e l equipment e q u i p m e n t including i n c l u d i n g emergency e m e r g e n c y generators, g e n e r a t o r s , fire f i r e in i n shelter s h e l t e r area, a r e a , storage s t o r a g e rooms r o o m s etc. e t c . Risk R i s k to t o personnel p e r s o n n e l is i s heat h e a t or o r toxic t o x i c smoke, s m o k e , and a n d potential p o t e n t i a l for f o r loss l o s s of o f escape e s c a p e route r o u t e when w h e n the t h e OSS O S S is i s manned. m a n n e d . 5.4 5 . 4 Insulation I n s u l a t i o n gas g a s (SF6) ( S F 6 ) hazards h a z a r d s Oxygen O x y g e n deprivation d e p r i v a t i o n / / asphyxia a s p h y x i a and a n d greenhouse g r e e n h o u s e gas g a s release r e l e a s e due d u e to t o leaks l e a k s of o f SF6 S F 6 from f r o m gas-insulated g a s - i n s u l a t e d switchgear s w i t c h g e a r (GIS) ( G I S ) and a n d gas-insulated g a s - i n s u l a t e d busbars b u s b a r s (GIB) ( G I B ) SF6 S F 6 is i s used u s e d as a s an a n insulation i n s u l a t i o n gas g a s in i n high h i g h voltage v o l t a g e switchboards, s w i t c h b o a r d s , breakers b r e a k e r s and a n d to t o segregate s e g r e g a t e electrical e l e c t r i c a l leads l e a d s to t o allow a l l o w for f o r low l o w spacing s p a c i n g between b e t w e e n electrical e l e c t r i c a l leads. l e a d s . The T h e gas g a s is i s not n o t harmful h a r m f u l to t o personnel p e r s o n n e l except e x c e p t for f o r the t h e risk r i s k of o f asphyxiation a s p h y x i a t i o n in i n case c a s e of o f leaks l e a k s in i n closed c l o s e d spaces, s p a c e s , but b u t SF6 S F 6 is i s one o n e of o f the t h e most m o s t potent p o t e n t greenhouse g r e e n h o u s e gases g a s e s with w i t h a a high h i g h global g l o b a l warming w a r m i n g potential p o t e n t i a l (GWP=22.000 ( G W P = 2 2 . 0 0 0 vs v s CO C O 2 2 =1). = 1 ) . The T h e density d e n s i t y of o f SF6 S F 6 gas g a s is i s considerably c o n s i d e r a b l y higher h i g h e r than t h a n the t h e density d e n s i t y of o f air a i r and a n d will w i l l accumulate a c c u m u l a t e in i n the t h e lower l o w e r parts p a r t s of o f an a n area. a r e a . Handling H a n d l i n g / / exposure e x p o s u r e to t o SF6 S F 6 decomposition d e c o m p o s i t i o n products p r o d u c t s after a f t e r internal i n t e r n a l arc a r c fault. f a u l t . SF6 S F 6 decomposes d e c o m p o s e s into i n t o toxic t o x i c products p r o d u c t s in i n the t h e form f o r m of o f a a fine f i n e dust d u s t if i f the t h e SF6 S F 6 is i s exposed e x p o s e d to t o high h i g h voltage v o l t a g e sparks. s p a r k s . This T h i s can c a n happen h a p p e n if i f there t h e r e is i s a a fault f a u l t in i n the t h e equipment e q u i p m e n t protected p r o t e c t e d by b y SF6 S F 6 or o r in i n case c a s e of o f a a short s h o r t circuit c i r c u i t in i n the t h e equipment. e q u i p m e n t . The T h e decomposed d e c o m p o s e d products p r o d u c t s should s h o u l d be b e contained c o n t a i n e d inside i n s i d e the t h e equipment e q u i p m e n t enclosure e n c l o s u r e and a n d in i n such s u c h case c a s e the t h e cleaning c l e a n i n g can c a n be b e performed p e r f o r m e d in i n a a controlled c o n t r o l l e d manner. m a n n e r . However, H o w e v e r , there t h e r e is i s no n o guarantee g u a r a n t e e that t h a t the t h e equipment e q u i p m e n t enclosure e n c l o s u r e resists r e s i s t s the t h e overpressure o v e r p r e s s u r e caused c a u s e d by b y the t h e high h i g h voltage v o l t a g e short-circuit s h o r t - c i r c u i t and a n d the t h e decomposed d e c o m p o s e d products p r o d u c t s can c a n enter e n t e r the t h e room r o o m where w h e r e the t h e equipment e q u i p m e n t is i s located, l o c a t e d , or o r it i t can c a n be b e released r e l e a s e d to t o the t h e environment e n v i r o n m e n t if i f used u s e d in i n outdoor o u t d o o r equipment. e q u i p m e n t . 5.5 5 . 5 Other O t h e r hazards h a z a r d s Dropped D r o p p e d objects o b j e c t s Material M a t e r i a l handling h a n d l i n g from f r o m CTV C T V to t o OSS O S S is i s performed p e r f o r m e d by b y the t h e davit d a v i t crane c r a n e on o n OSS. O S S . Dropped D r o p p e d load l o a d may m a y drop d r o p onto o n t o CTV. C T V . Material M a t e r i a l handling h a n d l i n g between b e t w e e n deck d e c k levels l e v e l s on o n OSS O S S will w i l l be b e by b y crane c r a n e lifting l i f t i n g between b e t w e e n laydown l a y d o w n areas a r e a s mainly m a i n l y above a b o v e sea. s e a . Main M a i n risk r i s k for f o r dropped d r o p p e d object o b j e c t on o n OSS O S S is i s related r e l a t e d to t o maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e tasks t a s k s when w h e n equipment e q u i p m e n t is i s lifted l i f t e d internally i n t e r n a l l y on o n the t h e OSS. O S S . Man M a n overboard o v e r b o a r d Personnel P e r s o n n e l entering e n t e r i n g from f r o m CTV C T V will w i l l use u s e fall f a l l arrest a r r e s t system s y s t e m to t o prevent p r e v e n t them t h e m from f r o m falling f a l l i n g into i n t o sea s e a from f r o m the t h e ladder. l a d d e r . Onboard O n b o a r d OSS O S S handrails h a n d r a i l s will w i l l be b e installed i n s t a l l e d at a t the t h e perimeter p e r i m e t e r of o f the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n protecting p r o t e c t i n g personnel p e r s o n n e l from f r o m falling f a l l i n g to t o sea. s e a . Gates G a t e s for f o r W2W W 2 W access a c c e s s are a r e installed i n s t a l l e d in i n the t h e handrail h a n d r a i l at a t the t h e bridge b r i d g e landing l a n d i n g area a r e a and a n d secured. s e c u r e d . In I n case c a s e of o f accident a c c i d e n t with w i t h man m a n overboard o v e r b o a r d there t h e r e is i s no n o man m a n overboard o v e r b o a r d boat b o a t (MOB) ( M O B ) located l o c a t e d on o n OSS O S S to t o assist. a s s i s t . The T h e CTV C T V is i s in i n the t h e field f i e l d and a n d will w i l l act a c t as a s a a MOB M O B vessel v e s s e l in i n a a man m a n overboard o v e r b o a r d situation. s i t u a t i o n . When W h e n SOV S O V is i s in i n the t h e field f i e l d the t h e MOB M O B vessel v e s s e l on o n SOV S O V is i s used. u s e d . Loss L o s s of o f containment c o n t a i n m e n t / / spills s p i l l s to t o environment e n v i r o n m e n t Extreme E x t r e m e weather w e a t h e r event e v e n t (storm, ( s t o r m , hurricane) h u r r i c a n e ) threatening t h r e a t e n i n g structural s t r u c t u r a l integrity i n t e g r i t y and a n d leading l e a d i n g to t o potential p o t e n t i a l material m a t e r i a l damage d a m a g e and a n d spill s p i l l to t o environment. e n v i r o n m e n t . Liquid L i q u i d spills s p i l l s can c a n be b e transformer t r a n s f o r m e r cooling c o o l i n g oil o i l and a n d diesel. d i e s e l . Gas G a s spills s p i l l s can c a n be b e leaks l e a k s of o f gas g a s used u s e d for f o r electrical e l e c t r i c a l insulation, i n s u l a t i o n , e.g. e . g . SF6 S F 6 type t y p e gas. g a s . Hurricane H u r r i c a n e / / adverse a d v e r s e weather w e a t h e r Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 20 2 0 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : OSS O S S is i s unmanned u n m a n n e d installation i n s t a l l a t i o n and a n d personnel p e r s o n n e l shall s h a l l not n o t be b e present p r e s e n t if i f weather w e a t h e r forecast f o r e c a s t predicts p r e d i c t s bad b a d weather. w e a t h e r . During D u r i n g planned p l a n n e d visits v i s i t s it i t is i s a a possibility p o s s i b i l i t y that t h a t weather w e a t h e r may m a y worsen w o r s e n and a n d prevent p r e v e n t CTV C T V from f r o m collecting c o l l e c t i n g the t h e personnel. p e r s o n n e l . In I n such s u c h case c a s e personnel p e r s o n n e l is i s left l e f t on o n OSS O S S until u n t i l weather w e a t h e r improves i m p r o v e s or o r picked p i c k e d up u p by b y other o t h e r means. m e a n s . Accumulation A c c u m u l a t i o n of o f snow s n o w and a n d ice i c e There T h e r e is i s the t h e possibility p o s s i b i l i t y of o f ice i c e collecting c o l l e c t i n g on o n access a c c e s s ladders, l a d d e r s , jacket j a c k e t structure, s t r u c t u r e , communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n tower t o w e r etc. e t c . in i n cold c o l d climates c l i m a t e s (both ( b o t h atmospheric a t m o s p h e r i c and a n d sea s e a spray s p r a y icing). i c i n g ) . Potential P o t e n t i a l consequences c o n s e q u e n c e s of o f ice i c e collection c o l l e c t i o n and a n d potential p o t e n t i a l drop d r o p of o f ice i c e include i n c l u d e equipment e q u i p m e n t damage, d a m a g e , injuries i n j u r i e s to t o personnel/third p e r s o n n e l / t h i r d parties p a r t i e s who w h o may m a y be b e in i n the t h e area, a r e a , issues i s s u e s accessing a c c e s s i n g OSS O S S for f o r maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e etc. e t c . Security S e c u r i t y incidents i n c i d e n t s OSS O S S is i s accessible a c c e s s i b l e by b y the t h e boat b o a t landing l a n d i n g (ladder ( l a d d e r from f r o m sea s e a level) l e v e l ) up u p to t o and a n d including i n c l u d i n g the t h e cellar c e l l a r deck. d e c k . Intruder I n t r u d e r protection p r o t e c t i o n is i s installed i n s t a l l e d at a t cellar c e l l a r deck d e c k to t o prevent p r e v e n t access a c c e s s to t o other o t h e r areas a r e a s of o f the t h e OSS. O S S . It I t should s h o u l d be b e assumed a s s u m e d that t h a t people p e o p l e who w h o intend i n t e n d to t o pass p a s s the t h e intruder i n t r u d e r barrier b a r r i e r are a r e authorised a u t h o r i s e d as a s competent c o m p e t e n t to t o pass p a s s it. i t . Global G l o b a l structural s t r u c t u r a l failure f a i l u r e Global G l o b a l structural s t r u c t u r a l failure f a i l u r e is i s related r e l a t e d to t o main m a i n load l o a d bearing b e a r i n g structure s t r u c t u r e for f o r substructure s u b s t r u c t u r e and a n d topside. t o p s i d e . Types T y p e s of o f incidents i n c i d e n t s which w h i c h can c a n cause c a u s e failure f a i l u r e are: a r e : 1. 1 . Structure S t r u c t u r e is i s not n o t strong s t r o n g enough e n o u g h either e i t h e r due d u e to t o its i t s size, s i z e , shape, s h a p e , or o r choice c h o i c e of o f materials. m a t e r i a l s . Catastrophic C a t a s t r o p h i c failure f a i l u r e can c a n occur o c c u r if i f stressed s t r e s s e d beyond b e y o n d its i t s critical c r i t i c a l stress s t r e s s level. l e v e l . 2. 2 . Fatigue F a t i g u e or o r corrosion c o r r o s i o n caused c a u s e d by b y instability i n s t a b i l i t y in i n the t h e structure’s s t r u c t u r e ’ s geometry, g e o m e t r y , design d e s i g n or o r material m a t e r i a l properties. p r o p e r t i e s . These T h e s e failures f a i l u r e s usually u s u a l l y begin b e g i n when w h e n cracks c r a c k s form f o r m at a t stress s t r e s s points. p o i n t s . 3. 3 . Manufacturing M a n u f a c t u r i n g errors, e r r o r s , including i n c l u d i n g improper i m p r o p e r selection s e l e c t i o n of o f materials, m a t e r i a l s , incorrect i n c o r r e c t sizing, s i z i n g , improper i m p r o p e r heat h e a t tracing t r a c i n g (heat ( h e a t treatment), t r e a t m e n t ) , failure f a i l u r e to t o adhere a d h e r e to t o design, d e s i g n , or o r poor p o o r workmanship. w o r k m a n s h i p . Can C a n occur o c c u r at a t any a n y time t i m e and a n d is i s usually u s u a l l y unpredictable. u n p r e d i c t a b l e . 4. 4 . Use U s e of o f defective d e f e c t i v e materials. m a t e r i a l s . Unpredictable U n p r e d i c t a b l e since s i n c e the t h e material m a t e r i a l may m a y have h a v e been b e e n improperly i m p r o p e r l y manufactured m a n u f a c t u r e d or o r damaged d a m a g e d from f r o m prior p r i o r use u s e (Prior ( P r i o r use u s e not n o t relevant r e l e v a n t when w h e n new n e w manufactured m a n u f a c t u r e d materials m a t e r i a l s are a r e used?). u s e d ? ) . 5. 5 . Lack L a c k of o f consideration c o n s i d e r a t i o n of o f unexpected u n e x p e c t e d problems. p r o b l e m s . E.g., E . g . , sabotage, s a b o t a g e , natural n a t u r a l disasters. d i s a s t e r s . Can C a n also a l s o occur o c c u r if i f those t h o s e who w h o use u s e and a n d maintain m a i n t a i n the t h e construction c o n s t r u c t i o n are a r e not n o t properly p r o p e r l y trained t r a i n e d and a n d overstress o v e r s t r e s s the t h e structure. s t r u c t u r e . OSS O S S is i s manned m a n n e d only o n l y during d u r i n g maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e periods p e r i o d s and a n d inspections i n s p e c t i o n s which w h i c h reduce r e d u c e the t h e exposure e x p o s u r e of o f personnel p e r s o n n e l in i n an a n event e v e n t of o f global g l o b a l structure s t r u c t u r e failure. f a i l u r e . Personnel P e r s o n n e l injury i n j u r y due d u e to t o electric e l e c t r i c shock s h o c k Procedures P r o c e d u r e s for f o r work w o r k on o n electrical e l e c t r i c a l systems s y s t e m s shall s h a l l be b e in i n place p l a c e to t o ensure e n s u r e systems s y s t e m s are a r e isolated i s o l a t e d and a n d made m a d e voltage v o l t a g e free f r e e before b e f o r e work w o r k is i s started. s t a r t e d . Still S t i l l it i t can c a n be b e inspection i n s p e c t i o n work w o r k or o r failure f a i l u r e to t o follow f o l l o w procedures p r o c e d u r e s which w h i c h cause c a u s e personnel p e r s o n n e l to t o accidentally a c c i d e n t a l l y be b e in i n contact c o n t a c t with w i t h live l i v e equipment. e q u i p m e n t . The T h e consequence c o n s e q u e n c e to t o personnel p e r s o n n e l is i s dependent d e p e n d e n t on o n the t h e voltage v o l t a g e level l e v e l and a n d range r a n g e from f r o m fatality, f a t a l i t y , coma, c o m a , heart h e a r t attack, a t t a c k , burns, b u r n s , tingling t i n g l i n g or o r prickling p r i c k l i n g sensations. s e n s a t i o n s . Personnel P e r s o n n e l injury i n j u r y due d u e to t o material m a t e r i a l handling: h a n d l i n g : A A material m a t e r i a l handling h a n d l i n g report r e p o r t is i s to t o be b e made m a d e up u p taking t a k i n g in i n account a c c o u n t the t h e human h u m a n interface i n t e r f a c e with w i t h handling h a n d l i n g of o f the t h e materials. m a t e r i a l s . Were W e r e cranage c r a n a g e is i s needed, n e e d e d , the t h e aid a i d is i s to t o be b e provided p r o v i d e d for f o r that t h a t area. a r e a . Bird B i r d guano: g u a n o : Bird B i r d deterrent d e t e r r e n t systems s y s t e m s are a r e to t o be b e provided p r o v i d e d reducing r e d u c i n g the t h e risk r i s k of o f bird b i r d guano g u a n o contamination. c o n t a m i n a t i o n . Bird B i r d guano g u a n o build b u i l d up u p can c a n result r e s u l t in i n an a n unsafe u n s a f e area a r e a (slippery ( s l i p p e r y and/or a n d / o r contamination) c o n t a m i n a t i o n ) and/or a n d / o r corrosion. c o r r o s i o n . Helicopter H e l i c o p t e r winching: w i n c h i n g : Medical M e d i c a l evacuation e v a c u a t i o n of o f injured i n j u r e d personnel p e r s o n n e l in i n emergency e m e r g e n c y situations s i t u a t i o n s by b y the t h e Coast C o a s t Guard G u a r d is i s infrequent i n f r e q u e n t operations o p e r a t i o n s and a n d will w i l l take t a k e place p l a c e from f r o m the t h e roof r o o f deck. d e c k . Roof R o o f deck d e c k may m a y be b e used u s e d for f o r storage s t o r a g e of o f containers c o n t a i n e r s and a n d there t h e r e is i s located l o c a t e d obstructions o b s t r u c t i o n s for f o r helicopter h e l i c o p t e r operations o p e r a t i o n s like l i k e platform p l a t f o r m crane c r a n e and a n d telecom t e l e c o m mast m a s t to t o be b e considered c o n s i d e r e d by b y helicopter h e l i c o p t e r pilots. p i l o t s . Loss L o s s of o f communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n system: s y s t e m : There T h e r e are a r e two t w o types t y p e s of o f communication. c o m m u n i c a t i o n . The T h e verbal v e r b a l communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n between b e t w e e n OSS O S S personnel p e r s o n n e l and a n d personnel p e r s o n n e l at a t onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l center c e n t e r or o r on o n a a vessel, v e s s e l , and a n d the t h e second s e c o n d type t y p e of o f communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n is i s the t h e data d a t a communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n between b e t w e e n the t h e onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l center c e n t e r and a n d the t h e OSS O S S control c o n t r o l and a n d safety s a f e t y system s y s t e m which w h i c h is i s controlling c o n t r o l l i n g the t h e power p o w e r transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n systems s y s t e m s on o n OSS. O S S . The T h e verbal v e r b a l communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n is i s handled h a n d l e d by b y various v a r i o u s systems s y s t e m s providing p r o v i d i n g back-up b a c k - u p possibilities p o s s i b i l i t i e s if i f one o n e system s y s t e m is i s out. o u t . The T h e data d a t a Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 21 2 1 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n between b e t w e e n offshore o f f s h o r e and a n d onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l and a n d safety s a f e t y systems s y s t e m s may m a y fell f e l l out, o u t , meaning m e a n i n g that t h a t onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l center c e n t e r cannot c a n n o t monitor m o n i t o r the t h e parameters p a r a m e t e r s offshore o f f s h o r e or o r control c o n t r o l them t h e m until u n t i l the t h e communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n is i s restored. r e s t o r e d . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 22 2 2 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 6 6 Offshore O f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n - - Safety S a f e t y strategies s t r a t e g i e s 6.1 6 . 1 Containment C o n t a i n m e n t (PS ( P S 1) 1 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e containment c o n t a i n m e n t function f u n c t i o n shall s h a l l prevent p r e v e n t release r e l e a s e of o f flammable f l a m m a b l e fluids f l u i d s or o r harmful h a r m f u l fluids f l u i d s Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards h a z a r d s • • Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r oil o i l leaks l e a k s • • Diesel D i e s e l leaks l e a k s (machinery, ( m a c h i n e r y , storage, s t o r a g e , and a n d bunkering b u n k e r i n g system) s y s t e m ) • • Hydraulic H y d r a u l i c leaks l e a k s (e.g. ( e . g . from f r o m crane c r a n e and a n d winch) w i n c h ) • • Insulation I n s u l a t i o n gas g a s (SF6) ( S F 6 ) used u s e d on o n gas g a s insulated i n s u l a t e d electrical e l e c t r i c a l equipment e q u i p m e n t Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s All A l l piping, p i p i n g , tanks, t a n k s , valves, v a l v e s , connections, c o n n e c t i o n s , pumps, p u m p s , rotating r o t a t i n g machinery, m a c h i n e r y , instruments, i n s t r u m e n t s , and a n d other o t h e r components c o m p o n e n t s in i n systems s y s t e m s handling h a n d l i n g flammable f l a m m a b l e fluids f l u i d s and/or a n d / o r harmful h a r m f u l fluids f l u i d s (chemicals, ( c h e m i c a l s , toxic t o x i c gases, g a s e s , etc.) e t c . ) shall s h a l l be b e designed, d e s i g n e d , constructed, c o n s t r u c t e d , maintained, m a i n t a i n e d , and a n d operated o p e r a t e d with w i t h the t h e aim a i m to t o avoid a v o i d leaks l e a k s to t o occur. o c c u r . Piping P i p i n g and a n d other o t h e r components c o m p o n e n t s shall s h a l l be b e tagged t a g g e d and a n d marked m a r k e d to t o identify i d e n t i f y fluids f l u i d s and a n d prevent p r e v e n t operational o p e r a t i o n a l errors. e r r o r s . (e.g. ( e . g . gas g a s insulated i n s u l a t e d equipment) e q u i p m e n t ) Casing C a s i n g of o f oil o i l filled f i l l e d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s shall s h a l l be b e of o f robust r o b u s t design. d e s i g n . Ref. R e f . PS12 P S 1 2 for f o r details d e t a i l s on o n transformer t r a n s f o r m e r safety s a f e t y system s y s t e m requirements. r e q u i r e m e n t s . All A l l components c o m p o n e n t s and a n d systems s y s t e m s shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d to t o enable e n a b l e necessary n e c e s s a r y inspection, i n s p e c t i o n , testing t e s t i n g and a n d correction c o r r e c t i o n in i n compliance c o m p l i a n c e with w i t h established e s t a b l i s h e d inspection i n s p e c t i o n program. p r o g r a m . TR1803 T R 1 8 0 3 Hoses H o s e s and a n d couplings c o u p l i n g s DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s - - Rules R u l e s and a n d standards s t a n d a r d s C256-EQ-M-FD-00001 C 2 5 6 - E Q - M - F D - 0 0 0 0 1 Material M a t e r i a l selection s e l e c t i o n Philosophy P h i l o s o p h y – – WTG W T G foundations, f o u n d a t i o n s , Offshore O f f s h o r e Substation S u b s t a t i o n C274-RA-M-RA-01000 C 2 7 4 - R A - M - R A - 0 1 0 0 0 – – MFW M F W – – Material M a t e r i a l Selection S e l e c t i o n and a n d Coating C o a t i n g Report R e p o r t Materials M a t e r i a l s and a n d connections c o n n e c t i o n s used u s e d in i n piping p i p i n g systems s y s t e m s shall s h a l l as a s minimum m i n i m u m meet m e e t the t h e requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s in i n DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 or o r project p r o j e c t specific s p e c i f i c material m a t e r i a l selection s e l e c t i o n report. r e p o r t . Diesel D i e s e l bunkering b u n k e r i n g system. s y s t e m . All A l l hoses h o s e s and a n d connections c o n n e c t i o n s (hose ( h o s e assemblies) a s s e m b l i e s ) shall s h a l l comply c o m p l y with w i t h TR1803. T R 1 8 0 3 . C274-RA-R-FD-01000 C 2 7 4 - R A - R - F D - 0 1 0 0 0 – – MFW M F W – – Mechanical M e c h a n i c a l Design D e s i g n Brief B r i e f Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 23 2 3 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Hose H o s e reel r e e l station: s t a t i o n : The T h e hose h o s e shall s h a l l be b e equipped e q u i p p e d with w i t h quick q u i c k release r e l e a s e auto a u t o close c l o s e connection c o n n e c t i o n on o n the t h e towards t o w a r d s the t h e CTV/SOV. C T V / S O V . The T h e diesel d i e s e l bunkering b u n k e r i n g system s y s t e m shall s h a l l have h a v e integrity i n t e g r i t y towards t o w a r d s the t h e maximum m a x i m u m shut-in s h u t - i n pressure p r e s s u r e of o f the t h e pump p u m p at a t CTV/SOV. C T V / S O V . Diesel D i e s e l lines l i n e s between b e t w e e n bunded b u n d e d areas a r e a s of o f hose h o s e reel r e e l station s t a t i o n and a n d diesel d i e s e l storage s t o r a g e tanks t a n k s shall s h a l l be b e welded. w e l d e d . 6.2 6 . 2 Natural N a t u r a l ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n and a n d HVAC H V A C (PS ( P S 2) 2 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Natural N a t u r a l ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n shall: s h a l l : • • Dilute D i l u t e gas g a s concentrations c o n c e n t r a t i o n s and a n d reduce r e d u c e the t h e size s i z e of o f flammable f l a m m a b l e gas g a s clouds c l o u d s • • Dilute D i l u t e harmful h a r m f u l concentrations c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of o f smoke s m o k e or o r toxic t o x i c gases g a s e s • • Ensure E n s u r e acceptable a c c e p t a b l e working w o r k i n g and a n d equipment e q u i p m e n t environment e n v i r o n m e n t HVAC H V A C shall, s h a l l , with w i t h respect r e s p e c t to t o accidental a c c i d e n t a l events: e v e n t s : • • Provide P r o v i d e smoke s m o k e ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n for f o r internal i n t e r n a l fire f i r e conditions c o n d i t i o n s if i f active a c t i v e smoke s m o k e ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n philosophy p h i l o s o p h y is i s chosen c h o s e n to t o facilitate f a c i l i t a t e safe s a f e escape e s c a p e from f r o m manned m a n n e d areas a r e a s • • Ensure E n s u r e acceptable a c c e p t a b l e equipment e q u i p m e n t environment e n v i r o n m e n t • • Dilute D i l u t e and a n d remove r e m o v e concentrations c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of o f flammable f l a m m a b l e or o r toxic t o x i c gas g a s DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s C274-RA-H-FD-01000 C 2 7 4 - R A - H - F D - 0 1 0 0 0 - - MFW M F W - - HVAC H V A C Design D e s i g n Brief B r i e f Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards h a z a r d s • • Smoke S m o k e generation g e n e r a t i o n from f r o m fire f i r e in i n diesel d i e s e l engine e n g i n e or o r transformer t r a n s f o r m e r area a r e a exposing e x p o s i n g HVAC H V A C inlets i n l e t s to t o spaces s p a c e s with w i t h safety s a f e t y critical c r i t i c a l functions f u n c t i o n s • • Electrical E l e c t r i c a l fires f i r e s within w i t h i n electrical e l e c t r i c a l rooms r o o m s creating c r e a t i n g toxic t o x i c atmosphere a t m o s p h e r e • • Hydrogen H y d r o g e n gas g a s accumulation a c c u m u l a t i o n in i n battery b a t t e r y rooms r o o m s resulting r e s u l t i n g in i n explosive e x p l o s i v e atmosphere a t m o s p h e r e • • Flammable F l a m m a b l e gas g a s accumulation a c c u m u l a t i o n / / oil o i l mist m i s t in i n transformer t r a n s f o r m e r area a r e a in i n the t h e event e v e n t of o f internal i n t e r n a l arch a r c h fault f a u l t and a n d gas g a s leakage l e a k a g e from f r o m transformer t r a n s f o r m e r casing c a s i n g • • Release R e l e a s e of o f decomposed d e c o m p o s e d products p r o d u c t s of o f SF6 S F 6 gas g a s in i n the t h e event e v e n t arc a r c fault f a u l t and a n d burst b u r s t of o f GIS G I S casing c a s i n g Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 24 2 4 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Requirements: R e q u i r e m e n t s : Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r area a r e a Natural N a t u r a l ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n is i s the t h e preferred p r e f e r r e d solution s o l u t i o n for f o r the t h e transformer t r a n s f o r m e r areas. a r e a s . Battery B a t t e r y rooms: r o o m s : Battery B a t t e r y rooms r o o m s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d with w i t h sufficient s u f f i c i e n t ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n to t o maintain m a i n t a i n non-hazardous n o n - h a z a r d o u s status, s t a t u s , forced f o r c e d or o r natural, n a t u r a l , according a c c o r d i n g to t o DNV-ST-0145. D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 . Ventilation V e n t i l a t i o n inlets i n l e t s and a n d outlets o u t l e t s Ventilation V e n t i l a t i o n air a i r inlets i n l e t s serving s e r v i n g shelter s h e l t e r area a r e a and a n d emergency e m e r g e n c y equipment e q u i p m e n t rooms r o o m s shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d such s u c h that t h a t they t h e y are a r e minimally m i n i m a l l y affected a f f e c t e d by b y smoke s m o k e from f r o m on-board o n - b o a r d incidents. i n c i d e n t s . Measures M e a s u r e s shall s h a l l be b e taken t a k e n to t o avoid a v o i d accumulation a c c u m u l a t i o n of o f ice i c e and a n d snow. s n o w . Dampers D a m p e r s Dampers D a m p e r s shall s h a l l provide p r o v i d e quick, q u i c k , reliable r e l i a b l e and a n d effective e f f e c t i v e means m e a n s to t o prevent p r e v e n t ingress i n g r e s s or o r spreading s p r e a d i n g of o f gas g a s or o r smoke. s m o k e . If I f smoke s m o k e is i s detected d e t e c t e d at a t ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n air a i r inlets, i n l e t s , the t h e ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n fan f a n in i n question q u e s t i o n shall s h a l l be b e stopped s t o p p e d and a n d all a l l inlet i n l e t and a n d outlet o u t l e t dampers d a m p e r s closed. c l o s e d . Dampers D a m p e r s and a n d fans f a n s shall s h a l l be b e interlocked i n t e r l o c k e d to t o avoid a v o i d abnormal a b n o r m a l pressure p r e s s u r e configurations. c o n f i g u r a t i o n s . Fire F i r e dampers d a m p e r s shall s h a l l be b e closed c l o s e d automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y by b y signal s i g n a l from f r o m the t h e F&G-system F & G - s y s t e m or o r by b y “fusible “ f u s i b l e link” l i n k ” where w h e r e specified. s p e c i f i e d . If I f release r e l e a s e of o f decomposed d e c o m p o s e d products p r o d u c t s (powder) ( p o w d e r ) of o f SF6 S F 6 gas g a s is i s detected d e t e c t e d (e.g. ( e . g . arc a r c failure f a i l u r e in i n GIS G I S equipment e q u i p m e n t followed f o l l o w e d by b y loss l o s s of o f SF6 S F 6 pressure) p r e s s u r e ) the t h e dampers d a m p e r s in i n the t h e rom r o m shall s h a l l be b e closed c l o s e d to t o prevent p r e v e n t decomposed d e c o m p o s e d products p r o d u c t s to t o be b e distributed d i s t r i b u t e d to t o other o t h e r areas. a r e a s . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 25 2 5 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 6.3 6 . 3 Leak L e a k detection d e t e c t i o n (PS ( P S 3) 3 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e leak l e a k detection d e t e c t i o n system s y s t e m shall s h a l l continuously c o n t i n u o u s l y monitor m o n i t o r for f o r the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of o f flammable f l a m m a b l e or o r toxic t o x i c gases, g a s e s , to t o alert a l e r t personnel p e r s o n n e l and a n d allow a l l o w control c o n t r o l actions a c t i o n s to t o be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d manually m a n u a l l y or o r automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y to t o minimize m i n i m i z e the t h e probability p r o b a b i l i t y of o f explosion, e x p l o s i o n , fire f i r e and a n d acute a c u t e effects e f f e c t s of o f personnel p e r s o n n e l exposure. e x p o s u r e . Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards h a z a r d s • • Hydrogen H y d r o g e n gas g a s accumulation a c c u m u l a t i o n in i n battery b a t t e r y rooms r o o m s resulting r e s u l t i n g in i n explosive e x p l o s i v e atmosphere a t m o s p h e r e • • SF S F 6 6 (or ( o r other o t h e r insulation i n s u l a t i o n gas g a s type) t y p e ) leak l e a k in i n GIS G I S area a r e a or o r GIB G I B resulting r e s u l t i n g in i n potential p o t e n t i a l risk r i s k of o f asphyxiation a s p h y x i a t i o n • • Leak L e a k from f r o m inert i n e r t gas g a s storage s t o r a g e bottles b o t t l e s resulting r e s u l t i n g in i n potential p o t e n t i a l risk r i s k of o f asphyxiation a s p h y x i a t i o n Requirements: R e q u i r e m e n t s : Battery B a t t e r y rooms r o o m s H H 2 2 detection d e t e c t i o n shall s h a l l be b e installed i n s t a l l e d in i n battery b a t t e r y rooms r o o m s if i f dangerous d a n g e r o u s concentrations c o n c e n t r a t i o n s can c a n accumulate. a c c u m u l a t e . • • Single S i n g l e H H 2 2 detection d e t e c t i o n shall s h a l l give g i v e alarm a l a r m in i n onshore o n s h o r e central c e n t r a l control c o n t r o l room r o o m (CCR). ( C C R ) . • • Confirmed C o n f i r m e d H H 2 2 detection d e t e c t i o n in i n the t h e room r o o m shall s h a l l stop s t o p boost b o o s t charging c h a r g i n g of o f batteries b a t t e r i e s (if ( i f applied). a p p l i e d ) . Unless U n l e s s required r e q u i r e d by b y local l o c a l regulation, r e g u l a t i o n , H H 2 2 detectors d e t e c t o r s may m a y be b e omitted o m i t t e d if i f boost b o o s t charging c h a r g i n g (if ( i f applied) a p p l i e d ) is i s interlocked i n t e r l o c k e d with w i t h room r o o m ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n and a n d batteries b a t t e r i e s do d o not n o t emit e m i t H H 2 2 gas g a s during d u r i n g normal n o r m a l charging, c h a r g i n g , or o r if i f it i t can c a n be b e documented d o c u m e n t e d that t h a t dangerous d a n g e r o u s quantities q u a n t i t i e s of o f hydrogen h y d r o g e n cannot c a n n o t be b e generated. g e n e r a t e d . GIS G I S rooms r o o m s and a n d GIB G I B SF S F 6 6 gas g a s density d e n s i t y is i s approx. a p p r o x . 6 6 times t i m e s larger l a r g e r than t h a n air a i r and a n d might m i g h t be b e an a n asphyxiate. a s p h y x i a t e . If I f the t h e quantity q u a n t i t y per p e r gas g a s compartment c o m p a r t m e n t is i s small, s m a l l , however, h o w e v e r , it i t might m i g h t not n o t represent r e p r e s e n t a a personnel p e r s o n n e l hazard. h a z a r d . SF S F 6 6 detection d e t e c t i o n may m a y then t h e n be b e omitted o m i t t e d with w i t h the t h e following f o l l o w i n g preconditions: p r e c o n d i t i o n s : • • SF6 S F 6 detection d e t e c t i o n is i s not n o t required r e q u i r e d by b y codes c o d e s or o r regulation r e g u l a t i o n • • Acceptable A c c e p t a b l e risk r i s k to t o personnel p e r s o n n e l is i s confirmed c o n f i r m e d by b y SF6 S F 6 risk r i s k assessment, a s s e s s m e n t , considering c o n s i d e r i n g layout, l a y o u t , volume, v o l u m e , congestion, c o n g e s t i o n , and a n d ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n of o f the t h e GIS G I S room/area. r o o m / a r e a . • • Pressure P r e s s u r e monitoring m o n i t o r i n g is i s integrated i n t e g r a t e d into i n t o the t h e GIS G I S equipment. e q u i p m e n t . External E x t e r n a l flash f l a s h beacon b e a c o n shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d at a t door d o o r entrance e n t r a n c e to t o warn w a r n personnel p e r s o n n e l of o f potential p o t e n t i a l SF S F 6 6 release r e l e a s e (upon ( u p o n confirmed c o n f i r m e d pressure p r e s s u r e drop d r o p in i n GIS G I S compartment) c o m p a r t m e n t ) Procedure P r o c e d u r e shall s h a l l be b e in i n place p l a c e to t o ventilate v e n t i l a t e GIS G I S room, r o o m , e.g. e . g . by b y opening o p e n i n g doors, d o o r s , before b e f o r e entry e n t r y in i n case c a s e of o f detected d e t e c t e d pressure p r e s s u r e drop d r o p in i n GIS G I S compartment. c o m p a r t m e n t . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 26 2 6 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e 6.4 6 . 4 Emergency E m e r g e n c y Shutdown S h u t d o w n system s y s t e m (PS ( P S 4) 4 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e purpose p u r p o s e of o f the t h e emergency e m e r g e n c y shutdown s h u t d o w n system s y s t e m (ESD) ( E S D ) is i s to t o prevent p r e v e n t escalation e s c a l a t i o n of o f abnormal a b n o r m a l conditions c o n d i t i o n s into i n t o a a major m a j o r hazardous h a z a r d o u s event e v e n t and a n d to t o limit l i m i t the t h e extent e x t e n t and a n d duration d u r a t i o n of o f any a n y such s u c h events e v e n t s that t h a t do d o occur. o c c u r . DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s In I n addition, a d d i t i o n , ESD E S D initiations i n i t i a t i o n s will w i l l activate a c t i v a t e (direct ( d i r e c t or o r indirect) i n d i r e c t ) other o t h e r safety s a f e t y systems/functions s y s t e m s / f u n c t i o n s such s u c h as a s HVAC H V A C (PS ( P S 2), 2 ) , Emergency E m e r g e n c y power p o w e r and a n d lighting l i g h t i n g (PS ( P S 11), 1 1 ) , Alarm A l a r m and a n d communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n system s y s t e m for f o r use u s e in i n emergency e m e r g e n c y situations s i t u a t i o n s (PS ( P S 13). 1 3 ) . Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards h a z a r d s - - Abnormal A b n o r m a l condition c o n d i t i o n on o n ONS, O N S , OSS O S S or o r a a WTG W T G not n o t detected d e t e c t e d and a n d controlled c o n t r o l l e d by b y the t h e Protection P r o t e c t i o n & & Control C o n t r o l system, s y s t e m , e.g. e . g . high h i g h hydrogen h y d r o g e n concentration, c o n c e n t r a t i o n , smoke s m o k e or o r flame f l a m e detection, d e t e c t i o n , ship s h i p collision/ship c o l l i s i o n / s h i p on o n collision c o l l i s i o n course c o u r s e etc. e t c . - - Abnormal A b n o r m a l condition c o n d i t i o n / / loss l o s s of o f communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n situation s i t u a t i o n requiring r e q u i r i n g local l o c a l manual m a n u a l shutdown s h u t d o w n at a t ONS, O N S , OSS O S S or o r WTG W T G to t o ensure e n s u r e safety s a f e t y of o f personnel, p e r s o n n e l , environment e n v i r o n m e n t or o r asset. a s s e t . C274-RA-S-FD-01000 C 2 7 4 - R A - S - F D - 0 1 0 0 0 - - MFW M F W - - HSE H S E Design D e s i g n Brief B r i e f Requirements: R e q u i r e m e n t s : Shutdown S h u t d o w n functions, f u n c t i o n s , with w i t h logic l o g i c solvers s o l v e r s independent i n d e p e n d e n t from f r o m the t h e Protection P r o t e c t i o n & & Control C o n t r o l system, s y s t e m , shall s h a l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e to t o perform p e r f o r m necessary n e c e s s a r y actions a c t i o n s to t o protect p r o t e c t personnel, p e r s o n n e l , environment e n v i r o n m e n t and a n d assets a s s e t s (ONS, ( O N S , OSS O S S and a n d WTGs) W T G s ) from f r o m abnormal a b n o r m a l conditions. c o n d i t i o n s . A A separate s e p a r a t e Emergency E m e r g e n c y Shutdown S h u t d o w n System S y s t e m may m a y be b e omitted o m i t t e d if i f shutdown s h u t d o w n actions a c t i o n s are a r e included i n c l u d e d in i n the t h e F&G F & G logic l o g i c solver. s o l v e r . The T h e shutdown s h u t d o w n actions a c t i o n s may m a y be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d manually m a n u a l l y and a n d automatically. a u t o m a t i c a l l y . Once O n c e initiated, i n i t i a t e d , actions a c t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y executed. e x e c u t e d . The T h e shutdown s h u t d o w n functions f u n c t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e arranged a r r a n g e d in i n a a tree-structured t r e e - s t r u c t u r e d level l e v e l hierarchy, h i e r a r c h y , reflecting r e f l e c t i n g different d i f f e r e n t levels l e v e l s of o f facility f a c i l i t y or o r wind w i n d farm f a r m shutdown. s h u t d o w n . The T h e higher h i g h e r levels l e v e l s in i n the t h e hierarchy h i e r a r c h y shall s h a l l initiate i n i t i a t e lower l o w e r levels. l e v e l s . A A signal s i g n a l on o n a a certain c e r t a i n level l e v e l shall s h a l l not n o t initiate i n i t i a t e actions a c t i o n s on o n higher h i g h e r ESD E S D levels. l e v e l s . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 27 2 7 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s MFW M F W Bałtyk B a ł t y k II I I & & MFW M F W Bałtyk B a ł t y k III I I I Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Reference R e f e r e n c e is i s made m a d e to t o Appendix A p p e n d i x B B – – Emergency E m e r g e n c y shutdown s h u t d o w n philosophy p h i l o s o p h y – – where w h e r e a a generic g e n e r i c ESD E S D hierarchy h i e r a r c h y is i s presented. p r e s e n t e d . Shutdown S h u t d o w n levels l e v e l s for f o r the t h e OSS O S S shall s h a l l include: i n c l u d e : - - Total T o t a l substation s u b s t a t i o n shutdown s h u t d o w n (A ( A and a n d B B system) s y s t e m ) including i n c l u d i n g utility u t i l i t y systems s y s t e m s - - Substation S u b s t a t i o n shutdown s h u t d o w n (A ( A and a n d B B system) s y s t e m ) - - System S y s t e m shutdown s h u t d o w n (e.g. ( e . g . A A or o r B B system) s y s t e m ) - - Equipment E q u i p m e n t shutdown s h u t d o w n Where W h e r e relevant, r e l e v a n t , remote r e m o t e equipment e q u i p m e n t emergency e m e r g e n c y shutdown s h u t d o w n shall s h a l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e through t h r o u g h ESI E S I control c o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system s y s t e m and a n d be b e available a v a i l a b l e in i n ESD E S D HMI. H M I . A A CAP C A P panel p a n e l with w i t h “Total “ T o t a l shutdown” s h u t d o w n ” and a n d “System “ S y s t e m A” A ” and a n d “System “ S y s t e m B” B ” shutdown s h u t d o w n included i n c l u d e d as a s minimum m i n i m u m shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d in i n a a strategic s t r a t e g i c location l o c a t i o n on o n the t h e OSS. O S S . Cascading C a s c a d i n g effects e f f e c t s shall s h a l l be b e avoided. a v o i d e d . This T h i s implies i m p l i e s that t h a t in i n some s o m e situations, s i t u a t i o n s , a a larger l a r g e r part p a r t of o f the t h e facility f a c i l i t y or o r wind w i n d farm f a r m than t h a n directly d i r e c t l y affected a f f e c t e d by b y the t h e incident i n c i d e n t in i n the t h e first f i r s t stage s t a g e should s h o u l d be b e shut s h u t down d o w n Depending D e p e n d i n g on o n the t h e shutdown s h u t d o w n levels l e v e l s attributed a t t r i b u t e d to t o particular p a r t i c u l a r accidental a c c i d e n t a l event, e v e n t , ESD E S D actions a c t i o n s or o r their t h e i r combinations c o m b i n a t i o n s shall s h a l l include i n c l u d e - - Shutdown S h u t d o w n of o f HV H V equipment e q u i p m e n t - - Stop S t o p of o f auxiliary a u x i l i a r y generator g e n e r a t o r - - Prevent P r e v e n t start-up s t a r t - u p of o f equipment e q u i p m e n t as a s required r e q u i r e d during d u r i n g an a n emergency e m e r g e n c y situation, s i t u a t i o n , e.g. e . g . inhibiting i n h i b i t i n g the t h e start-up s t a r t - u p of o f auxiliary a u x i l i a r y generators g e n e r a t o r s during d u r i n g the t h e shutdown s h u t d o w n of o f HV H V system s y s t e m - - Disconnection D i s c o n n e c t i o n of o f the t h e substation s u b s t a t i o n from f r o m the t h e grid g r i d - - Start-up S t a r t - u p of o f auxiliary a u x i l i a r y supply, s u p p l y , load l o a d transfer t r a n s f e r of o f emergency e m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s from f r o m transitional t r a n s i t i o n a l / / emergency e m e r g e n c y source s o u r c e of o f power p o w e r - - Activation A c t i v a t i o n of o f diesel d i e s e l shut-off s h u t - o f f valves v a l v e s - - Shutdown S h u t d o w n of o f power p o w e r ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n - - Stop S t o p battery b a t t e r y charging c h a r g i n g - - Closure C l o s u r e of o f doors d o o r s and a n d ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n openings o p e n i n g s - - Initiation I n i t i a t i o n of o f audible a u d i b l e siren s i r e n signal s i g n a l Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 28 2 8 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Any A n y shutdown, s h u t d o w n , spurious s p u r i o u s or o r intended, i n t e n d e d , shall s h a l l require r e q u i r e a a manual m a n u a l reset r e s e t from f r o m onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l room r o o m after a f t e r normalization n o r m a l i z a t i o n and a n d systems s y s t e m s have h a v e been b e e n confirmed c o n f i r m e d OK O K to t o restart r e s t a r t (e.g. ( e . g . by b y system s y s t e m status s t a t u s reporting r e p o r t i n g / / CCTV). C C T V ) . ESD E S D alarm a l a r m annunciation a n n u n c i a t i o n Shutdown S h u t d o w n status s t a t u s shall s h a l l continuously c o n t i n u o u s l y be b e available a v a i l a b l e in i n the t h e control c o n t r o l room, r o o m , and a n d the t h e system s y s t e m shall s h a l l raise r a i s e alarms a l a r m s in i n the t h e control c o n t r o l room r o o m for f o r operator o p e r a t o r awareness a w a r e n e s s or o r actions, a c t i o n s , considering: c o n s i d e r i n g : - - Level L e v e l of o f shutdown s h u t d o w n initiated i n i t i a t e d - - Shutdown S h u t d o w n function f u n c t i o n failure f a i l u r e to t o execute e x e c u t e actions a c t i o n s upon u p o n demand d e m a n d - - Shutdown S h u t d o w n function f u n c t i o n (sensor, ( s e n s o r , logic l o g i c solver s o l v e r or o r final f i n a l element) e l e m e n t ) defect d e f e c t or o r failure f a i l u r e Personnel P e r s o n n e l shall s h a l l be b e warned w a r n e d to t o ensure e n s u r e safe s a f e escape e s c a p e and a n d evacuation, e v a c u a t i o n , ref. r e f . PS13. P S 1 3 . Upon U p o n shutdown s h u t d o w n (automatic ( a u t o m a t i c or o r manual), m a n u a l ) , general g e n e r a l alarm a l a r m shall s h a l l be b e automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y initiated. i n i t i a t e d . An A n ESD E S D alarm a l a r m shall s h a l l be b e alerted a l e r t e d in i n other o t h e r strategic s t r a t e g i c locations, l o c a t i o n s , i.e. i . e . the t h e onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l room r o o m shall s h a l l alert a l e r t SOV/CTV S O V / C T V upon u p o n ESD E S D alarm. a l a r m . Logic L o g i c solver s o l v e r The T h e logic l o g i c solver s o l v e r including i n c l u d i n g I/O, I / O , logic l o g i c and a n d communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n interfaces, i n t e r f a c e s , shall s h a l l comply c o m p l y with w i t h prevailing p r e v a i l i n g regulations r e g u l a t i o n s and a n d practices p r a c t i c e s for f o r normal n o r m a l operation, o p e r a t i o n , test t e s t and a n d emergency e m e r g e n c y situations. s i t u a t i o n s . The T h e logic l o g i c solver s o l v e r compliance c o m p l i a n c e with w i t h the t h e intended i n t e n d e d use u s e and a n d safety s a f e t y integrity i n t e g r i t y requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s shall s h a l l be b e demonstrated, d e m o n s t r a t e d , i.e.: i . e . : - - Logic L o g i c solver s o l v e r (firmware, ( f i r m w a r e , as a s standard s t a n d a r d manufacturer m a n u f a c t u r e r provision) p r o v i s i o n ) compliance c o m p l i a n c e with w i t h IEC I E C 61508 6 1 5 0 8 shall s h a l l be b e documented d o c u m e n t e d and a n d certified c e r t i f i e d / / type t y p e approved a p p r o v e d (note: ( n o t e : also a l s o valid v a l i d for f o r system s y s t e m software s o f t w a r e revisions). r e v i s i o n s ) . Use U s e of o f existing e x i s t i n g non-certified n o n - c e r t i f i e d equipment e q u i p m e n t may m a y be b e accepted a c c e p t e d subject s u b j e c t to t o particular p a r t i c u l a r safety s a f e t y assessment a s s e s s m e n t and a n d “prior “ p r i o r use” u s e ” characteristics. c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . - - Logic L o g i c solver s o l v e r (hardware ( h a r d w a r e and a n d software, s o f t w a r e , according a c c o r d i n g to t o user u s e r requirements) r e q u i r e m e n t s ) arrangement a r r a n g e m e n t and a n d application a p p l i c a t i o n configuration c o n f i g u r a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e subject s u b j e c t to t o acceptance a c c e p t a n c e based b a s e d on o n independent i n d e p e n d e n t verifications. v e r i f i c a t i o n s . System S y s t e m safety s a f e t y manual m a n u a l shall s h a l l provide p r o v i d e guidance g u i d a n c e to t o applications a p p l i c a t i o n s and a n d application a p p l i c a t i o n program p r o g r a m development. d e v e l o p m e n t . ESD E S D system s y s t e m units u n i t s (logic ( l o g i c solver) s o l v e r ) shall s h a l l not n o t be b e used u s e d for f o r non-safety n o n - s a f e t y related r e l a t e d systems. s y s t e m s . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 29 2 9 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Logic L o g i c solver s o l v e r shall s h a l l include i n c l u d e measures m e a s u r e s that t h a t prohibit p r o h i b i t unauthorized u n a u t h o r i z e d and a n d avoid a v o i d unintentional u n i n t e n t i o n a l changes c h a n g e s of o f system s y s t e m parameters, p a r a m e t e r s , i.e. i . e . key-lock, k e y - l o c k , password p a s s w o r d or o r software s o f t w a r e configuration. c o n f i g u r a t i o n . 6.5 6 . 5 Open O p e n Drain D r a i n system s y s t e m (PS ( P S 5) 5 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e purpose p u r p o s e of o f the t h e open o p e n drain d r a i n system s y s t e m is i s to t o provide p r o v i d e measures m e a s u r e s for f o r containment c o n t a i n m e n t and a n d proper p r o p e r disposal d i s p o s a l of o f flammable f l a m m a b l e or o r environmentally e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y hazardous h a z a r d o u s liquid l i q u i d spills, s p i l l s , as a s well w e l l as a s handling h a n d l i n g wash-down, w a s h - d o w n , rainwater r a i n w a t e r and a n d fire f i r e water. w a t e r . The T h e open o p e n drain d r a i n system s y s t e m consists c o n s i s t s of o f equipment e q u i p m e n t such s u c h as a s drip d r i p trays t r a y s and a n d bunding, b u n d i n g , drain d r a i n pots p o t s and a n d liquid l i q u i d seals, s e a l s , piping p i p i n g and a n d pumping p u m p i n g arrangement, a r r a n g e m e n t , collection c o l l e c t i o n and a n d treatment t r e a t m e n t tanks t a n k s necessary n e c e s s a r y to t o collect c o l l e c t and a n d handle h a n d l e spillage s p i l l a g e of o f hydrocarbon h y d r o c a r b o n liquids, l i q u i d s , wash w a s h down d o w n water, w a t e r , fire f i r e water w a t e r and a n d rainwater. r a i n w a t e r . C274-RA-R-SP-01001 C 2 7 4 - R A - R - S P - 0 1 0 0 1 - - MFW M F W - - Pollution P o l l u t i o n Prevention P r e v e n t i o n System S y s t e m Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards: h a z a r d s : Release R e l e a s e with w i t h potential p o t e n t i a l damage d a m a g e to t o environment e n v i r o n m e n t or o r prolonged p r o l o n g e d fire f i r e from: f r o m : • • Transformers T r a n s f o r m e r s with w i t h mineral m i n e r a l oil o i l • • Coolers C o o l e r s for f o r transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s containing c o n t a i n i n g mineral m i n e r a l oil o i l • • Diesel D i e s e l leaks l e a k s (machinery, ( m a c h i n e r y , storage, s t o r a g e , and a n d bunkering b u n k e r i n g system) s y s t e m ) • • Hydraulic H y d r a u l i c leaks l e a k s (e.g. ( e . g . from f r o m crane c r a n e and a n d winch) w i n c h ) C274-RA-R-SP-01000 C 2 7 4 - R A - R - S P - 0 1 0 0 0 - - MFW M F W - - Cleaning C l e a n i n g System S y s t e m Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s Open O p e n drain d r a i n systems s y s t e m s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d to t o contain c o n t a i n and a n d collect c o l l e c t spills s p i l l s and a n d leaks l e a k s in i n all a l l areas a r e a s that t h a t have h a v e a a source s o u r c e of o f flammable f l a m m a b l e or o r environmentally e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y hazardous h a z a r d o u s liquid l i q u i d so s o as a s to t o minimize m i n i m i z e the t h e risk r i s k of o f fires f i r e s and a n d personnel p e r s o n n e l exposure e x p o s u r e to t o hazardous h a z a r d o u s materials m a t e r i a l s and a n d avoid a v o i d damage d a m a g e to t o the t h e environment. e n v i r o n m e n t . Tanks T a n k s and a n d vessels v e s s e l s containing c o n t a i n i n g flammable f l a m m a b l e or o r environmental e n v i r o n m e n t a l hazardous h a z a r d o u s liquids l i q u i d s shall s h a l l have h a v e a a bunding b u n d i n g covering c o v e r i n g the t h e tank t a n k perimeter p e r i m e t e r to t o control c o n t r o l the t h e spread s p r e a d of o f spills. s p i l l s . There T h e r e shall s h a l l be b e adequate a d e q u a t e drainage d r a i n a g e within w i t h i n the t h e bunding. b u n d i n g . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 30 3 0 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Guidance G u i d a n c e Dedicated D e d i c a t e d bunding b u n d i n g per p e r tank t a n k or o r vessel v e s s e l may m a y be b e exempted e x e m p t e d if i f part p a r t of o f a a larger l a r g e r containment c o n t a i n m e n t area a r e a provided p r o v i d e d with w i t h fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n grating g r a t i n g (restricting ( r e s t r i c t i n g air a i r to t o burning b u r n i n g liquids l i q u i d s and a n d extinguish e x t i n g u i s h fire) f i r e ) and a n d containment c o n t a i n m e n t basin. b a s i n . End E n d of o f guidance g u i d a n c e Open O p e n drain d r a i n systems s y s t e m s shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d with w i t h adequate a d e q u a t e slope s l o p e to t o control c o n t r o l spills. s p i l l s . Cooler C o o l e r areas a r e a s Open O p e n drain d r a i n from f r o m the t h e external e x t e r n a l cooler c o o l e r areas a r e a s shall s h a l l be b e connected c o n n e c t e d to t o the t h e oily o i l y water w a t e r package p a c k a g e including i n c l u d i n g tank. t a n k . Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r areas: a r e a s : Leak L e a k containment c o n t a i n m e n t criteria: c r i t e r i a : The T h e transformer t r a n s f o r m e r areas a r e a s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d with w i t h fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n grating g r a t i n g and a n d containment c o n t a i n m e n t basins b a s i n s with w i t h minimum m i n i m u m capacity c a p a c i t y for f o r the t h e largest l a r g e s t transformer t r a n s f o r m e r oil o i l inventory i n v e n t o r y in i n the t h e area a r e a + + firewater/foam f i r e w a t e r / f o a m liquid l i q u i d volumes v o l u m e s +10%. + 1 0 % . An A n alternative a l t e r n a t i v e to t o containment c o n t a i n m e n t basin b a s i n is i s a a drip d r i p tray t r a y / / bund b u n d area a r e a with w i t h fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n grating g r a t i n g and a n d drains d r a i n s to t o collection c o l l e c t i o n tank t a n k with w i t h same s a m e capacities c a p a c i t i e s as a s specified s p e c i f i e d above, a b o v e , The T h e containment c o n t a i n m e n t basins b a s i n s / / collection c o l l e c t i o n tank t a n k shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d with w i t h overflow o v e r f l o w to t o sea, s e a , such s u c h that t h a t rainwater r a i n w a t e r can c a n be b e discharged d i s c h a r g e d in i n all a l l conditions. c o n d i t i o n s . Drainpipes D r a i n p i p e s from f r o m drip d r i p tray t r a y or o r bund b u n d area a r e a to t o collection c o l l e c t i o n tank t a n k shall s h a l l be b e of o f sufficient s u f f i c i e n t size s i z e to t o drain d r a i n the t h e oil o i l inventory i n v e n t o r y in i n the t h e tank t a n k without w i t h o u t overflowing o v e r f l o w i n g the t h e drip d r i p tray t r a y underneath u n d e r n e a t h the t h e transformer. t r a n s f o r m e r . There T h e r e shall s h a l l be b e means m e a n s of o f continuous c o n t i n u o u s measuring m e a s u r i n g of o f hydrocarbon h y d r o c a r b o n content c o n t e n t in i n the t h e liquid l i q u i d to t o stop s t o p unwanted u n w a n t e d release r e l e a s e to t o sea. s e a . National N a t i o n a l / / local l o c a l requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s to t o the t h e system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e observed o b s e r v e d and a n d adhered a d h e r e d to. t o . The T h e drain d r a i n system s y s t e m needs n e e d s to t o consider c o n s i d e r operability o p e r a b i l i t y in i n cold c o l d climate. c l i m a t e . The T h e overflow o v e r f l o w system s y s t e m shall: s h a l l : • • control c o n t r o l the t h e liquid l i q u i d level l e v e l in i n the t h e containment c o n t a i n m e n t basins b a s i n s / / collection c o l l e c t i o n tank t a n k such s u c h that t h a t the t h e leak l e a k containment c o n t a i n m e n t criteria c r i t e r i a is i s met. m e t . • • be b e designed d e s i g n e d such s u c h that t h a t liquid l i q u i d is i s removed r e m o v e d from f r o m a a section s e c t i o n with w i t h continuous c o n t i n u o u s water w a t e r phase p h a s e of o f the t h e containment c o n t a i n m e n t basins b a s i n s • • have h a v e sufficient s u f f i c i e n t capacity c a p a c i t y to t o handle h a n d l e the t h e heaviest h e a v i e s t rainfall r a i n f a l l of o f 1-hour 1 - h o u r duration d u r a t i o n over o v e r a a 10-year 1 0 - y e a r recurrence r e c u r r e n c e period. p e r i o d . Auxiliary A u x i l i a r y diesel d i e s e l engine e n g i n e skid s k i d The T h e auxiliary a u x i l i a r y diesel d i e s e l engine e n g i n e skid s k i d and a n d diesel d i e s e l storage s t o r a g e shall s h a l l preferably p r e f e r a b l y be b e self-contained s e l f - c o n t a i n e d with w i t h capacity c a p a c i t y for f o r the t h e maximum m a x i m u m potential p o t e n t i a l diesel d i e s e l leak l e a k inventory, i n v e n t o r y , or o r alternatively a l t e r n a t i v e l y be b e connected c o n n e c t e d to t o open o p e n drain d r a i n system s y s t e m on o n the t h e installation. i n s t a l l a t i o n . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 31 3 1 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Hose H o s e reel r e e l station s t a t i o n The T h e hose h o s e reel r e e l station s t a t i o n is i s envisaged e n v i s a g e d to t o be b e in i n infrequent i n f r e q u e n t use u s e and a n d located l o c a t e d at a t low l o w level l e v e l on o n the t h e installation. i n s t a l l a t i o n . Diesel D i e s e l bunkering b u n k e r i n g will w i l l be b e a a manned m a n n e d operation. o p e r a t i o n . The T h e hose h o s e reel r e e l station s t a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d with w i t h bunding b u n d i n g with w i t h capacity c a p a c i t y to t o minimum m i n i m u m contain c o n t a i n possible p o s s i b l e flow f l o w back b a c k diesel d i e s e l inventory i n v e n t o r y in i n piping p i p i n g or o r hoses h o s e s and a n d credible c r e d i b l e pressurized p r e s s u r i z e d leak l e a k before b e f o r e SOV/CTV S O V / C T V supply s u p p l y pump p u m p is i s stopped. s t o p p e d . In I n case c a s e of o f a a diesel d i e s e l leakage, l e a k a g e , removing r e m o v i n g the t h e diesel d i e s e l from f r o m the t h e bunding b u n d i n g will w i l l be b e an a n operation o p e r a t i o n requiring r e q u i r i n g temporary t e m p o r a r y pump p u m p and a n d suitable s u i t a b l e tote t o t e tank t a n k to t o pump p u m p the t h e diesel d i e s e l to. t o . Segregation S e g r e g a t i o n between b e t w e e n areas a r e a s The T h e containment c o n t a i n m e n t basins b a s i n s for f o r Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r A A and a n d B B area a r e a shall s h a l l be b e separated s e p a r a t e d according a c c o r d i n g to t o the t h e fire f i r e division d i v i s i o n between b e t w e e n the t h e areas. a r e a s . The T h e open o p e n drain d r a i n system s y s t e m shall s h a l l provide p r o v i d e effective e f f e c t i v e means, m e a n s , e.g., e . g . , liquid l i q u i d seals s e a l s if i f relevant, r e l e v a n t , to t o prevent p r e v e n t liquids, l i q u i d s , vapors v a p o r s and a n d gases g a s e s to t o spread s p r e a d to t o other o t h e r fire f i r e areas a r e a s via v i a the t h e drain d r a i n system. s y s t e m . The T h e drain d r a i n system, s y s t e m , such s u c h as a s drain d r a i n box b o x and a n d piping, p i p i n g , shall s h a l l not n o t impair i m p a i r the t h e integrity i n t e g r i t y of o f fire f i r e partitions. p a r t i t i o n s . 6.6 6 . 6 Ignition I g n i t i o n source s o u r c e control c o n t r o l (PS ( P S 6) 6 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e ignition i g n i t i o n probability p r o b a b i l i t y of o f flammable f l a m m a b l e liquids l i q u i d s and a n d explosive e x p l o s i v e gas g a s atmospheres a t m o s p h e r e s shall s h a l l be b e minimized m i n i m i z e d by b y rendering r e n d e r i n g the t h e sources s o u r c e s of o f ignition i g n i t i o n harmless h a r m l e s s or o r reducing r e d u c i n g the t h e likelihood l i k e l i h o o d of o f occurrence o c c u r r e n c e of o f effective e f f e c t i v e ignition i g n i t i o n sources. s o u r c e s . Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards: h a z a r d s : - - Hydrogen H y d r o g e n gas g a s accumulation a c c u m u l a t i o n in i n battery b a t t e r y rooms r o o m s resulting r e s u l t i n g in i n explosive e x p l o s i v e atmosphere. a t m o s p h e r e . - - Electrical E l e c t r i c a l fault f a u l t in i n transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s resulting r e s u l t i n g in i n arc a r c flash f l a s h and a n d flammable f l a m m a b l e gas g a s and a n d oil o i l mist m i s t released r e l e a s e d to t o atmosphere. a t m o s p h e r e . - - Release R e l e a s e of o f flammable f l a m m a b l e diesel d i e s e l oil o i l mist m i s t inside i n s i d e diesel d i e s e l engine e n g i n e generator g e n e r a t o r skid s k i d exposing e x p o s i n g hot h o t surfaces. s u r f a c e s . DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s - - Rules R u l e s and a n d standards s t a n d a r d s Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 32 3 2 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Battery B a t t e r y rooms: r o o m s : Battery B a t t e r y type t y p e shall s h a l l be b e VRLA V R L A or o r other o t h e r similar s i m i l a r low l o w hydrogen h y d r o g e n emission e m i s s i o n type. t y p e . Boost B o o s t charging c h a r g i n g of o f batteries b a t t e r i e s shall s h a l l not n o t be b e used. u s e d . The T h e HVAC H V A C extract e x t r a c t fans f a n s from f r o m battery b a t t e r y rooms r o o m s shall s h a l l be b e certified c e r t i f i e d for f o r operation o p e r a t i o n in i n zone z o n e 2. 2 . For F o r further f u r t h e r control c o n t r o l of o f risk r i s k of o f hydrogen h y d r o g e n accumulation, a c c u m u l a t i o n , it i t is i s referred r e f e r r e d to t o requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s to t o battery b a t t e r y rooms r o o m s in i n PS P S 2 2 HVAC H V A C and a n d PS P S 3 3 Leak L e a k Detection. D e t e c t i o n . Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r areas: a r e a s : Barriers B a r r i e r s to t o detect d e t e c t and a n d shutdown s h u t d o w n electrical e l e c t r i c a l equipment e q u i p m e n t and a n d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s upon u p o n electrical e l e c t r i c a l faults f a u l t s are a r e described d e s c r i b e d in i n PS P S 12 1 2 Process P r o c e s s safety. s a f e t y . Natural N a t u r a l ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n is i s preferred p r e f e r r e d to t o minimize m i n i m i z e potential p o t e n t i a l gas g a s clouds, c l o u d s , ref. r e f . PS P S 2 2 HVAC H V A C Diesel D i e s e l engine e n g i n e skids s k i d s Hot H o t surfaces s u r f a c e s inside i n s i d e generator g e n e r a t o r skids s k i d s that t h a t can c a n potentially p o t e n t i a l l y be b e exposed e x p o s e d to t o diesel d i e s e l oil o i l leaks l e a k s shall s h a l l be b e thermally t h e r m a l l y insulated, i n s u l a t e d , e.g. e . g . internal i n t e r n a l exhaust e x h a u s t ducting d u c t i n g and a n d turbochargers, t u r b o c h a r g e r s , 6.7 6 . 7 Fire F i r e detection d e t e c t i o n (PS ( P S 7) 7 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n system s y s t e m shall s h a l l continuously c o n t i n u o u s l y monitor m o n i t o r for f o r the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of o f a a fire f i r e to t o alert a l e r t personnel p e r s o n n e l and a n d allow a l l o w control c o n t r o l actions a c t i o n s to t o be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d manually m a n u a l l y or o r automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y to t o minimize m i n i m i z e the t h e likelihood l i k e l i h o o d of o f fire f i r e escalation e s c a l a t i o n and a n d probability p r o b a b i l i t y of o f personnel p e r s o n n e l exposure. e x p o s u r e . The T h e fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n system s y s t e m shall, s h a l l , relevant r e l e v a n t to t o specific s p e c i f i c equipment e q u i p m e n t and a n d areas, a r e a s , monitor m o n i t o r continuously c o n t i n u o u s l y for f o r the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of o f an a n incipient i n c i p i e n t fire f i r e condition c o n d i t i o n to t o alert a l e r t personnel p e r s o n n e l and a n d allow a l l o w control c o n t r o l actions a c t i o n s to t o be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d manually m a n u a l l y to t o minimize m i n i m i z e the t h e probability p r o b a b i l i t y of o f a a fire f i r e condition c o n d i t i o n to t o develop. d e v e l o p . Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards: h a z a r d s : • • Electrical E l e c t r i c a l fires f i r e s (e.g. ( e . g . in i n electrical e l e c t r i c a l rooms) r o o m s ) • • Fires F i r e s in i n oil o i l filled f i l l e d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s (mineral ( m i n e r a l oil) o i l ) • • Diesel D i e s e l fires f i r e s (Auxiliary ( A u x i l i a r y diesel d i e s e l engine, e n g i n e , diesel d i e s e l storage s t o r a g e & & supply) s u p p l y ) Requirements: R e q u i r e m e n t s : EN E N 54 5 4 all a l l parts p a r t s DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s - - Rules R u l e s and a n d standards s t a n d a r d s IEC I E C 61508 6 1 5 0 8 Functional F u n c t i o n a l safety s a f e t y of o f electrical/electronic/progr e l e c t r i c a l / e l e c t r o n i c / p r o g r ammable a m m a b l e electronic e l e c t r o n i c safety-related s a f e t y - r e l a t e d systems s y s t e m s - - Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 33 3 3 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n function f u n c t i o n shall s h a l l provide p r o v i d e reliable r e l i a b l e and a n d fast f a s t detection d e t e c t i o n of o f a a fire f i r e by b y adequate a d e q u a t e type, t y p e , number n u m b e r and a n d location l o c a t i o n of o f fire f i r e detectors d e t e c t o r s and a n d shall s h a l l ensure e n s u r e timely t i m e l y alarm a l a r m and a n d initiation i n i t i a t i o n of o f control c o n t r o l actions. a c t i o n s . Part P a r t 1: 1 : General G e n e r a l requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s Sufficient S u f f i c i e n t fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n redundancy r e d u n d a n c y shall s h a l l be b e implemented i m p l e m e n t e d to t o ensure e n s u r e that t h a t the t h e fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n will w i l l be b e maintained m a i n t a i n e d if i f defect d e f e c t fire f i r e detectors d e t e c t o r s are a r e not n o t repaired r e p a i r e d or o r changed c h a n g e d immediately. i m m e d i a t e l y . Possibility P o s s i b i l i t y for f o r manual m a n u a l reset r e s e t from f r o m onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l room r o o m after a f t e r normalization n o r m a l i z a t i o n and a n d systems s y s t e m s have h a v e been b e e n confirmed c o n f i r m e d OK O K to t o restart r e s t a r t (e.g. ( e . g . by b y system s y s t e m status s t a t u s reporting r e p o r t i n g / / CCTV), C C T V ) , to t o disable d i s a b l e detectors d e t e c t o r s etc. e t c . Detectors D e t e c t o r s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d based b a s e d on o n an a n assessment a s s e s s m e n t of o f fire f i r e scenarios s c e n a r i o s within w i t h i n each e a c h area a r e a considering c o n s i d e r i n g potential p o t e n t i a l fire f i r e sources s o u r c e s and a n d characteristics, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , consequences, c o n s e q u e n c e s , area a r e a and a n d equipment e q u i p m e n t arrangement a r r a n g e m e n t and a n d environmental e n v i r o n m e n t a l conditions. c o n d i t i o n s . Design D e s i g n premises p r e m i s e s for f o r determination d e t e r m i n a t i o n of o f fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n coverage c o v e r a g e shall s h a l l apply a p p l y flame f l a m e size, s i z e , smoke s m o k e characteristics c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and a n d temperature t e m p e r a t u r e (heat) ( h e a t ) rise, r i s e , established e s t a b l i s h e d for f o r each e a c h area, a r e a , as a s basis b a s i s (sensor ( s e n s o r number n u m b e r and a n d distribution). d i s t r i b u t i o n ) . The T h e basis b a s i s and a n d assumptions a s s u m p t i o n s used u s e d for f o r detector d e t e c t o r selection s e l e c t i o n and a n d location l o c a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e documented. d o c u m e n t e d . Smoke S m o k e dispersion d i s p e r s i o n studies s t u d i e s may m a y be b e performed p e r f o r m e d for f o r verification v e r i f i c a t i o n and a n d optimization o p t i m i z a t i o n of o f location l o c a t i o n of o f detectors. d e t e c t o r s . The T h e location l o c a t i o n of o f smoke s m o k e detectors d e t e c t o r s shall s h a l l be b e confirmed c o n f i r m e d by b y smoke s m o k e dispersion d i s p e r s i o n tests t e s t s for f o r actual a c t u a l conditions c o n d i t i o n s inside i n s i d e rooms r o o m s with w i t h and a n d without w i t h o u t ventilation. v e n t i l a t i o n . A A mix m i x of o f standard s t a n d a r d and a n d high-sensitive h i g h - s e n s i t i v e smoke s m o k e detectors d e t e c t o r s shall s h a l l be b e given g i v e n preference p r e f e r e n c e for f o r use u s e as a s general g e n e r a l detection d e t e c t i o n in i n rooms r o o m s containing c o n t a i n i n g P&C P & C panels, p a n e l s , automation/instrument/telecom a u t o m a t i o n / i n s t r u m e n t / t e l e c o m panels p a n e l s and a n d low l o w voltage v o l t a g e distribution d i s t r i b u t i o n boards b o a r d s and a n d switchgears. s w i t c h g e a r s . Access A c c e s s to t o perform p e r f o r m maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e of o f detectors d e t e c t o r s shall s h a l l be b e planned p l a n n e d for f o r and a n d documented. d o c u m e n t e d . It I t shall s h a l l be b e able a b l e to t o test t e s t detectors d e t e c t o r s from f r o m deck d e c k level, l e v e l , test t e s t equipment e q u i p m e n t shall s h a l l be b e included i n c l u d e d as a s part p a r t of o f special s p e c i a l tools. t o o l s . Areas A r e a s requiring r e q u i r i n g fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n Fire F i r e detectors d e t e c t o r s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d in i n all a l l areas a r e a s where w h e r e fires f i r e s may m a y occur o c c u r and a n d where w h e r e ingress i n g r e s s of o f smoke s m o k e is i s to t o be b e prevented. p r e v e n t e d . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 34 3 4 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Fire F i r e detector d e t e c t o r arrangements a r r a n g e m e n t s should s h o u l d be b e implemented i m p l e m e n t e d in i n accordance a c c o r d a n c e with w i t h the t h e following: f o l l o w i n g : Area A r e a / / Room R o o m Detector D e t e c t o r type t y p e Comment C o m m e n t Oil O i l filled f i l l e d Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r area a r e a and a n d areas a r e a s with w i t h flammable f l a m m a b l e Flame F l a m e liquids l i q u i d s / / gases g a s e s Utility U t i l i t y area a r e a without w i t h o u t flammable f l a m m a b l e liquids l i q u i d s / / gases g a s e s Flame, F l a m e , heat h e a t or o r Detector D e t e c t o r selection s e l e c t i o n dependent d e p e n d e n t upon u p o n fire f i r e smoke s m o k e characteristics c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s Instrument I n s t r u m e n t rooms, r o o m s , Control C o n t r o l room, r o o m , LV L V electrical e l e c t r i c a l rooms r o o m s Smoke S m o k e High H i g h sensitive s e n s i t i v e type t y p e for f o r early e a r l y warning w a r n i n g and a n d manual m a n u a l (rooms ( r o o m s containing c o n t a i n i n g panels, p a n e l s , cubicles, c u b i c l e s , distribution d i s t r i b u t i o n shutdown. s h u t d o w n . boards) b o a r d s ) Standard S t a n d a r d smoke s m o k e detectors d e t e c t o r s for f o r automatic a u t o m a t i c actions. a c t i o n s . HV H V Electrical E l e c t r i c a l rooms r o o m s Smoke S m o k e and/or a n d / o r flame f l a m e Smoke S m o k e detector d e t e c t o r suitable s u i t a b l e for f o r high h i g h energy e n e r g y fires f i r e s in i n addition a d d i t i o n to t o high h i g h sensitive s e n s i t i v e type. t y p e . Flame F l a m e detectors d e t e c t o r s to t o be b e evaluated e v a l u a t e d for f o r detection d e t e c t i o n of o f HV H V arcs a r c s Diesel D i e s e l machinery m a c h i n e r y spaces s p a c e s Flame F l a m e Rooms R o o m s containing c o n t a i n i n g gas g a s bottles b o t t l e s (typically ( t y p i c a l l y inert i n e r t gas g a s for f o r Smoke S m o k e fire f i r e suppression s u p p r e s s i o n system) s y s t e m ) Storage S t o r a g e room r o o m for f o r flammable f l a m m a b l e materials m a t e r i a l s Flame F l a m e and/or a n d / o r E.g. E . g . paint p a i n t or o r chemical c h e m i c a l storage s t o r a g e heat h e a t Workshops, W o r k s h o p s , storage s t o r a g e area a r e a without w i t h o u t flammable f l a m m a b l e Smoke S m o k e or o r heat h e a t Type T y p e of o f activity a c t i v i t y to t o be b e considered c o n s i d e r e d materials m a t e r i a l s HVAC H V A C inlets i n l e t s Smoke S m o k e Confined C o n f i n e d spaces, s p a c e s , e.g. e . g . below b e l o w false f a l s e floor, f l o o r , above a b o v e Smoke S m o k e ceiling c e i l i n g Manual M a n u a l Call C a l l Points P o i n t s (MCP) ( M C P ) Manual M a n u a l call c a l l points p o i n t s shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d strategically, s t r a t e g i c a l l y , and a n d in i n locations l o c a t i o n s such s u c h as a s • • Along A l o n g escape e s c a p e ways w a y s • • Embarkation E m b a r k a t i o n areas, a r e a s , such s u c h as a s SOV/CTV S O V / C T V landing l a n d i n g area, a r e a , etc. e t c . • • At A t door d o o r (inside) ( i n s i d e ) for f o r every e v e r y exit e x i t to t o outside o u t s i d e deck d e c k The T h e maximum m a x i m u m walking w a l k i n g distance d i s t a n c e to t o a a Manual M a n u a l Call C a l l Point P o i n t in i n outdoor o u t d o o r areas a r e a s shall s h a l l not n o t exceed e x c e e d 30 3 0 meters. m e t e r s . Manual M a n u a l Call C a l l points p o i n t s shall s h a l l be b e protected p r o t e c t e d against a g a i n s t inadvertent i n a d v e r t e n t activation a c t i v a t i o n and a n d easily e a s i l y recognized r e c o g n i z e d by b y signs s i g n s and a n d color c o l o r coding. c o d i n g . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 35 3 5 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Fire F i r e detector d e t e c t o r characteristics c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and a n d calibration c a l i b r a t i o n Fire F i r e detectors d e t e c t o r s shall s h a l l be b e self-monitoring. s e l f - m o n i t o r i n g . Detector D e t e c t o r safety s a f e t y characteristics c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s should s h o u l d be b e optimized o p t i m i z e d through t h r o u g h preferences p r e f e r e n c e s and a n d adoption a d o p t i o n of o f best b e s t available a v a i l a b l e technology t e c h n o l o g y including i n c l u d i n g provisions p r o v i s i o n s of o f self-diagnostic. s e l f - d i a g n o s t i c . Flame F l a m e detectors d e t e c t o r s shall s h a l l comply c o m p l y with w i t h actual a c t u a l fire f i r e potential p o t e n t i a l and a n d environment e n v i r o n m e n t conditions c o n d i t i o n s within w i t h i n the t h e relevant r e l e v a n t area, a r e a , e.g.: e . g . : • • IR I R or o r UV U V where w h e r e flame f l a m e is i s predominating p r e d o m i n a t i n g and a n d according a c c o r d i n g to t o flame f l a m e wave w a v e radiation r a d i a t i o n characteristic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c • • Sensor S e n s o r range r a n g e and a n d cone c o n e of o f vision. v i s i o n . Based B a s e d on o n a a typical t y p i c a l flame f l a m e detector d e t e c t o r characteristic, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , the t h e distance d i s t a n c e between b e t w e e n flame f l a m e detectors d e t e c t o r s and a n d targets t a r g e t s monitored m o n i t o r e d shall s h a l l be b e in i n accordance a c c o r d a n c e with w i t h current c u r r e n t technology t e c h n o l o g y • • Sensor S e n s o r direction d i r e c t i o n and a n d angle a n g l e • • Sensitivity S e n s i t i v i t y to t o external e x t e r n a l impact i m p a c t such s u c h as a s arc a r c welding w e l d i n g Heat H e a t point p o i n t detectors d e t e c t o r s (electrical) ( e l e c t r i c a l ) characteristics c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s shall s h a l l comply c o m p l y with w i t h actual a c t u a l fire f i r e potential p o t e n t i a l and a n d environmental e n v i r o n m e n t a l conditions c o n d i t i o n s within w i t h i n the t h e relevant r e l e v a n t area, a r e a , e.g.: e . g . : • • Normally N o r m a l l y limited l i m i t e d use, u s e , i.e. i . e . specific s p e c i f i c high-risk h i g h - r i s k areas a r e a s and a n d where w h e r e other o t h e r detection d e t e c t i o n principles p r i n c i p l e s are a r e not n o t suitable. s u i t a b l e . • • Maximum M a x i m u m coverage c o v e r a g e in i n naturally n a t u r a l l y ventilated v e n t i l a t e d area a r e a approximate a p p r o x i m a t e 24 2 4 m m 2 2 , , maximum m a x i m u m distance d i s t a n c e between b e t w e e n sensors s e n s o r s 7 7 m m and a n d maximum m a x i m u m distance d i s t a n c e from f r o m wall w a l l 4.5 4 . 5 m m and a n d minimum m i n i m u m 0.5 0 . 5 meters m e t e r s away a w a y from f r o m outside o u t s i d e wall w a l l or o r dividing d i v i d i n g partition. p a r t i t i o n . • • Maximum M a x i m u m coverage c o v e r a g e in i n mechanically m e c h a n i c a l l y ventilated v e n t i l a t e d area a r e a approximate a p p r o x i m a t e 37 3 7 m m 2 2 , , maximum m a x i m u m distance d i s t a n c e between b e t w e e n sensors s e n s o r s 9 9 m m and a n d maximum m a x i m u m distance d i s t a n c e from f r o m wall w a l l 4.5 4 . 5 m. m . Smoke S m o k e detectors d e t e c t o r s characteristics c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s shall s h a l l comply c o m p l y with w i t h actual a c t u a l fire f i r e potential p o t e n t i a l and a n d environmental e n v i r o n m e n t a l conditions c o n d i t i o n s within w i t h i n the t h e relevant r e l e v a n t area, a r e a , e.g.: e . g . : • • Optical O p t i c a l detectors d e t e c t o r s used u s e d for f o r smoldering s m o l d e r i n g fires. f i r e s . • • Detectors, D e t e c t o r s , e.g., e . g . , ionic i o n i c type, t y p e , suitable s u i t a b l e for f o r energy e n e r g y intensive i n t e n s i v e smoke s m o k e generating g e n e r a t i n g fires, f i r e s , e.g., e . g . , fire f i r e in i n high h i g h voltage v o l t a g e switchgear s w i t c h g e a r caused c a u s e d by b y short s h o r t circuit. c i r c u i t . • • Smoke S m o k e detectors d e t e c t o r s mounted m o u n t e d in i n areas a r e a s such s u c h as a s suspended s u s p e n d e d ceilings c e i l i n g s and a n d raised r a i s e d floors f l o o r s shall s h a l l have h a v e their t h e i r location l o c a t i o n indicated i n d i c a t e d by b y visible v i s i b l e tag-plate. t a g - p l a t e . • • Early E a r l y warning w a r n i n g sensor s e n s o r specified s p e c i f i e d with w i t h higher h i g h e r sensitivity s e n s i t i v i t y than t h a n norm n o r m recommendation. r e c o m m e n d a t i o n . • • Maximum M a x i m u m distance d i s t a n c e between b e t w e e n sensors s e n s o r s 11 1 1 meters, m e t e r s , maximum m a x i m u m distance d i s t a n c e from f r o m sensor s e n s o r to t o bulkhead b u l k h e a d 5.5 5 . 5 meters m e t e r s and a n d minimum m i n i m u m 0.5 0 . 5 meters m e t e r s away a w a y from f r o m outside o u t s i d e wall w a l l or o r dividing d i v i d i n g partition. p a r t i t i o n . Fire F i r e detection d e t e c t i o n actions a c t i o n s Automatic A u t o m a t i c initiation i n i t i a t i o n of o f actions a c t i o n s shall s h a l l include i n c l u d e Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 36 3 6 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e • • ESD E S D (confirmed ( c o n f i r m e d fire) f i r e ) • • HVAC H V A C and a n d fire f i r e damper d a m p e r shutdown, s h u t d o w n , except e x c e p t for f o r areas a r e a s subject s u b j e c t to t o smoke s m o k e control c o n t r o l (confirmed ( c o n f i r m e d fire) f i r e ) • • Activation A c t i v a t i o n of o f Fire F i r e Fighting F i g h t i n g Equipment E q u i p m e n t (confirmed ( c o n f i r m e d fire) f i r e ) • • General G e n e r a l installation i n s t a l l a t i o n alarm a l a r m (confirmed ( c o n f i r m e d fire) f i r e ) • • MCP M C P activation a c t i v a t i o n shall s h a l l initiate i n i t i a t e alarm a l a r m in i n central c e n t r a l control c o n t r o l room. r o o m . Central C e n t r a l control c o n t r o l room r o o m to t o verify v e r i f y and a n d initiate i n i t i a t e further f u r t h e r actions a c t i o n s and a n d alarm a l a r m on o n installation i n s t a l l a t i o n as a s required. r e q u i r e d . Guidance G u i d a n c e Early E a r l y smoke s m o k e detection d e t e c t i o n may m a y be b e subject s u b j e c t to t o manual m a n u a l initiation i n i t i a t i o n of o f actions a c t i o n s only. o n l y . End E n d of o f guidance g u i d a n c e A A fire f i r e alarm a l a r m shall s h a l l be b e presented p r e s e n t e d in i n CCR C C R on o n an a n OSS O S S layout l a y o u t to t o easily e a s i l y identify i d e n t i f y location. l o c a t i o n . Confirmed C o n f i r m e d fire f i r e shall s h a l l be b e based b a s e d on o n voting v o t i n g between b e t w e e n two t w o or o r more m o r e fire f i r e detectors d e t e c t o r s in i n alarm. a l a r m . Voting V o t i n g shall s h a l l include i n c l u d e all a l l fire f i r e detectors d e t e c t o r s within w i t h i n a a defined d e f i n e d area a r e a (any ( a n y type t y p e of o f detectors) d e t e c t o r s ) and a n d exposed e x p o s e d to t o the t h e same s a m e fire f i r e scenario. s c e n a r i o . The T h e voting v o t i n g logic l o g i c shall s h a l l be b e arranged a r r a n g e d such s u c h that t h a t confirmed c o n f i r m e d fire f i r e can c a n be b e achieved a c h i e v e d with w i t h faulty f a u l t y detectors, d e t e c t o r s , and a n d also a l s o including i n c l u d i n g inhibited i n h i b i t e d detectors d e t e c t o r s unless u n l e s s safe s a f e detector d e t e c t o r inhibit i n h i b i t is i s achieved a c h i e v e d by b y established e s t a b l i s h e d operating o p e r a t i n g procedures. p r o c e d u r e s . The T h e following f o l l o w i n g voting v o t i n g principles p r i n c i p l e s should s h o u l d apply a p p l y (for ( f o r automatic a u t o m a t i c actions a c t i o n s only): o n l y ) : Smoke S m o k e (except ( e x c e p t areas a r e a s such s u c h as a s accommodation a c c o m m o d a t i o n or o r offices o f f i c e s with w i t h manual m a n u a l intervention): i n t e r v e n t i o n ) : • • 2ooN 2 o o N detectors d e t e c t o r s to t o reach r e a c h specified s p e c i f i e d alarm a l a r m limit l i m i t when w h e n N N ≥ ≥ 3 3 Note: N o t e : Smoke S m o k e detectors d e t e c t o r s are a r e less l e s s likely l i k e l y to t o be b e used u s e d together t o g e t h e r with w i t h other o t h e r types t y p e s of o f fire f i r e detectors, d e t e c t o r s , and a n d applications a p p l i c a t i o n s that t h a t require r e q u i r e voting v o t i n g are a r e not n o t common. c o m m o n . Smoke S m o k e detectors d e t e c t o r s covering c o v e r i n g enclosures e n c l o s u r e s and a n d HVAC H V A C inlets i n l e t s shall s h a l l not n o t be b e voted v o t e d together t o g e t h e r with w i t h other o t h e r fire f i r e detectors d e t e c t o r s in i n the t h e same s a m e area. a r e a . Flame: F l a m e : • • 2ooN 2 o o N detectors d e t e c t o r s to t o reach r e a c h specified s p e c i f i e d alarm a l a r m limit l i m i t when w h e n N N ≥ ≥ 3 3 Heat: H e a t : Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 37 3 7 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e • • 1ooN 1 o o N detectors d e t e c t o r s to t o reach r e a c h specified s p e c i f i e d alarm a l a r m limit l i m i t when w h e n N N ≥ ≥ 2. 2 . 1ooN 1 o o N voting v o t i n g with w i t h highly h i g h l y reliable r e l i a b l e heat h e a t detectors d e t e c t o r s to t o be b e approved a p p r o v e d by b y Company. C o m p a n y . Fire F i r e detection d e t e c t i o n alarms a l a r m s Detection D e t e c t i o n of o f fire, f i r e , failure f a i l u r e to t o execute e x e c u t e actions a c t i o n s upon u p o n demand d e m a n d and a n d system s y s t e m defects d e f e c t s shall s h a l l be b e presented p r e s e n t e d as a s alarms a l a r m s in i n Central C e n t r a l Control C o n t r o l Room R o o m (see ( s e e also a l s o PS P S 22). 2 2 ) . F&G F & G system s y s t e m status s t a t u s shall s h a l l be b e continuously c o n t i n u o u s l y available a v a i l a b l e in i n CCR, C C R , and a n d the t h e system s y s t e m shall s h a l l raise r a i s e alarms a l a r m s in i n CCR C C R for f o r operator o p e r a t o r awareness a w a r e n e s s or o r action, a c t i o n , considering: c o n s i d e r i n g : • • Detection D e t e c t i o n of o f fire f i r e or o r activation a c t i v a t i o n of o f Manual M a n u a l Call C a l l Point P o i n t • • Failure F a i l u r e to t o execute e x e c u t e action a c t i o n upon u p o n demand d e m a n d • • Function F u n c t i o n (sensor, ( s e n s o r , logic l o g i c solver, s o l v e r , final f i n a l element) e l e m e n t ) defect d e f e c t or o r failure. f a i l u r e . Status/alarm S t a t u s / a l a r m parameters p a r a m e t e r s for f o r each e a c h individual i n d i v i d u a l fire f i r e detector d e t e c t o r shall s h a l l be b e identifiable i d e n t i f i a b l e in i n the t h e CCR. C C R . An A n F&G F & G alarm a l a r m condition c o n d i t i o n shall s h a l l be b e alerted a l e r t e d in i n other o t h e r strategic s t r a t e g i c locations, l o c a t i o n s , i.e. i . e . the t h e onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l room r o o m shall s h a l l alert a l e r t SOV/CTV S O V / C T V upon u p o n F&G F & G alarm. a l a r m . CCTV C C T V coverage c o v e r a g e CCTV C C T V cameras c a m e r a s shall s h a l l be b e installed i n s t a l l e d in i n order o r d e r to t o help h e l p the t h e control c o n t r o l room r o o m operators o p e r a t o r s evaluate e v a l u a t e appropriate a p p r o p r i a t e actions a c t i o n s following f o l l o w i n g an a n alarm a l a r m event e v e n t on o n the t h e unmanned u n m a n n e d substation. s u b s t a t i o n . Evaluation E v a l u a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e performed p e r f o r m e d to t o identify i d e n t i f y relevant r e l e v a n t locations, l o c a t i o n s , but b u t CCTV C C T V cameras c a m e r a s shall s h a l l as a s minimum m i n i m u m be b e installed i n s t a l l e d with w i t h sufficient s u f f i c i e n t coverage c o v e r a g e of o f transformer t r a n s f o r m e r containment c o n t a i n m e n t area a r e a and a n d high h i g h voltage v o l t a g e switchgear s w i t c h g e a r / / GIS G I S areas. a r e a s . Independence I n d e p e n d e n c e The T h e F&G F & G safety s a f e t y related r e l a t e d functions f u n c t i o n s shall s h a l l fulfil f u l f i l their t h e i r intended i n t e n d e d role r o l e independently i n d e p e n d e n t l y of o f other o t h e r control c o n t r o l - - and a n d safety s a f e t y related r e l a t e d control c o n t r o l systems, s y s t e m s , Prerequisites P r e r e q u i s i t e s to t o fulfil f u l f i l the t h e independence i n d e p e n d e n c e requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s are: a r e : • • Logic L o g i c solver s o l v e r (firmware, ( f i r m w a r e , as a s standard s t a n d a r d manufacturer m a n u f a c t u r e r provision) p r o v i s i o n ) shall s h a l l be b e certified c e r t i f i e d / / type t y p e approved a p p r o v e d to t o relevant r e l e v a n t standard s t a n d a r d (i.e. ( i . e . IEC I E C 61508). 6 1 5 0 8 ) . Use U s e of o f existing e x i s t i n g non-certified n o n - c e r t i f i e d equipment e q u i p m e n t may m a y be b e accepted a c c e p t e d subject s u b j e c t to t o particular p a r t i c u l a r safety s a f e t y assessment a s s e s s m e n t and a n d “prior “ p r i o r use” u s e ” characteristics. c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . • • F&G F & G safety s a f e t y related r e l a t e d functions f u n c t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e realized r e a l i z e d in i n addition a d d i t i o n to t o and a n d independent i n d e p e n d e n t of o f installation i n s t a l l a t i o n basic b a s i c control c o n t r o l systems. s y s t e m s . • • F&G F & G system s y s t e m units u n i t s (logic ( l o g i c solver) s o l v e r ) shall s h a l l not n o t be b e used u s e d for f o r non-safety n o n - s a f e t y related r e l a t e d systems. s y s t e m s . • • F&G F & G sensor s e n s o r loop l o o p including i n c l u d i n g accessories a c c e s s o r i e s (e.g. ( e . g . air a i r supply s u p p l y branch-off b r a n c h - o f f and a n d power p o w e r fuses) f u s e s ) shall s h a l l be b e separate s e p a r a t e from f r o m other o t h e r functions, f u n c t i o n s , directly d i r e c t l y connected c o n n e c t e d to t o F&G F & G system s y s t e m unit. u n i t . • • F&G F & G final f i n a l element e l e m e n t shall s h a l l be b e operated o p e r a t e d directly d i r e c t l y from f r o m F&G F & G system s y s t e m unit u n i t unless u n l e s s actions a c t i o n s are a r e executed e x e c u t e d through t h r o u g h the t h e ESD E S D system. s y s t e m . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 38 3 8 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Possible P o s s i b l e use u s e of o f common c o m m o n SAS S A S data d a t a network n e t w o r k and a n d operator o p e r a t o r stations s t a t i o n s are a r e addressed a d d r e s s e d in i n automation a u t o m a t i o n discipline d i s c i p l i n e requirements. r e q u i r e m e n t s . Same S a m e reference r e f e r e n c e will w i l l apply a p p l y to t o signal s i g n a l exchanged e x c h a n g e d between b e t w e e n different d i f f e r e n t safety s a f e t y systems. s y s t e m s . 6.8 6 . 8 Active A c t i v e Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n (PS ( P S 9) 9 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e main m a i n purpose p u r p o s e of o f the t h e firefighting f i r e f i g h t i n g systems s y s t e m s is i s to t o provide p r o v i d e quick q u i c k and a n d reliable r e l i a b l e means m e a n s for f o r firefighting f i r e f i g h t i n g in i n addition a d d i t i o n to t o cooling c o o l i n g of o f equipment e q u i p m e n t and a n d structures. s t r u c t u r e s . Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards h a z a r d s • • Fires F i r e s in i n oil o i l filled f i l l e d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s • • Diesel D i e s e l fires f i r e s (e.g. ( e . g . related r e l a t e d to t o diesel d i e s e l storage s t o r a g e or o r auxiliary a u x i l i a r y generator) g e n e r a t o r ) • • Electrical E l e c t r i c a l fires f i r e s Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s Active A c t i v e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n strategy s t r a t e g y Fixed F i x e d fire-fighting f i r e - f i g h t i n g systems s y s t e m s shall s h a l l be b e installed i n s t a l l e d in i n areas a r e a s representing r e p r e s e n t i n g a a fire f i r e risk, r i s k , and a n d particularly p a r t i c u l a r l y for f o r equipment e q u i p m e n t containing c o n t a i n i n g significant s i g n i f i c a n t quantities q u a n t i t i e s of o f hydrocarbons h y d r o c a r b o n s or o r other o t h e r flammable f l a m m a b l e materials. m a t e r i a l s . The T h e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n strategies s t r a t e g i e s shall s h a l l take t a k e into i n t o consideration c o n s i d e r a t i o n that t h a t manual m a n u a l intervention i n t e r v e n t i o n normally n o r m a l l y is i s not n o t available a v a i l a b l e at a t the t h e unmanned u n m a n n e d substation. s u b s t a t i o n . Asset A s s e t protection p r o t e c t i o n shall s h a l l hence h e n c e be b e part p a r t of o f the t h e considerations. c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . DNV-GL-ST D N V - G L - S T 0145 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s - - Rules R u l e s and a n d standards s t a n d a r d s NFPA N F P A 101, 1 0 1 , Life L i f e Safety S a f e t y Code C o d e NFPA N F P A 850, 8 5 0 , Recommended R e c o m m e n d e d Practice P r a c t i c e for f o r Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n for f o r Electric E l e c t r i c Generating G e n e r a t i n g Plants P l a n t s and a n d High H i g h Voltage V o l t a g e Direct D i r e c t Current C u r r e n t Converter C o n v e r t e r Stations S t a t i o n s The T h e following f o l l o w i n g active a c t i v e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n strategies s t r a t e g i e s are a r e envisaged, e n v i s a g e d , but b u t shall s h a l l be b e further f u r t h e r assessed a s s e s s e d and a n d developed d e v e l o p e d based b a s e d on o n risk r i s k assessment: a s s e s s m e n t : Area A r e a / / room r o o m Active A c t i v e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n Comment C o m m e n t IEEE I E E E 979 9 7 9 - - Guide G u i d e for f o r Substation S u b s t a t i o n Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 39 3 9 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Oil O i l filled f i l l e d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s Fixed F i x e d expanding e x p a n d i n g foam f o a m In I n combination c o m b i n a t i o n with w i t h certified c e r t i f i e d fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n grating g r a t i n g solution s o l u t i o n within w i t h i n bunding b u n d i n g system s y s t e m around a r o u n d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s (ref. ( r e f . PS P S 10). 1 0 ) . Foam F o a m system s y s t e m extinguish e x t i n g u i s h and a n d prevent p r e v e n t pool p o o l fire f i r e on o n top t o p of o f the t h e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n grating g r a t i n g and a n d plated p l a t e d deck. d e c k . The T h e qualities q u a l i t i e s of o f the t h e grating g r a t i n g prevent p r e v e n t fire f i r e within w i t h i n the t h e bound b o u n d underneath u n d e r n e a t h the t h e grating. g r a t i n g . Diesel D i e s e l engine e n g i n e Water W a t e r mist m i s t In I n combination c o m b i n a t i o n with w i t h remote r e m o t e operated o p e r a t e d or o r automatic a u t o m a t i c isolation i s o l a t i o n valve v a l v e on o n diesel d i e s e l room/enclosure r o o m / e n c l o s u r e fuel f u e l line l i n e Electrical E l e c t r i c a l rooms, r o o m s , / / Inert I n e r t gas g a s suppression s u p p r e s s i o n system s y s t e m Fixed F i x e d CO2 C O 2 extinguishing e x t i n g u i s h i n g systems s y s t e m s shall s h a l l not n o t be b e used. u s e d . instrument i n s t r u m e n t rooms r o o m s (e.g. ( e . g . Argonite, A r g o n i t e , inergen i n e r g e n etc.) e t c . ) The T h e active a c t i v e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n systems s y s t e m s shall s h a l l have h a v e possibility p o s s i b i l i t y of o f remote r e m o t e (onshore) ( o n s h o r e ) and a n d local l o c a l activation. a c t i v a t i o n . For F o r automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y initiated i n i t i a t e d systems, s y s t e m s , a a manual m a n u a l release r e l e a s e station s t a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d and a n d conveniently c o n v e n i e n t l y located l o c a t e d outside o u t s i d e the t h e area. a r e a . The T h e inert i n e r t gas g a s suppression s u p p r e s s i o n system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e one o n e central c e n t r a l system s y s t e m with w i t h valve-controlled v a l v e - c o n t r o l l e d distribution d i s t r i b u t i o n system s y s t e m to t o direct d i r e c t the t h e suppression s u p p r e s s i o n gas g a s to t o the t h e intended i n t e n d e d room. r o o m . The T h e inert i n e r t gas g a s system s y s t e m shall s h a l l have h a v e 2x100% 2 x 1 0 0 % capacity c a p a c i t y to t o provide p r o v i d e back-up b a c k - u p coverage c o v e r a g e e.g. e . g . if i f the t h e system s y s t e m is i s unintentionally u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y released. r e l e a s e d . NFPA N F P A 11 1 1 Standard S t a n d a r d for f o r Low, L o w , Medium, M e d i u m , and a n d High- H i g h - Expansion E x p a n s i o n Foam, F o a m , Chapter C h a p t e r 7 7 Compressed C o m p r e s s e d Air A i r Foam F o a m Systems S y s t e m s NFPA N F P A 750 7 5 0 Standard S t a n d a r d on o n Water W a t e r Mist M i s t Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n Systems S y s t e m s NFPA N F P A 2001 2 0 0 1 Standard S t a n d a r d for f o r Clean C l e a n Agent A g e n t Fire F i r e Extinguishing E x t i n g u i s h i n g Systems S y s t e m s Refer R e f e r to t o Appendix A p p e n d i x A A in i n this t h i s document d o c u m e n t for f o r specifications s p e c i f i c a t i o n s for f o r active a c t i v e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n systems. s y s t e m s . Manual M a n u a l fire f i r e fighting f i g h t i n g Fire F i r e extinguishers e x t i n g u i s h e r s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d in i n line l i n e with w i t h the t h e fire f i r e assessment a s s e s s m e n t of o f the t h e rooms r o o m s and a n d areas. a r e a s . The T h e location l o c a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e clearly c l e a r l y identified i d e n t i f i e d with w i t h photo-luminescent p h o t o - l u m i n e s c e n t signage s i g n a g e in i n addition a d d i t i o n to t o all a l l statutory s t a t u t o r y signage. s i g n a g e . Any A n y outdoor o u t d o o r fire f i r e extinguisher e x t i n g u i s h e r and a n d emergency e m e r g e n c y equipment e q u i p m e n t shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d in i n cabinets. c a b i n e t s . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 40 4 0 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 6.9 6 . 9 Passive P a s s i v e Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n (PS ( P S 10) 1 0 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Passive P a s s i v e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n (PFP) ( P F P ) shall s h a l l ensure e n s u r e that t h a t relevant r e l e v a n t structures s t r u c t u r e s and a n d equipment e q u i p m e n t components c o m p o n e n t s have h a v e adequate a d e q u a t e fire f i r e resistance r e s i s t a n c e with w i t h regard r e g a r d to t o load l o a d bearing b e a r i n g properties, p r o p e r t i e s , integrity i n t e g r i t y and a n d insulation i n s u l a t i o n properties p r o p e r t i e s during d u r i n g a a dimensioning d i m e n s i o n i n g fire, f i r e , and a n d contribute c o n t r i b u t e in i n reducing r e d u c i n g the t h e consequences c o n s e q u e n c e s in i n general. g e n e r a l . DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards: h a z a r d s : • • Escalation E s c a l a t i o n of o f fire f i r e between b e t w e e n equipment e q u i p m e n t (e.g. ( e . g . between b e t w e e n adjacent a d j a c e n t transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s in i n one o n e area) a r e a ) • • Escalation E s c a l a t i o n of o f fire f i r e between b e t w e e n rooms r o o m s or o r areas a r e a s (e.g. ( e . g . from f r o m transformer t r a n s f o r m e r A A to t o transformer t r a n s f o r m e r area a r e a B B or o r adjacent a d j a c e n t electrical e l e c t r i c a l rooms) r o o m s ) • • Escalation E s c a l a t i o n of o f fire f i r e to t o safety s a f e t y critical c r i t i c a l elements e l e m e n t s before b e f o r e the t h e equipment e q u i p m e n t has h a s performed p e r f o r m e d its i t s intended i n t e n d e d duty d u t y in i n a a fire f i r e scenario s c e n a r i o (e.g. ( e . g . UPS U P S or o r control c o n t r o l systems, s y s t e m s , muster m u s t e r area) a r e a ) Requirements: R e q u i r e m e n t s : All A l l rooms r o o m s shall s h a l l have h a v e bulkheads b u l k h e a d s with w i t h rating r a t i n g A-0 A - 0 or o r stricter, s t r i c t e r , according a c c o r d i n g to t o DNV-ST-0145. D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 . Bulkheads B u l k h e a d s between b e t w e e n Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r A A and a n d B B areas a r e a s and a n d between b e t w e e n transformer t r a n s f o r m e r areas a r e a s and a n d adjacent a d j a c e n t spaces s p a c e s shall s h a l l be b e H-rated H - r a t e d unless u n l e s s a a lower l o w e r fire f i r e rating r a t i n g is i s justified j u s t i f i e d by b y structural s t r u c t u r a l fire f i r e response r e s p o n s e analysis. a n a l y s i s . The T h e fire f i r e divisions d i v i s i o n s shall s h a l l be b e capable c a p a b l e of o f resisting r e s i s t i n g dimensioning d i m e n s i o n i n g fire f i r e and a n d explosion e x p l o s i o n loads. l o a d s . IEC I E C 60332 6 0 3 3 2 Test T e s t on o n electrical e l e c t r i c a l cables c a b l e s under u n d e r fire f i r e conditions c o n d i t i o n s GL0644 G L 0 6 4 4 Guideline G u i d e l i n e Coat C o a t back b a c k on o n Steel S t e e l Structure S t r u c t u r e C274-RA-S-RA-01011 C 2 7 4 - R A - S - R A - 0 1 0 1 1 - - MFW M F W - - Fire F i r e and a n d Explosion E x p l o s i o n Risk R i s k Analysis A n a l y s i s Penetrations, P e n e t r a t i o n s , e.g. e . g . for f o r ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n ducts, d u c t s , piping, p i p i n g , cables, c a b l e s , beams b e a m s as a s well w e l l as a s doors d o o r s in i n fire f i r e divisions, d i v i s i o n s , shall s h a l l not n o t reduce r e d u c e the t h e fire f i r e and a n d explosion e x p l o s i o n integrity i n t e g r i t y of o f the t h e divisions. d i v i s i o n s . Doors D o o r s in i n fire f i r e divisions d i v i s i o n s shall s h a l l be b e of o f a a self-closing s e l f - c l o s i n g type. t y p e . Load L o a d bearing b e a r i n g structures s t r u c t u r e s / / important i m p o r t a n t elements e l e m e n t s shall s h a l l have h a v e adequate a d e q u a t e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n to t o prevent p r e v e n t unacceptable u n a c c e p t a b l e deformations d e f o r m a t i o n s or o r collapse c o l l a p s e during d u r i n g a a dimensioning d i m e n s i o n i n g fire. f i r e . However, H o w e v e r , contractor c o n t r a c t o r shall s h a l l strive s t r i v e to t o reduce r e d u c e fire f i r e insulation i n s u l a t i o n to t o a a minimum. m i n i m u m . Need N e e d for f o r fire f i r e insulation i n s u l a t i o n of o f structure, s t r u c t u r e , piping p i p i n g etc. e t c . shall s h a l l be b e assessed a s s e s s e d and a n d justified. j u s t i f i e d . Coat C o a t back b a c k of o f attachments a t t a c h m e n t s to t o main m a i n structures: s t r u c t u r e s : If I f the t h e contact c o n t a c t area a r e a including i n c l u d i n g the t h e cross-sectional c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l area a r e a inside i n s i d e hollow h o l l o w sections s e c t i o n s of o f an a n unprotected u n p r o t e c t e d structural s t r u c t u r a l element e l e m e n t is i s equal e q u a l or o r larger l a r g e r than t h a n 1000 1 0 0 0 mm m m 2 2 per p e r square s q u a r e meter m e t e r of o f fireproofed f i r e p r o o f e d structural s t r u c t u r a l elements, e l e m e n t s , the t h e need n e e d for f o r coat c o a t back b a c k must m u s t be b e evaluated. e v a l u a t e d . To T o do d o this, t h i s , the t h e Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 41 4 1 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s III I I I Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : actual a c t u a l structural s t r u c t u r a l design d e s i g n and a n d utilization u t i l i z a t i o n can c a n be b e compared c o m p a r e d with w i t h the t h e solutions s o l u t i o n s described d e s c r i b e d in i n GL0644. G L 0 6 4 4 . In I n most m o s t cases c a s e s coat c o a t back b a c k can c a n be b e avoided a v o i d e d and a n d it i t is i s not n o t expected e x p e c t e d that t h a t the t h e coat c o a t back b a c k distance d i s t a n c e in i n any a n y case c a s e needs n e e d s to t o be b e more m o r e than t h a n 150 1 5 0 mm. m m . Cables C a b l e s for f o r emergency e m e r g e n c y services/safety s e r v i c e s / s a f e t y services s e r v i c e s required r e q u i r e d to t o be b e operable o p e r a b l e under u n d e r fire f i r e conditions c o n d i t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e of o f a a fire-resistant f i r e - r e s i s t a n t type, t y p e , especially e s p e c i a l l y when w h e n they t h e y pass p a s s through t h r o u g h high h i g h fire f i r e risk r i s k areas a r e a s other o t h e r than t h a n those t h o s e which w h i c h they t h e y serve. s e r v e . All A l l other o t h e r cables c a b l e s shall s h a l l be b e minimum m i n i m u m flame f l a m e retardant r e t a r d a n t as a s per p e r IEC I E C 60332. 6 0 3 3 2 . Containment C o n t a i n m e n t around a r o u n d oil o i l filled f i l l e d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d with w i t h certified c e r t i f i e d passive p a s s i v e fire-protecting f i r e - p r o t e c t i n g grating g r a t i n g (restricting ( r e s t r i c t i n g air a i r to t o the t h e burning b u r n i n g liquids l i q u i d s and a n d quenching q u e n c h i n g of o f fire) f i r e ) to t o minimize m i n i m i z e risk r i s k of o f long-lasting l o n g - l a s t i n g pool p o o l fire, f i r e , ref. r e f . PS P S 5. 5 . 6.10 6 . 1 0 Emergency E m e r g e n c y Power P o w e r and a n d Lightning L i g h t n i n g (PS ( P S 11) 1 1 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e purpose p u r p o s e of o f the t h e Emergency E m e r g e n c y Power P o w e r and a n d Lighting L i g h t i n g is i s to t o provide p r o v i d e the t h e following: f o l l o w i n g : - - Electrical E l e c t r i c a l power p o w e r when w h e n main m a i n power p o w e r generation g e n e r a t i o n or o r supply s u p p l y is i s being b e i n g shut s h u t down. d o w n . - - Emergency E m e r g e n c y electrical e l e c t r i c a l power p o w e r supply s u p p l y for f o r a a specific s p e c i f i c period p e r i o d of o f time t i m e for f o r systems s y s t e m s required r e q u i r e d to t o be b e in i n operation o p e r a t i o n during d u r i n g or o r after a f t e r a a major m a j o r hazard h a z a r d incident. i n c i d e n t . - - Sufficient S u f f i c i e n t lighting l i g h t i n g for f o r evacuation e v a c u a t i o n and a n d escape e s c a p e in i n an a n emergency e m e r g e n c y situation. s i t u a t i o n . Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s DNV-GL-ST D N V - G L - S T 0145 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s EN E N 1838:2013, 1 8 3 8 : 2 0 1 3 , Lighting L i g h t i n g applications a p p l i c a t i o n s - - Emergency E m e r g e n c y lighting l i g h t i n g Emergency E m e r g e n c y power p o w e r supply s u p p l y Two T w o redundant r e d u n d a n t and a n d independent i n d e p e n d e n t UPS U P S systems s y s t e m s (2x100) ( 2 x 1 0 0 ) with w i t h three t h r e e (3) ( 3 ) hours h o u r s total t o t a l capacity c a p a c i t y serving s e r v i n g both b o t h emergency e m e r g e n c y and a n d non-emergency n o n - e m e r g e n c y consumers c o n s u m e r s shall s h a l l be b e provided. p r o v i d e d . Each E a c h emergency e m e r g e n c y consumer c o n s u m e r is i s fed f e d from f r o m each e a c h of o f the t h e two t w o UPS U P S systems s y s t e m s with w i t h local l o c a l change c h a n g e over o v e r to t o ensure e n s u r e availability a v a i l a b i l i t y of o f the t h e emergency e m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s for f o r minimum m i n i m u m three t h r e e (3) ( 3 ) hours. h o u r s . C256-EQ-Z-SP-00009 C 2 5 6 - E Q - Z - S P - 0 0 0 0 9 Offshore O f f s h o r e Substation S u b s t a t i o n (OSS) ( O S S ) Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 42 4 2 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e available a v a i l a b l e UPS U P S capacity c a p a c i t y shall, s h a l l , at a t any a n y time t i m e when w h e n needed, n e e d e d , ensure e n s u r e that t h a t safety s a f e t y systems s y s t e m s will w i l l be b e kept k e p t operational o p e r a t i o n a l during d u r i n g periods p e r i o d s of o f accidental a c c i d e n t a l events, e v e n t s , evacuation e v a c u a t i o n and a n d escape. e s c a p e . Reference R e f e r e n c e is i s made m a d e to t o Appendix A p p e n d i x C C for f o r assessment a s s e s s m e n t of o f required r e q u i r e d emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r and a n d duration d u r a t i o n of o f emergency e m e r g e n c y power. p o w e r . Emergency E m e r g e n c y consumers c o n s u m e r s to t o be b e supplied s u p p l i e d by b y the t h e UPS U P S shall s h a l l include: i n c l u d e : • • Emergency E m e r g e n c y and a n d escape e s c a p e lighting l i g h t i n g • • Active A c t i v e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n (when ( w h e n firefighting f i r e f i g h t i n g equipment e q u i p m e n t is i s dependent d e p e n d e n t on o n emergency e m e r g e n c y source s o u r c e of o f electrical e l e c t r i c a l power) p o w e r ) • • Control C o n t r o l and a n d communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n systems s y s t e m s required r e q u i r e d in i n an a n abnormal a b n o r m a l situation s i t u a t i o n (incl. ( i n c l . HV H V P&C) P & C ) • • Alarm A l a r m systems s y s t e m s • • HVAC H V A C systems s y s t e m s required r e q u i r e d to t o prevent p r e v e n t overheating o v e r h e a t i n g of o f rooms r o o m s with w i t h safety s a f e t y critical c r i t i c a l or o r essential e s s e n t i a l functions. f u n c t i o n s . Topside T o p s i d e Technical T e c h n i c a l Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n C274-RA-E-FD-01000 C 2 7 4 - R A - E - F D - 0 1 0 0 0 - - - - Design D e s i g n Brief B r i e f - - Electrical E l e c t r i c a l Low L o w Voltage V o l t a g e Systems S y s t e m s Consumers C o n s u m e r s supplied s u p p l i e d from f r o m the t h e UPS U P S shall s h a l l also a l s o enable e n a b l e personnel p e r s o n n e l to t o perform p e r f o r m corrective c o r r e c t i v e actions a c t i o n s to t o restore r e s t o r e main m a i n power, p o w e r , this t h i s includes i n c l u d e s but b u t not n o t limited l i m i t e d to: t o : • • Sufficient S u f f i c i e n t lighting l i g h t i n g at a t key k e y areas a r e a s • • Strategically S t r a t e g i c a l l y located l o c a t e d sockets. s o c k e t s . Separate S e p a r a t e UPS U P S system(s) s y s t e m ( s ) with w i t h 96-hour 9 6 - h o u r capacity c a p a c i t y shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d for: f o r : • • navigation n a v i g a t i o n lights l i g h t s • • aviation a v i a t i o n warning w a r n i n g lights l i g h t s • • structure s t r u c t u r e marking. m a r k i n g . Shut S h u t down d o w n of o f ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n shall s h a l l not n o t cause c a u s e temperatures t e m p e r a t u r e s above a b o v e vulnerable v u l n e r a b l e components’ c o m p o n e n t s ’ tolerance t o l e r a n c e within w i t h i n the t h e required r e q u i r e d operating o p e r a t i n g time t i m e of o f the t h e relevant r e l e v a n t installation i n s t a l l a t i o n safety s a f e t y systems. s y s t e m s . Minimum M i n i m u m required r e q u i r e d operating o p e r a t i n g time t i m e in i n this t h i s scenario s c e n a r i o is i s 30 3 0 minutes, m i n u t e s , to t o ensure e n s u r e availability a v a i l a b i l i t y of o f safety s a f e t y critical c r i t i c a l functions f u n c t i o n s until u n t i l escape e s c a p e and a n d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n is i s completed. c o m p l e t e d . Guidance: G u i d a n c e : Room R o o m temperature t e m p e r a t u r e may m a y exceed e x c e e d the t h e maximum m a x i m u m allowed a l l o w e d continuous c o n t i n u o u s ambient a m b i e n t temperature t e m p e r a t u r e for f o r a a short s h o r t section s e c t i o n at a t the t h e end e n d of o f the t h e period, p e r i o d , provided p r o v i d e d that t h a t lifetime l i f e t i m e consequence c o n s e q u e n c e is i s evaluated e v a l u a t e d and a n d found f o u n d acceptable. a c c e p t a b l e . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 43 4 3 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e End E n d guidance. g u i d a n c e . The T h e emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e monitored m o n i t o r e d and a n d raise r a i s e critical c r i t i c a l status s t a t u s alarms a l a r m s in i n Control C o n t r o l room. r o o m . Emergency E m e r g e n c y lighting: l i g h t i n g : Emergency E m e r g e n c y and a n d escape e s c a p e lighting l i g h t i n g shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d in i n order o r d e r to t o allow a l l o w escape e s c a p e during d u r i n g emergency e m e r g e n c y situations s i t u a t i o n s and a n d provide p r o v i d e sufficient s u f f i c i e n t lighting l i g h t i n g in i n areas a r e a s which w h i c h are a r e manned m a n n e d during d u r i n g such s u c h events. e v e n t s . This T h i s includes i n c l u d e s Escape E s c a p e routes, r o u t e s , muster m u s t e r areas, a r e a s , SOV/CTV S O V / C T V access a c c e s s gates, g a t e s , escape e s c a p e chute c h u t e areas, a r e a s , helicopter h e l i c o p t e r winch w i n c h area, a r e a , sea s e a illumination i l l u m i n a t i o n of o f boat b o a t landing l a n d i n g and a n d escape-to-sea e s c a p e - t o - s e a systems. s y s t e m s . The T h e emergency e m e r g e n c y lighting l i g h t i n g shall s h a l l be b e minimum m i n i m u m 30% 3 0 % of o f the t h e normal n o r m a l lighting l i g h t i n g level l e v e l and a n d ensure e n s u r e sufficient s u f f i c i e n t illumination i l l u m i n a t i o n for f o r safe s a f e work w o r k in i n areas a r e a s required r e q u i r e d to t o be b e manned m a n n e d during d u r i n g emergency e m e r g e n c y situations. s i t u a t i o n s . Escape E s c a p e lighting l i g h t i n g levels l e v e l s shall s h a l l be b e minimum m i n i m u m 15 1 5 lux l u x at a t high h i g h risk r i s k task t a s k areas a r e a s and a n d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n stations s t a t i o n s and a n d 1 1 lux l u x on o n escape e s c a p e routes. r o u t e s . Emergency E m e r g e n c y exit e x i t signs s i g n s shall s h a l l either e i t h e r have h a v e an a n illuminated i l l u m i n a t e d or o r fluorescent f l u o r e s c e n t type t y p e of o f design. d e s i g n . Survivability S u r v i v a b i l i t y requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s UPS U P S shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d in i n protected p r o t e c t e d area. a r e a . Cables C a b l e s to t o emergency e m e r g e n c y consumers c o n s u m e r s shall s h a l l be b e fire f i r e resistant. r e s i s t a n t . Emergency E m e r g e n c y light l i g h t fixtures f i x t u r e s without w i t h o u t internal i n t e r n a l batteries, b a t t e r i e s , shall s h a l l be b e arranged a r r a n g e d in i n A A and a n d B B system, s y s t e m , each e a c h supplied s u p p l i e d from f r o m separate s e p a r a t e redundant r e d u n d a n t power p o w e r sources. s o u r c e s . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 44 4 4 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 6.11 6 . 1 1 Process P r o c e s s Safety S a f e t y (PS ( P S 12) 1 2 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Process P r o c e s s safety s a f e t y means m e a n s of o f protection, p r o t e c t i o n , incorporating i n c o r p o r a t i n g electrical e l e c t r i c a l and a n d mechanical m e c h a n i c a l protection p r o t e c t i o n devices d e v i c e s and a n d safety s a f e t y instrumented i n s t r u m e n t e d functions, f u n c t i o n s , shall s h a l l ensure e n s u r e that t h a t the t h e process p r o c e s s conditions c o n d i t i o n s do d o not n o t exceed e x c e e d specified s p e c i f i e d process p r o c e s s safety s a f e t y limits. l i m i t s . The T h e main m a i n process p r o c e s s for f o r wind w i n d farms f a r m s is i s understood u n d e r s t o o d as a s generation g e n e r a t i o n and a n d transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n of o f electrical e l e c t r i c a l energy. e n e r g y . C274-RA-S-RA-01004- C 2 7 4 - R A - S - R A - 0 1 0 0 4 - ELHAZ E L H A Z Report R e p o r t The T h e aim a i m is i s to t o control c o n t r o l any a n y abnormal a b n o r m a l process p r o c e s s operating o p e r a t i n g conditions c o n d i t i o n s to t o prevent p r e v e n t and/or a n d / o r minimize m i n i m i z e possible p o s s i b l e accidental a c c i d e n t a l events e v e n t s or o r releases. r e l e a s e s . Typical T y p i c a l actions, a c t i o n s , by b y means m e a n s of o f protection p r o t e c t i o n devices d e v i c e s include: i n c l u d e : • • Process P r o c e s s shutdown s h u t d o w n by b y tripping t r i p p i n g of o f Circuit C i r c u i t Breakers B r e a k e r s (CBs) ( C B s ) • • Pressure P r e s s u r e relief r e l i e f The T h e extent e x t e n t of o f a a shutdown s h u t d o w n situation s i t u a t i o n will w i l l depend d e p e n d on o n type t y p e of o f abnormality a b n o r m a l i t y and a n d may m a y vary v a r y from f r o m shutdown s h u t d o w n of o f process p r o c e s s sections s e c t i o n s with w i t h minimum m i n i m u m effect e f f e c t on o n the t h e production, p r o d u c t i o n , to t o a a total t o t a l shutdown. s h u t d o w n . Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards h a z a r d s • • Electrical E l e c t r i c a l faults f a u l t s resulting r e s u l t i n g in i n short s h o r t circuits c i r c u i t s / / arcing a r c i n g events e v e n t s and a n d subsequent s u b s e q u e n t fire f i r e or o r explosion e x p l o s i o n scenarios. s c e n a r i o s . Requirements: R e q u i r e m e n t s : Electrical E l e c t r i c a l faults f a u l t s are a r e detected d e t e c t e d and a n d cleared c l e a r e d by b y protection p r o t e c t i o n relays r e l a y s without w i t h o u t operator o p e r a t o r intervention. i n t e r v e n t i o n . A A SCADA S C A D A system s y s t e m will w i l l be b e installed i n s t a l l e d for f o r monitoring m o n i t o r i n g of o f the t h e wind w i n d farm f a r m plant. p l a n t . If I f abnormal a b n o r m a l condition c o n d i t i o n is i s detected d e t e c t e d in i n the t h e electrical e l e c t r i c a l systems, s y s t e m s , the t h e operator o p e r a t o r in i n onshore o n s h o r e central c e n t r a l control c o n t r o l room r o o m shall s h a l l evaluate e v a l u a t e and a n d consider c o n s i d e r appropriate a p p r o p r i a t e actions. a c t i o n s . There T h e r e will w i l l also a l s o be b e automatic a u t o m a t i c actions a c t i o n s based b a s e d on o n predefined p r e d e f i n e d levels/limits. l e v e l s / l i m i t s . The T h e control c o n t r o l room r o o m shall s h a l l be b e manned m a n n e d 24/7. 2 4 / 7 . High H i g h system s y s t e m reliability r e l i a b i l i t y shall s h a l l be b e ensured e n s u r e d by: b y : - - Autonomous A u t o n o m o u s protection p r o t e c t i o n relays r e l a y s will w i l l clear c l e a r any a n y electrical e l e c t r i c a l fault f a u l t in i n the t h e system. s y s t e m . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 45 4 5 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e - - Primary P r i m a r y protection p r o t e c t i o n relays r e l a y s are a r e backed b a c k e d up u p by b y secondary s e c o n d a r y back b a c k up u p relays r e l a y s if i f fault f a u l t is i s not n o t cleared c l e a r e d by b y primary. p r i m a r y . Redundant R e d u n d a n t protection p r o t e c t i o n relays r e l a y s are a r e as a s minimum m i n i m u m provided p r o v i d e d for f o r main m a i n HV H V equipment e q u i p m e n t and a n d cables c a b l e s (e.g. ( e . g . transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s and a n d export e x p o r t cables). c a b l e s ) . - - Relays R e l a y s from f r o m different d i f f e r e n t vendors/models v e n d o r s / m o d e l s All A l l relays r e l a y s onshore o n s h o r e and a n d offshore o f f s h o r e shall s h a l l be b e communicating c o m m u n i c a t i n g on o n redundant r e d u n d a n t fiber f i b e r networks n e t w o r k s (IEC61850). ( I E C 6 1 8 5 0 ) . Transformer T r a n s f o r m e r safety s a f e t y (electrical ( e l e c t r i c a l oil o i l filled f i l l e d equipment) e q u i p m e n t ) Each E a c h oil o i l filled f i l l e d transformer t r a n s f o r m e r shall s h a l l be b e protected p r o t e c t e d by b y redundant r e d u n d a n t protection p r o t e c t i o n systems s y s t e m s aimed a i m e d to t o detect d e t e c t internal i n t e r n a l failures f a i l u r e s and a n d quench q u e n c h an a n internal i n t e r n a l arc a r c by b y the t h e feeding f e e d i n g circuit c i r c u i t breaker. b r e a k e r . As A s minimum m i n i m u m the t h e following f o l l o w i n g shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d as a s part p a r t of o f the t h e short s h o r t circuit c i r c u i t protection: p r o t e c t i o n : - - Buchholz B u c h h o l z Relay R e l a y (not ( n o t redundant r e d u n d a n t detection d e t e c t i o n but b u t redundant r e d u n d a n t tripping) t r i p p i n g ) - - Differential D i f f e r e n t i a l protection p r o t e c t i o n relay r e l a y - - Earth E a r t h Fault F a u l t protection p r o t e c t i o n The T h e Transformers T r a n s f o r m e r s shall s h a l l be b e equipped e q u i p p e d with w i t h a a Pressure P r e s s u r e Release R e l e a s e Valve V a l v e (PRV) ( P R V ) to t o protect p r o t e c t the t h e transformer t r a n s f o r m e r tank t a n k in i n scenarios s c e n a r i o s with w i t h gradual g r a d u a l pressure p r e s s u r e build-up b u i l d - u p and a n d low-energy l o w - e n e r g y arching a r c h i n g faults f a u l t s (as ( a s result r e s u l t of o f fire f i r e exposure, e x p o s u r e , oil o i l filling f i l l i n g operation o p e r a t i o n or o r other o t h e r maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e operations o p e r a t i o n s or o r transformer t r a n s f o r m e r malfunction m a l f u n c t i o n scenarios). s c e n a r i o s ) . PRV P R V shall s h a l l be b e equipped e q u i p p e d with w i t h an a n external e x t e r n a l duct d u c t to t o guide g u i d e the t h e ruptured r u p t u r e d oil o i l down d o w n below b e l o w the t h e deck d e c k grating g r a t i n g instead i n s t e a d of o f spreading s p r e a d i n g to t o the t h e surroundings. s u r r o u n d i n g s . The T h e PRV P R V shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d to t o not n o t limit l i m i t the t h e free f r e e flow f l o w of o f oil o i l in i n any a n y way. w a y . 6.12 6 . 1 2 Alarm A l a r m and a n d Communication C o m m u n i c a t i o n System S y s t e m for f o r use u s e in i n Emergency E m e r g e n c y Situations S i t u a t i o n s (PS ( P S 13) 1 3 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e GA, G A , Alarm A l a r m and a n d communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n systems s y s t e m s for f o r use u s e in i n emergency e m e r g e n c y situations s i t u a t i o n s shall: s h a l l : • • Alert A l e r t and a n d inform i n f o r m personnel p e r s o n n e l as a s quickly q u i c k l y as a s possible p o s s i b l e in i n the t h e event e v e n t of o f a a hazardous h a z a r d o u s or o r emergency e m e r g e n c y situation s i t u a t i o n • • Provide P r o v i d e two-way t w o - w a y communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n of o f information i n f o r m a t i o n regarding r e g a r d i n g emergency e m e r g e n c y events e v e n t s to t o the t h e Control C o n t r o l Room R o o m • • Allow A l l o w the t h e co-ordination c o - o r d i n a t i o n of o f rescue, r e s c u e , recovery, r e c o v e r y , and a n d emergency e m e r g e n c y assistance. a s s i s t a n c e . DNV-GL-ST D N V - G L - S T 0145 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 46 4 6 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s III I I I Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s All A l l personnel p e r s o n n e l onboard o n b o a r d shall s h a l l carry c a r r y personal, p e r s o n a l , two-way t w o - w a y radios r a d i o s suitable s u i t a b l e for f o r effective, e f f e c t i v e , intelligible i n t e l l i g i b l e communication. c o m m u n i c a t i o n . This T h i s is i s intended i n t e n d e d to t o replace r e p l a c e the t h e need n e e d for f o r a a dedicated d e d i c a t e d public p u b l i c address a d d r e s s (PA) ( P A ) system. s y s t e m . C274-RA-S-FD-01000 C 2 7 4 - R A - S - F D - 0 1 0 0 0 - - - - HSE H S E Design D e s i g n Brief B r i e f The T h e GA/alarm G A / a l a r m system, s y s t e m , loudspeakers, l o u d s p e a k e r s , alarm a l a r m horns/ h o r n s / sirens, s i r e n s , bells b e l l s and a n d flashing f l a s h i n g lights l i g h t s shall s h a l l comply c o m p l y with w i t h prevailing p r e v a i l i n g regulations r e g u l a t i o n s and a n d practices p r a c t i c e s to t o ensure e n s u r e that t h a t personnel p e r s o n n e l will w i l l be b e alerted a l e r t e d and a n d informed i n f o r m e d in i n the t h e event e v e n t of o f an a n emergency e m e r g e n c y situation. s i t u a t i o n . Layout L a y o u t and a n d location l o c a t i o n of o f loudspeakers, l o u d s p e a k e r s , horns/ h o r n s / sirens s i r e n s and a n d bells b e l l s shall s h a l l be b e reviewed r e v i e w e d during d u r i n g design d e s i g n and a n d verified v e r i f i e d during d u r i n g start-up s t a r t - u p and a n d operation. o p e r a t i o n . This T h i s also a l s o applies a p p l i e s to t o alarm/ a l a r m / flashing f l a s h i n g lights l i g h t s particularly p a r t i c u l a r l y with w i t h respect r e s p e c t to t o areas a r e a s with w i t h high h i g h noise n o i s e level l e v e l and a n d possible p o s s i b l e toxic t o x i c gas. g a s . Flashing F l a s h i n g light l i g h t shall s h a l l be b e installed i n s t a l l e d in i n areas a r e a s with w i t h noise n o i s e levels l e v e l s exceeding e x c e e d i n g 85 8 5 dBA. d B A . The T h e alarm a l a r m system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e fully f u l l y redundant r e d u n d a n t (separate ( s e p a r a t e A A system s y s t e m and a n d B B system). s y s t e m ) . Alarm A l a r m signals s i g n a l s The T h e alarm a l a r m system s y s t e m shall s h a l l distribute d i s t r i b u t e audio a u d i o alarms, a l a r m s , visual v i s u a l alarms a l a r m s and a n d emergency e m e r g e n c y messages, m e s s a g e s , and a n d shall s h a l l be b e interfaced i n t e r f a c e d with w i t h the t h e emergency e m e r g e n c y shutdown s h u t d o w n and a n d Fire F i r e & & Gas G a s systems s y s t e m s for f o r alarm a l a r m input. i n p u t . Signal S i g n a l types, t y p e s , visual v i s u a l color c o l o r codes c o d e s and a n d alarm a l a r m types t y p e s (e.g.: ( e . g . : general, g e n e r a l , muster, m u s t e r , abandon a b a n d o n and a n d toxic) t o x i c ) shall s h a l l be b e according a c c o r d i n g to t o local l o c a l requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s and a n d practice. p r a c t i c e . Emergency E m e r g e n c y communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n Minimum M i n i m u m two t w o means m e a n s of o f communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e between b e t w e e n onshore o n s h o r e CCR C C R and a n d OSS O S S via v i a redundant r e d u n d a n t communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n links l i n k s (e.g. ( e . g . VHF V H F radio, r a d i o , IP I P telephony, t e l e p h o n y , TETRA). T E T R A ) . A A telephone t e l e p h o n e system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e installed i n s t a l l e d on o n the t h e OSS O S S so s o that t h a t personnel p e r s o n n e l can c a n alert a l e r t the t h e onshore o n s h o r e CCR. C C R . External E x t e r n a l emergency e m e r g e n c y communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n The T h e facilities f a c i l i t i e s shall s h a l l have h a v e necessary n e c e s s a r y equipment e q u i p m e n t for f o r communications c o m m u n i c a t i o n s with w i t h external e x t e r n a l emergency e m e r g e n c y response r e s p o n s e resources| r e s o u r c e s | Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 47 4 7 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s III I I I Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Radio R a d i o system s y s t e m shall s h a l l also a l s o provide p r o v i d e marine m a r i n e communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n to t o allow a l l o w for f o r co-ordination c o - o r d i n a t i o n of o f active a c t i v e fire f i r e protection, p r o t e c t i o n , response r e s p o n s e to t o marine m a r i n e pollution p o l l u t i o n and a n d emergency e m e r g e n c y assistance. a s s i s t a n c e . Equipment E q u i p m e n t for f o r communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e powered p o w e r e d from f r o m dedicated d e d i c a t e d battery b a t t e r y supplies s u p p l i e s and/ a n d / or o r powered p o w e r e d from f r o m the t h e facility’s f a c i l i t y ’ s UPS U P S system. s y s t e m . 6.13 6 . 1 3 Escape, E s c a p e , Evacuation E v a c u a t i o n and a n d Rescue; R e s c u e ; EER E E R (PS ( P S 14) 1 4 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Escape E s c a p e and a n d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n route r o u t e and a n d exits e x i t s In I n the t h e case c a s e of o f a a hazardous h a z a r d o u s incident, i n c i d e n t , the t h e purpose p u r p o s e of o f escape e s c a p e and a n d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n routes r o u t e s is i s to: t o : • • Ensure E n s u r e that t h a t personnel p e r s o n n e l can c a n leave l e a v e the t h e area(s) a r e a ( s ) in i n question q u e s t i o n by b y at a t least l e a s t one o n e safe s a f e route r o u t e • • Enable E n a b l e personnel p e r s o n n e l to t o safely s a f e l y reach r e a c h the t h e assigned a s s i g n e d mustering m u s t e r i n g area a r e a from f r o m any a n y position p o s i t i o n on o n the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n they t h e y are a r e likely l i k e l y to t o occupy o c c u p y (and ( a n d hence h e n c e the t h e designated d e s i g n a t e d embarkation e m b a r k a t i o n area). a r e a ) . • • Enable E n a b l e rescue/medical r e s c u e / m e d i c a l teams t e a m s to t o safely s a f e l y bring b r i n g injured i n j u r e d personnel p e r s o n n e l to t o areas a r e a s where w h e r e medical m e d i c a l treatment t r e a t m e n t can c a n be b e given g i v e n Temporary T e m p o r a r y refuges r e f u g e s and a n d embarkation e m b a r k a t i o n areas a r e a s (Muster ( M u s t e r area) a r e a ) The T h e purpose p u r p o s e of o f refuges r e f u g e s and a n d embarkation(mustering) e m b a r k a t i o n ( m u s t e r i n g ) areas a r e a s is i s to. t o . • • Provide P r o v i d e safe s a f e refuge r e f u g e on o n the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n as a s long l o n g as a s required r e q u i r e d for f o r a a controlled c o n t r o l l e d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n to t o be b e carried c a r r i e d out. o u t . • • Ensure E n s u r e easy, e a s y , fast f a s t and a n d safe s a f e entering e n t e r i n g of o f the t h e evacuation e v a c u a t i o n systems s y s t e m s in i n question q u e s t i o n Evacuation E v a c u a t i o n systems s y s t e m s The T h e purpose p u r p o s e of o f the t h e evacuation e v a c u a t i o n system(s) s y s t e m ( s ) is i s to t o ensure e n s u r e safe s a f e means m e a n s of o f evacuating e v a c u a t i n g the t h e maximum m a x i m u m POB. P O B . SOLAS S O L A S Chapter C h a p t e r III I I I – – Life L i f e Saving S a v i n g Appliances A p p l i a n c e s and a n d arrangements a r r a n g e m e n t s I I DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e Substations S u b s t a t i o n s CAP C A P 437 4 3 7 Standards S t a n d a r d s for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e helicopter h e l i c o p t e r landing l a n d i n g areas a r e a s Rescue R e s c u e and a n d safety s a f e t y equipment e q u i p m e n t The T h e purpose p u r p o s e of o f rescue r e s c u e and a n d safety s a f e t y equipment e q u i p m e n t is i s to: t o : • • Provide P r o v i d e personnel p e r s o n n e l with w i t h necessary n e c e s s a r y equipment e q u i p m e n t to t o ensure e n s u r e safe s a f e EER E E R ISO I S O 3864 3 8 6 4 Graphical G r a p h i c a l symbols s y m b o l s — — Safety S a f e t y colors c o l o r s and a n d safety s a f e t y signs s i g n s Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 48 4 8 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e • • Ensure E n s u r e that t h a t injured i n j u r e d personnel p e r s o n n e l are a r e given g i v e n adequate a d e q u a t e first f i r s t aid a i d treatment t r e a t m e n t and a n d a a professional p r o f e s s i o n a l follow f o l l o w up, u p , thus t h u s minimizing m i n i m i z i n g the t h e effects e f f e c t s from f r o m possible p o s s i b l e injuries. i n j u r i e s . Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s ISO I S O 7010 7 0 1 0 Graphical G r a p h i c a l symbols s y m b o l s — — Safety S a f e t y colors c o l o r s and a n d safety s a f e t y signs s i g n s – – Registered R e g i s t e r e d safety s a f e t y signs s i g n s Escape E s c a p e and a n d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n routes r o u t e s and a n d exits e x i t s Escape E s c a p e routes r o u t e s and a n d muster m u s t e r area a r e a shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d enabling e n a b l i n g all a l l personnel p e r s o n n e l to t o safely s a f e l y leave l e a v e the t h e affected a f f e c t e d area(s) a r e a ( s ) in i n case c a s e of o f a a hazardous h a z a r d o u s incident. i n c i d e n t . A A minimum m i n i m u m of o f two t w o independent i n d e p e n d e n t escape e s c a p e routes r o u t e s leading l e a d i n g from f r o m any a n y area a r e a to t o muster m u s t e r area a r e a shall s h a l l be b e provided. p r o v i d e d . C256-EQ-Z-SP-00009 C 2 5 6 - E Q - Z - S P - 0 0 0 0 9 Offshore O f f s h o r e Substation S u b s t a t i o n (OSS) ( O S S ) Topside T o p s i d e Technical T e c h n i c a l Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n The T h e muster m u s t e r area(s) a r e a ( s ) shall s h a l l be b e positioned p o s i t i o n e d in i n lower l o w e r deck d e c k with w i t h close c l o s e access a c c e s s to t o escape e s c a p e chutes, c h u t e s , boat b o a t landing l a n d i n g ladders l a d d e r s and a n d SOV S O V gangway g a n g w a y connection c o n n e c t i o n points. p o i n t s . Survival S u r v i v a l suits s u i t s shall s h a l l be b e stored s t o r e d nearby n e a r b y or o r at a t muster m u s t e r areas. a r e a s . Escape E s c a p e routes r o u t e s shall s h a l l preferably p r e f e r a b l y be b e provided p r o v i d e d on o n the t h e outside, o u t s i d e , along a l o n g the t h e periphery p e r i p h e r y of o f the t h e installation, i n s t a l l a t i o n , and a n d be b e designed d e s i g n e d to t o be b e passable p a s s a b l e by b y position p o s i t i o n rather r a t h e r than t h a n by b y special s p e c i a l protection. p r o t e c t i o n . C274-RA-S-RA-01012 C 2 7 4 - R A - S - R A - 0 1 0 1 2 - - Escape E s c a p e and a n d Evacuation E v a c u a t i o n Assessment A s s e s s m e n t Escape E s c a p e and a n d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n routes r o u t e s leading l e a d i n g to t o a a higher h i g h e r or o r lower l o w e r level l e v e l shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d by b y stairways. s t a i r w a y s . They T h e y shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d nearly n e a r l y diagonally d i a g o n a l l y opposite o p p o s i t e each e a c h other o t h e r as a s practicable. p r a c t i c a b l e . Hatches H a t c h e s shall s h a l l not n o t be b e part p a r t of o f escape e s c a p e routes. r o u t e s . Ladders L a d d e r s can c a n be b e used u s e d as a s part p a r t of o f escape e s c a p e routes r o u t e s in i n areas a r e a s where w h e r e the t h e work w o r k is i s of o f such s u c h a a nature n a t u r e that t h a t only o n l y a a few f e w persons p e r s o n s (3 ( 3 or o r less) l e s s ) are a r e in i n the t h e area a r e a on o n a a short s h o r t time t i m e basis b a s i s when w h e n the t h e platform p l a t f o r m is i s manned. m a n n e d . The T h e length l e n g t h of o f a a stair s t a i r flight f l i g h t or o r a a ladder l a d d e r shall s h a l l be b e as a s low l o w as a s possible. p o s s i b l e . The T h e substation s u b s t a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d for f o r stretcher s t r e t c h e r transport t r a n s p o r t to t o embarkation e m b a r k a t i o n points p o i n t s at a t the t h e lower l o w e r deck d e c k and a n d to t o helicopter h e l i c o p t e r hoist h o i s t area. a r e a . It I t shall s h a l l be b e demonstrated d e m o n s t r a t e d in i n all a l l cases c a s e s that t h a t equipment e q u i p m e n t used u s e d for f o r transportation t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of o f injured i n j u r e d personnel p e r s o n n e l can c a n be b e turned t u r n e d at a t corners c o r n e r s and a n d in i n the t h e staircases. s t a i r c a s e s . Required R e q u i r e d width w i d t h of o f main m a i n access a c c e s s / / escape e s c a p e routes r o u t e s shall s h a l l emphasize e m p h a s i z e easy e a s y transport t r a n s p o r t of o f injured i n j u r e d personnel p e r s o n n e l on o n a a stretcher. s t r e t c h e r . The T h e dimensions d i m e n s i o n s shall s h a l l minimum m i n i m u m be b e 1 1 m m in i n width w i d t h (0.9 ( 0 . 9 m m for f o r doors) d o o r s ) and a n d 2.3 2 . 3 m m in i n height h e i g h t (2050 ( 2 0 5 0 mm m m for f o r doors). d o o r s ) . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 49 4 9 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e There T h e r e shall s h a l l be b e at a t least l e a s t two t w o exits e x i t s to t o escape e s c a p e routes r o u t e s from f r o m areas a r e a s that t h a t are a r e permanently p e r m a n e n t l y or o r intermittently i n t e r m i t t e n t l y manned m a n n e d during d u r i n g inspection i n s p e c t i o n or o r maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e visits, v i s i t s , leading l e a d i n g in i n different d i f f e r e n t escape e s c a p e directions d i r e c t i o n s and a n d situated s i t u a t e d as a s far f a r apart a p a r t from f r o m each e a c h other o t h e r as a s possible. p o s s i b l e . Internal I n t e r n a l room r o o m arrangement a r r a n g e m e n t shall s h a l l be b e considered c o n s i d e r e d for f o r possible p o s s i b l e blocking b l o c k i n g of o f exits e x i t s following f o l l o w i n g an a n accident. a c c i d e n t . Layout L a y o u t shall s h a l l accommodate a c c o m m o d a t e that t h a t escape e s c a p e from f r o m one o n e area a r e a to t o another a n o t h e r area a r e a with w i t h higher h i g h e r risk r i s k level l e v e l is i s not n o t required. r e q u i r e d . Escape E s c a p e from f r o m a a HV H V room r o o m may m a y be b e through t h r o u g h another a n o t h e r HV H V room r o o m of o f same s a m e or o r lower l o w e r risk r i s k level. l e v e l . All A l l doors d o o r s shall s h a l l be b e constructed c o n s t r u c t e d so s o that t h a t one o n e person p e r s o n can c a n easily e a s i l y open o p e n them t h e m from f r o m either e i t h e r side. s i d e . They T h e y shall s h a l l open o p e n in i n the t h e direction d i r e c t i o n of o f escape e s c a p e without w i t h o u t blocking b l o c k i n g the t h e outside o u t s i d e escape e s c a p e route r o u t e and a n d be b e self-closing. s e l f - c l o s i n g . This T h i s requirement r e q u i r e m e n t should s h o u l d consider c o n s i d e r the t h e effect e f f e c t of o f wind w i n d (1-year ( 1 - y e a r condition). c o n d i t i o n ) . If I f analysis a n a l y s i s shows s h o w s that t h a t a a door d o o r can c a n be b e used u s e d from f r o m both b o t h directions d i r e c t i o n s during d u r i n g escape/evacuation, e s c a p e / e v a c u a t i o n , e.g. e . g . due d u e to t o two t w o separate s e p a r a t e incidents, i n c i d e n t s , a a sliding s l i d i n g door d o o r should s h o u l d be b e used. u s e d . Doors D o o r s that t h a t are a r e normally n o r m a l l y locked l o c k e d can c a n be b e accepted a c c e p t e d with w i t h opening o p e n i n g in i n either e i t h e r direction d i r e c t i o n in i n such s u c h cases. c a s e s . Corridors C o r r i d o r s and a n d dead d e a d ends e n d s shall s h a l l not n o t exceed e x c e e d 7 7 meters m e t e r s unless u n l e s s provided p r o v i d e d with w i t h at a t least l e a s t two t w o exits, e x i t s , one o n e at a t each e a c h end. e n d . Survivability S u r v i v a b i l i t y of o f escape e s c a p e routes r o u t e s Escape E s c a p e routes r o u t e s outside o u t s i d e the t h e area a r e a for f o r the t h e initial i n i t i a l event e v e n t shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d and a n d protected p r o t e c t e d so s o that t h a t at a t least l e a s t one o n e route r o u t e of o f escape e s c a p e is i s available a v a i l a b l e for f o r the t h e required r e q u i r e d period p e r i o d of o f time t i m e during d u r i n g a a dimensioning d i m e n s i o n i n g accidental a c c i d e n t a l event. e v e n t . Personnel P e r s o n n e l shall s h a l l be b e able a b l e to t o use u s e the t h e escape e s c a p e routes r o u t e s without w i t h o u t being b e i n g exposed e x p o s e d to t o excessive e x c e s s i v e toxic t o x i c fumes, f u m e s , smoke s m o k e nor n o r unacceptable u n a c c e p t a b l e heat h e a t loads, l o a d s , hot h o t liquids l i q u i d s or o r falling f a l l i n g objects. o b j e c t s . Signs S i g n s and a n d markings m a r k i n g s A A sufficient s u f f i c i e n t number n u m b e r of o f safety s a f e t y signs s i g n s and a n d markings m a r k i n g s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d to t o convey c o n v e y necessary n e c e s s a r y information i n f o r m a t i o n to t o guide g u i d e personnel p e r s o n n e l in i n emergency e m e r g e n c y situations s i t u a t i o n s and a n d give g i v e clear c l e a r information i n f o r m a t i o n regarding r e g a r d i n g directions/locations d i r e c t i o n s / l o c a t i o n s of o f various v a r i o u s functions, f u n c t i o n s , areas a r e a s and a n d exits. e x i t s . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 50 5 0 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Safety S a f e t y signs s i g n s and a n d markings m a r k i n g s shall s h a l l conform c o n f o r m with w i t h regional r e g i o n a l requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s and a n d with w i t h reference r e f e r e n c e to t o international i n t e r n a t i o n a l industry i n d u s t r y standards, s t a n d a r d s , e.g. e . g . ISO I S O 3864 3 8 6 4 and a n d ISO I S O 7010. 7 0 1 0 . Signs S i g n s and a n d markings m a r k i n g s shall s h a l l be b e consistent c o n s i s t e n t throughout t h r o u g h o u t the t h e plant, p l a n t , and a n d the t h e color c o l o r code c o d e used u s e d shall s h a l l be b e specific s p e c i f i c and a n d not n o t used u s e d for f o r other o t h e r purposes. p u r p o s e s . A A descriptive d e s c r i p t i v e text t e x t shall s h a l l be b e added a d d e d to t o the t h e sign s i g n if i f symbols s y m b o l s are a r e not n o t easily e a s i l y understood. u n d e r s t o o d . Text T e x t shall s h a l l however h o w e v e r be b e kept k e p t to t o a a minimum. m i n i m u m . All A l l signs/markings s i g n s / m a r k i n g s and a n d their t h e i r supports s u p p o r t s shall s h a l l be b e constructed c o n s t r u c t e d from f r o m robust r o b u s t material; m a t e r i a l ; durable d u r a b l e and a n d suitable s u i t a b l e for f o r the t h e intended i n t e n d e d use, u s e , the t h e environmental e n v i r o n m e n t a l forces f o r c e s and a n d cleaning c l e a n i n g methods m e t h o d s to t o which w h i c h they t h e y will w i l l be b e subjected. s u b j e c t e d . Escape E s c a p e routes r o u t e s shall s h a l l have h a v e signs/markings s i g n s / m a r k i n g s showing s h o w i n g the t h e preferred p r e f e r r e d direction d i r e c t i o n of o f escape. e s c a p e . Escape E s c a p e and a n d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n routes r o u t e s on o n plated p l a t e d decks d e c k s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d with w i t h a a non-skid, n o n - s k i d , oil o i l resistant r e s i s t a n t coating c o a t i n g in i n yellow y e l l o w (RAL1023), ( R A L 1 0 2 3 ) , unless u n l e s s local l o c a l requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s regulate r e g u l a t e the t h e color c o l o r coding. c o d i n g . On O n deck d e c k grating, g r a t i n g , two t w o parallel p a r a l l e l 100 1 0 0 mm m m wide w i d e yellow y e l l o w (RAL ( R A L 1023 1 0 2 3 if i f no n o other o t h e r requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s are a r e given) g i v e n ) lines l i n e s shall s h a l l be b e painted p a i n t e d indicating i n d i c a t i n g the t h e width w i d t h of o f the t h e escape e s c a p e route. r o u t e . Escape E s c a p e and a n d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n routes r o u t e s inside i n s i d e rooms r o o m s with w i t h other o t h e r floor f l o o r finish f i n i s h than t h a n plated p l a t e d deck d e c k or o r grating, g r a t i n g , e.g. e . g . multipurpose m u l t i p u r p o s e and a n d control c o n t r o l room, r o o m , shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d with w i t h low l o w level l e v e l fluorescent f l u o r e s c e n t arrows a r r o w s showing s h o w i n g correct c o r r e c t escape e s c a p e direction. d i r e c t i o n . Other O t h e r enclosed e n c l o s e d spaces s p a c e s shall s h a l l be b e considered c o n s i d e r e d separately. s e p a r a t e l y . Safety S a f e t y plans p l a n s shall s h a l l be b e strategically s t r a t e g i c a l l y located l o c a t e d / / posted p o s t e d on o n the t h e premises p r e m i s e s with w i t h high h i g h degree d e g r e e of o f accessibility. a c c e s s i b i l i t y . Such S u c h a a plan p l a n shall s h a l l include: i n c l u d e : • • Locations L o c a t i o n s of o f safety, s a f e t y , rescue r e s c u e and a n d firefighting f i r e f i g h t i n g equipment e q u i p m e n t • • Emergency E m e r g e n c y exits, e x i t s , escape e s c a p e and a n d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n routes r o u t e s • • Evacuation E v a c u a t i o n instructions i n s t r u c t i o n s and a n d legends l e g e n d s Muster M u s t e r area a r e a The T h e muster m u s t e r area a r e a is i s a a safe s a f e place p l a c e where w h e r e personnel p e r s o n n e l normally n o r m a l l y muster m u s t e r while w h i l e emergency e m e r g e n c y response r e s p o n s e are a r e undertaken. u n d e r t a k e n . Muster M u s t e r area a r e a shall s h a l l be b e safe s a f e by b y position p o s i t i o n rather r a t h e r than t h a n by b y protection. p r o t e c t i o n . Two T w o easily e a s i l y accessible a c c e s s i b l e muster m u s t e r areas a r e a s (primary ( p r i m a r y and a n d secondary) s e c o n d a r y ) shall s h a l l be b e clearly c l e a r l y defined d e f i n e d and a n d separated s e p a r a t e d from f r o m each e a c h other o t h e r as a s widely w i d e l y as a s practicable. p r a c t i c a b l e . The T h e muster m u s t e r areas a r e a s shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d in i n protected p r o t e c t e d area a r e a at a t lower l o w e r deck d e c k with w i t h easy e a s y access a c c e s s to t o the t h e escape e s c a p e chutes, c h u t e s , boat b o a t landing l a n d i n g ladders l a d d e r s and a n d SOV S O V gangway g a n g w a y connection c o n n e c t i o n points. p o i n t s . The T h e muster m u s t e r areas, a r e a s , and a n d the t h e evacuation e v a c u a t i o n routes r o u t e s from f r o m muster m u s t e r area a r e a to t o the t h e embarkation e m b a r k a t i o n area a r e a in i n question, q u e s t i o n , shall s h a l l be b e arranged a r r a n g e d and a n d protected p r o t e c t e d in i n order o r d e r to t o ensure e n s u r e the t h e Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 51 5 1 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e safety s a f e t y of o f all a l l personnel p e r s o n n e l during d u r i n g the t h e period p e r i o d required r e q u i r e d for f o r the t h e evacuation e v a c u a t i o n process p r o c e s s to t o be b e completed c o m p l e t e d in i n an a n organized o r g a n i z e d and a n d efficient e f f i c i e n t way. w a y . The T h e primary p r i m a r y Muster M u s t e r Area A r e a shall s h a l l remain r e m a i n unimpaired u n i m p a i r e d by b y excessive e x c e s s i v e toxic t o x i c fumes, f u m e s , smoke, s m o k e , unacceptable u n a c c e p t a b l e heat h e a t load, l o a d , hot h o t liquids l i q u i d s and a n d falling f a l l i n g objects o b j e c t s for f o r minimum m i n i m u m 60 6 0 minutes. m i n u t e s . Additional A d d i t i o n a l functions f u n c t i o n s for f o r the t h e muster m u s t e r area a r e a are a r e to t o provide p r o v i d e first f i r s t aid, a i d , information, i n f o r m a t i o n , and a n d communication. c o m m u n i c a t i o n . The T h e size s i z e of o f the t h e muster m u s t e r areas a r e a s shall s h a l l as a s minimum m i n i m u m correspond c o r r e s p o n d to t o N*0.4 N * 0 . 4 m m 2 2 , , where w h e r e N N denotes d e n o t e s maximum m a x i m u m personnel p e r s o n n e l at a t the t h e substation. s u b s t a t i o n . Emergency E m e r g e n c y communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n systems s y s t e m s (e.g. ( e . g . telephone t e l e p h o n e and a n d UHF U H F radios) r a d i o s ) shall s h a l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e at a t the t h e muster m u s t e r station. s t a t i o n . At A t escape e s c a p e chutes c h u t e s waterproof w a t e r p r o o f portable p o r t a b l e VHF V H F shall s h a l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e and a n d adapted a d a p t e d for f o r use u s e in i n life l i f e rafts. r a f t s . Evacuation E v a c u a t i o n systems s y s t e m s Primary P r i m a r y method m e t h o d of o f evacuation e v a c u a t i o n is i s to t o CTV C T V via v i a the t h e boat b o a t landing l a n d i n g ladders l a d d e r s or o r to t o SOV S O V via v i a gangway g a n g w a y connection, c o n n e c t i o n , i.e. i . e . the t h e normal n o r m a l method m e t h o d of o f getting g e t t i n g to t o and a n d from f r o m the t h e installation. i n s t a l l a t i o n . Secondary S e c o n d a r y method m e t h o d of o f evacuation e v a c u a t i o n is i s helicopter h e l i c o p t e r winching w i n c h i n g from f r o m upper u p p e r level l e v e l of o f the t h e OSS O S S (medevac ( m e d e v a c or o r non-emergency n o n - e m e r g e n c y scenario) s c e n a r i o ) Tertiary T e r t i a r y method m e t h o d of o f evacuation e v a c u a t i o n is i s evacuation e v a c u a t i o n to t o sea s e a by b y escape e s c a p e chutes c h u t e s with w i t h life l i f e rafts. r a f t s . Evacuation E v a c u a t i o n by b y SOV S O V SOV S O V will w i l l not n o t be b e permanently p e r m a n e n t l y connected c o n n e c t e d when w h e n personnel p e r s o n n e l are a r e on-board o n - b o a r d the t h e OSS. O S S . The T h e SOV S O V shall s h a l l be b e able a b l e to t o react r e a c t and a n d connect c o n n e c t with w i t h gangway g a n g w a y to t o the t h e OSS O S S within w i t h i n 30 3 0 minutes m i n u t e s upon u p o n request. r e q u e s t . The T h e SOV S O V walk-to-work w a l k - t o - w o r k system s y s t e m shall s h a l l as a s minimum m i n i m u m be b e operational o p e r a t i o n a l for f o r wave w a v e heights h e i g h t s up u p to t o 2.5 2 . 5 m m Hs. H s . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 52 5 2 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Weather W e a t h e r conditions c o n d i t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e monitored m o n i t o r e d and a n d personnel p e r s o n n e l onboard o n b o a r d the t h e OSS O S S shall s h a l l be b e transferred t r a n s f e r r e d to t o SOV S O V prior p r i o r to t o the t h e critical c r i t i c a l weather w e a t h e r condition c o n d i t i o n is i s reached. r e a c h e d . The T h e SOV S O V shall s h a l l be b e equipped e q u i p p e d with w i t h fast f a s t rescue r e s c u e craft c r a f t and a n d have h a v e emergency e m e r g e n c y medical m e d i c a l facility. f a c i l i t y . Evacuation E v a c u a t i o n via v i a CTV C T V Minimum M i n i m u m two t w o boat b o a t landings l a n d i n g s shall s h a l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e for f o r CTV C T V access. a c c e s s . Helicopter H e l i c o p t e r winching w i n c h i n g area a r e a A A helicopter h e l i c o p t e r winching w i n c h i n g area a r e a shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d on o n the t h e top t o p deck. d e c k . The T h e winching w i n c h i n g area a r e a is i s for f o r emergency e m e r g e n c y scenarios s c e n a r i o s when w h e n not n o t requiring r e q u i r i n g immediate i m m e d i a t e evacuation. e v a c u a t i o n . It I t is i s not n o t intended i n t e n d e d for f o r normal n o r m a l crew c r e w transfer t r a n s f e r nor n o r normal n o r m a l goods g o o d s logistics l o g i s t i c s but b u t may m a y be b e used u s e d in i n exceptional e x c e p t i o n a l cases c a s e s for f o r personnel p e r s o n n e l transfer t r a n s f e r and/or a n d / o r goods g o o d s logistics. l o g i s t i c s . Design D e s i g n and a n d obstacle o b s t a c l e restrictions r e s t r i c t i o n s and a n d visual v i s u a l aids a i d s marking m a r k i n g shall s h a l l be b e according a c c o r d i n g to t o requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s for f o r helicopter h e l i c o p t e r winching w i n c h i n g areas a r e a s in i n CAP C A P 437 4 3 7 and a n d relevant r e l e v a n t local l o c a l codes c o d e s and a n d standards. s t a n d a r d s . There T h e r e shall s h a l l be b e no n o obstructions o b s t r u c t i o n s such s u c h as a s antennas, a n t e n n a s , masts m a s t s or o r other o t h e r equipment e q u i p m e n t preventing p r e v e n t i n g helicopter h e l i c o p t e r access a c c e s s above a b o v e the t h e winching w i n c h i n g area. a r e a . The T h e maximum m a x i m u m helicopter h e l i c o p t e r rotor r o t o r diameter d i a m e t e r size s i z e shall s h a l l correspond c o r r e s p o n d to t o type t y p e of o f SAR S A R helicopters h e l i c o p t e r s to t o be b e used u s e d in i n Polish P o l i s h waters. w a t e r s . Escape E s c a p e chutes c h u t e s with w i t h life l i f e rafts r a f t s Escape E s c a p e chutes c h u t e s with w i t h life l i f e rafts r a f t s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d on o n two t w o separate s e p a r a t e locations l o c a t i o n s of o f the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n arranged a r r a n g e d such s u c h as a s to t o maximize m a x i m i z e availability a v a i l a b i l i t y with w i t h respect r e s p e c t to t o sea s e a conditions. c o n d i t i o n s . Each E a c h escape e s c a p e chute c h u t e location l o c a t i o n shall s h a l l have h a v e capacity c a p a c i t y for f o r maximum m a x i m u m POB. P O B . The T h e escape e s c a p e chutes c h u t e s shall s h a l l comply c o m p l y with w i t h air-gap a i r - g a p requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s as a s specified s p e c i f i e d in i n the t h e OSS O S S Topside T o p s i d e Technical T e c h n i c a l Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n and a n d be b e located l o c a t e d such s u c h that t h a t they t h e y are a r e unimpaired u n i m p a i r e d by b y excessive e x c e s s i v e toxic t o x i c fumes, f u m e s , smoke, s m o k e , unacceptable u n a c c e p t a b l e heat h e a t loads, l o a d s , hot h o t liquids l i q u i d s and a n d falling f a l l i n g objects o b j e c t s for f o r minimum m i n i m u m 60 6 0 minutes m i n u t e s after a f t e r all a l l reasonably r e a s o n a b l y foreseeable f o r e s e e a b l e incidents i n c i d e n t s begin. b e g i n . The T h e chute c h u t e system’s s y s t e m ’ s life l i f e rafts r a f t s and a n d boarding b o a r d i n g raft r a f t shall s h a l l be b e lowered l o w e r e d together t o g e t h e r with w i t h the t h e chute, c h u t e , and a n d the t h e boarding b o a r d i n g raft r a f t shall s h a l l automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y inflate. i n f l a t e . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 53 5 3 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e escape e s c a p e chute c h u t e system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e readily r e a d i l y available a v a i l a b l e and a n d easy e a s y to t o operate o p e r a t e with w i t h clear c l e a r operating o p e r a t i n g instructions i n s t r u c t i o n s located l o c a t e d on o n an a n appropriate a p p r o p r i a t e place, p l a c e , e.g. e . g . on o n the t h e wall w a l l inside i n s i d e container. c o n t a i n e r . Winch W i n c h for f o r recovery r e c o v e r y should s h o u l d be b e fed f e d by b y main m a i n power. p o w e r . Removal R e m o v a l of o f rafts r a f t s for f o r re-certification r e - c e r t i f i c a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e possible p o s s i b l e without w i t h o u t affecting a f f e c t i n g the t h e suspension s u s p e n s i o n system s y s t e m including i n c l u d i n g lifting l i f t i n g wire. w i r e . Location L o c a t i o n and a n d arrangement a r r a n g e m e n t shall s h a l l ensure e n s u r e easy e a s y lifting, l i f t i n g , installation i n s t a l l a t i o n and a n d removal r e m o v a l of o f the t h e chutes. c h u t e s . The T h e evacuation-to-sea-equipment e v a c u a t i o n - t o - s e a - e q u i p m e n t shall s h a l l be b e type t y p e approved a p p r o v e d and a n d tested t e s t e d according a c c o r d i n g to t o IMO/SOLAS/LSA, I M O / S O L A S / L S A , code c o d e and a n d national n a t i o n a l maritime m a r i t i m e regulatory r e g u l a t o r y requirements. r e q u i r e m e n t s . Rescue R e s c u e and a n d safety s a f e t y equipment e q u i p m e n t Suits S u i t s and a n d life l i f e jackets j a c k e t s Permanent P e r m a n e n t cabinets c a b i n e t s for f o r storage s t o r a g e of o f survival s u r v i v a l suits s u i t s (with ( w i t h floating f l o a t i n g and a n d thermal t h e r m a l protection p r o t e c t i o n abilities) a b i l i t i e s ) shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d at a t or o r close c l o s e to t o the t h e primary p r i m a r y muster m u s t e r station, s t a t i o n , corresponding c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t o the t h e maximum m a x i m u m POB P O B on o n the t h e OSS. O S S . The T h e survival s u r v i v a l suit s u i t is i s personal p e r s o n a l safety s a f e t y equipment, e q u i p m e n t , meaning m e a n i n g that t h a t each e a c h person p e r s o n on o n the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n shall s h a l l have h a v e their t h e i r own o w n suit s u i t that t h a t is i s brought b r o u g h t onboard o n b o a r d and a n d temporarily t e m p o r a r i l y stored s t o r e d in i n the t h e permanent p e r m a n e n t cabinets. c a b i n e t s . There T h e r e shall s h a l l be b e sufficient s u f f i c i e n t space s p a c e around a r o u n d the t h e cabinets c a b i n e t s to t o ensure e n s u r e quick q u i c k dress d r e s s up u p for f o r the t h e maximum m a x i m u m number n u m b e r of o f POB. P O B . Additional A d d i t i o n a l storage s t o r a g e of o f survival s u r v i v a l suits s u i t s corresponding c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t o the t h e maximum m a x i m u m POB P O B shall s h a l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e at a t the t h e muster m u s t e r station. s t a t i o n . Survival S u r v i v a l suits s u i t s shall s h a l l as a s a a minimum m i n i m u m be b e type t y p e approved a p p r o v e d according a c c o r d i n g to t o IMO/SOLAS/ I M O / S O L A S / LSA L S A Code, C o d e , but b u t additional a d d i t i o n a l requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s may m a y come c o m e out o u t of o f the t h e EER E E R analysis. a n a l y s i s . The T h e following f o l l o w i n g applies: a p p l i e s : • • Design D e s i g n should s h o u l d minimize m i n i m i z e impact i m p a c t to t o the t h e neck n e c k of o f the t h e wearer w e a r e r in i n case c a s e of o f jumping j u m p i n g from f r o m a a high h i g h level l e v e l • • Be B e of o f a a color c o l o r which w h i c h is i s easily e a s i l y visible v i s i b l e at a t sea s e a (yellow, ( y e l l o w , orange, o r a n g e , etc.) e t c . ) • • Have H a v e reflecting r e f l e c t i n g and/or a n d / o r fluorescent f l u o r e s c e n t markings m a r k i n g s to t o facilitate f a c i l i t a t e rescue r e s c u e in i n the t h e dark d a r k Life L i f e buoys b u o y s Life L i f e buoys b u o y s shall s h a l l be b e installed i n s t a l l e d at a t regular r e g u l a r intervals i n t e r v a l s on o n lower l o w e r deck d e c k perimeter p e r i m e t e r along a l o n g the t h e walkway, w a l k w a y , for f o r guidance g u i d a n c e see s e e DNV-ST-0145. D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 . Safety S a f e t y showers s h o w e r s and a n d eyebaths e y e b a t h s Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 54 5 4 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Need N e e d for f o r safety s a f e t y showers s h o w e r s or o r eyebaths e y e b a t h s and a n d strategic s t r a t e g i c locations l o c a t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e identified i d e n t i f i e d through t h r o u g h a a separate s e p a r a t e evaluation e v a l u a t i o n considering c o n s i d e r i n g the t h e chemicals c h e m i c a l s handled h a n d l e d and a n d spillage s p i l l a g e that t h a t may m a y occur o c c u r or o r risk r i s k for f o r burns b u r n s or o r exposure e x p o s u r e of o f hot h o t fluids f l u i d s to t o personnel. p e r s o n n e l . Potable P o t a b l e water w a t e r quality q u a l i t y shall s h a l l be b e used u s e d for f o r safety s a f e t y showers s h o w e r s and a n d eyebaths. e y e b a t h s . First F i r s t aid a i d kits k i t s and a n d equipment e q u i p m e n t An A n adequate a d e q u a t e number n u m b e r of o f first f i r s t aid a i d kits k i t s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d at a t suitable s u i t a b l e locations l o c a t i o n s and a n d shall s h a l l as a s minimum m i n i m u m be b e provided p r o v i d e d at a t the t h e Multipurpose M u l t i p u r p o s e room. r o o m . The T h e muster m u s t e r station s t a t i o n / / locker l o c k e r room r o o m shall s h a l l further f u r t h e r accommodate a c c o m m o d a t e storage/space s t o r a g e / s p a c e for f o r first f i r s t aid a i d equipment e q u i p m e n t such s u c h as a s medication, m e d i c a t i o n , rigged r i g g e d stretcher s t r e t c h e r and a n d defibrillation d e f i b r i l l a t i o n equipment. e q u i p m e n t . Search S e a r c h and a n d rescue r e s c u e equipment e q u i p m e n t Breathing B r e a t h i n g masks/smoke m a s k s / s m o k e hoods h o o d s for f o r escape e s c a p e through t h r o u g h areas a r e a s exposed e x p o s e d to t o toxic t o x i c fumes f u m e s or o r smoke s m o k e shall s h a l l be b e evaluated. e v a l u a t e d . Electrical E l e c t r i c a l rescue r e s c u e kits k i t s shall s h a l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e and a n d easily e a s i l y accessible a c c e s s i b l e for f o r personnel p e r s o n n e l performing p e r f o r m i n g tasks t a s k s in i n electrical e l e c t r i c a l rooms. r o o m s . 6.14 6 . 1 4 Layout L a y o u t Design D e s i g n Principles P r i n c i p l e s and a n d Explosion E x p l o s i o n Barriers B a r r i e r s (PS ( P S 15) 1 5 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e layout l a y o u t and a n d arrangement a r r a n g e m e n t shall s h a l l reduce r e d u c e the t h e probability p r o b a b i l i t y and a n d the t h e consequences c o n s e q u e n c e s of o f accidents a c c i d e n t s through t h r o u g h location, l o c a t i o n , separation s e p a r a t i o n and a n d orientation o r i e n t a t i o n of o f areas, a r e a s , equipment e q u i p m e n t and a n d functions. f u n c t i o n s . The T h e explosion e x p l o s i o n barriers b a r r i e r s shall s h a l l reduce r e d u c e the t h e consequences c o n s e q u e n c e s of o f the t h e pressure p r e s s u r e loads l o a d s from f r o m an a n ignited i g n i t e d cloud c l o u d of o f released r e l e a s e d gas g a s or o r oil o i l mist m i s t to t o prevent p r e v e n t the t h e accident a c c i d e n t to t o spread s p r e a d to t o other o t h e r areas a r e a s and/or a n d / o r critical c r i t i c a l equipment. e q u i p m e n t . TR3021 T R 3 0 2 1 Electrical E l e c t r i c a l system s y s t e m design, d e s i g n , offshore o f f s h o r e units u n i t s DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e Substations S u b s t a t i o n s Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 55 5 5 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards h a z a r d s • • Safety S a f e t y critical c r i t i c a l functions f u n c t i o n s impaired i m p a i r e d by b y accidental a c c i d e n t a l loads l o a d s • • Security S e c u r i t y incidents i n c i d e n t s or o r accidents a c c i d e n t s caused c a u s e d by b y third t h i r d party p a r t y entry e n t r y to t o the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n • • Explosion E x p l o s i o n e.g. e . g . due d u e to t o fault f a u l t in i n oil o i l filled f i l l e d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s resulting r e s u l t i n g in i n escalation e s c a l a t i o n between b e t w e e n equipment e q u i p m e n t or o r areas a r e a s • • Asphyxiation A s p h y x i a t i o n risk r i s k related r e l a t e d to t o leaks l e a k s from f r o m pressurized p r e s s u r i z e d bottles b o t t l e s (inert ( i n e r t gas, g a s , SF6, S F 6 , N2) N 2 ) C274-RA-S-SP-01000 C 2 7 4 - R A - S - S P - 0 1 0 0 0 - - - - Design D e s i g n Accidental A c c i d e n t a l Load L o a d Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n (DAL) ( D A L ) Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s Areas A r e a s or o r equipment e q u i p m e n t of o f high-risk h i g h - r i s k potential p o t e n t i a l (e.g. ( e . g . oil o i l filled f i l l e d transformer t r a n s f o r m e r area) a r e a ) shall s h a l l be b e segregated s e g r e g a t e d by b y sufficient s u f f i c i e n t distance d i s t a n c e or o r barriers b a r r i e r s from f r o m areas a r e a s required r e q u i r e d to t o be b e of o f low l o w risk r i s k potential, p o t e n t i a l , and a n d from f r o m areas a r e a s containing c o n t a i n i n g important i m p o r t a n t safety s a f e t y functions. f u n c t i o n s . Incident I n c i d e n t escalation e s c a l a t i o n between b e t w e e n areas a r e a s shall s h a l l be b e avoided. a v o i d e d . Muster M u s t e r and a n d embarkation e m b a r k a t i o n areas a r e a s and a n d rooms r o o m s with w i t h safety s a f e t y critical c r i t i c a l functions f u n c t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d at a t lower l o w e r deck d e c k level, l e v e l , separated s e p a r a t e d and a n d protected p r o t e c t e d by b y plated p l a t e d deck d e c k towards t o w a r d s areas a r e a s and a n d spaces s p a c e s with w i t h higher h i g h e r risk r i s k potential p o t e n t i a l which w h i c h shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d above a b o v e (e.g. ( e . g . transformer t r a n s f o r m e r areas, a r e a s , cooler c o o l e r areas). a r e a s ) . Physical P h y s i c a l security s e c u r i t y Access A c c e s s to t o boat b o a t landing l a n d i n g and a n d ladder l a d d e r up u p to t o lower l o w e r deck d e c k level l e v e l may m a y be b e available a v a i l a b l e for f o r third t h i r d party, p a r t y , but b u t access a c c e s s to t o deck d e c k shall s h a l l be b e controlled c o n t r o l l e d and a n d locked l o c k e d for f o r third t h i r d party, p a r t y , e.g. e . g . by b y mariner m a r i n e r cage c a g e or o r similar. s i m i l a r . The T h e lock l o c k design d e s i g n on o n the t h e mariner m a r i n e r cage c a g e entrance e n t r a n c e door d o o r must m u s t facilitate f a c i l i t a t e escape e s c a p e from f r o m the t h e platform. p l a t f o r m . Ladder L a d d e r entry e n t r y and a n d boat b o a t landings l a n d i n g s shall s h a l l be b e part p a r t of o f CCTV C C T V coverage. c o v e r a g e . All A l l rooms r o o m s on o n the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e locked l o c k e d as a s default. d e f a u l t . High H i g h voltage v o l t a g e rooms r o o m s locked l o c k e d with w i t h dedicated d e d i c a t e d keys. k e y s . High H i g h Voltage V o l t a g e cabinets c a b i n e t s locked l o c k e d with w i t h pad p a d locks. l o c k s . Ref R e f high h i g h voltage v o l t a g e (HV) ( H V ) safety s a f e t y rules. r u l e s . Explosion E x p l o s i o n design d e s i g n principles p r i n c i p l e s for f o r rooms r o o m s for f o r major m a j o r electrical e l e c t r i c a l equipment e q u i p m e n t The T h e rooms r o o m s shall s h a l l withstand w i t h s t a n d without w i t h o u t any a n y damage d a m a g e the t h e highest h i g h e s t blast b l a s t pressure p r e s s u r e caused c a u s e d by b y a a short s h o r t circuit. c i r c u i t . As A s a a general g e n e r a l rule r u l e it i t is i s not n o t necessary n e c e s s a r y to t o do d o any a n y calculations c a l c u l a t i o n s to t o document d o c u m e n t this t h i s requirement r e q u i r e m e n t for f o r short s h o r t circuit c i r c u i t levels l e v e l s up u p to t o the t h e levels l e v e l s listed l i s t e d below b e l o w (indicated ( i n d i c a t e d as a s the t h e maximum m a x i m u m symmetrical s y m m e t r i c a l root r o o t mean m e a n square s q u a r e (RMS) ( R M S ) value v a l u e of o f the t h e sub s u b transient t r a n s i e n t fault f a u l t current): c u r r e n t ) : - - 11 1 1 / / 6,6/3,3 6 , 6 / 3 , 3 kV: k V : 40 4 0 kA k A RMS R M S - - 690 6 9 0 V: V : 50 5 0 kA k A RMS R M S Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 56 5 6 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e - - 400/230 4 0 0 / 2 3 0 V: V : 30 3 0 kA k A RMS R M S – – Main M a i n distribution d i s t r i b u t i o n board; b o a r d ; - - 400/230 4 0 0 / 2 3 0 V: V : 10 1 0 kA k A RMS R M S – – Sub-distribution S u b - d i s t r i b u t i o n board b o a r d For F o r higher h i g h e r short s h o r t circuit c i r c u i t levels, l e v e l s , the t h e room r o o m integrity i n t e g r i t y towards t o w a r d s blast b l a s t pressure p r e s s u r e caused c a u s e d by b y a a short s h o r t circuit c i r c u i t shall s h a l l be b e documented. d o c u m e n t e d . Explosion E x p l o s i o n design d e s i g n principles p r i n c i p l e s - - Oil O i l filled f i l l e d transformer t r a n s f o r m e r areas a r e a s The T h e amount a m o u n t of o f venting v e n t i n g available, a v a i l a b l e , the t h e degree d e g r e e of o f blockage b l o c k a g e and a n d congestion c o n g e s t i o n in i n the t h e area a r e a significantly s i g n i f i c a n t l y influence i n f l u e n c e the t h e severity s e v e r i t y of o f an a n explosion e x p l o s i o n and a n d shall s h a l l be b e optimized o p t i m i z e d to t o reduce r e d u c e explosion e x p l o s i o n risk. r i s k . Oil O i l filled f i l l e d transformers t r a n s f o r m e r s should s h o u l d be b e located l o c a t e d in i n natural n a t u r a l ventilated v e n t i l a t e d area. a r e a . Dimensioning D i m e n s i o n i n g explosion e x p l o s i o n loads l o a d s shall s h a l l be b e established e s t a b l i s h e d and a n d implemented i m p l e m e n t e d in i n design d e s i g n for f o r structures s t r u c t u r e s and a n d equipment. e q u i p m e n t . Explosion E x p l o s i o n panels p a n e l s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d in i n walls w a l l s facing f a c i n g sea s e a (if ( i f partially p a r t i a l l y enclosed) e n c l o s e d ) in i n order o r d e r to t o reduce r e d u c e explosion e x p l o s i o n load l o a d potential. p o t e n t i a l . Storage S t o r a g e of o f pressurized p r e s s u r i z e d bottles b o t t l e s (Inert ( I n e r t gas, g a s , SF S F 6 6 , , N N 2 2 ) ) Storage S t o r a g e of o f pressurized p r e s s u r i z e d bottles b o t t l e s should s h o u l d be b e in i n naturally n a t u r a l l y ventilated v e n t i l a t e d area. a r e a . If I f gas g a s bottles b o t t l e s are a r e stored s t o r e d in i n enclosed e n c l o s e d spaces, s p a c e s , introducing i n t r o d u c i n g risk r i s k of o f asphyxiation, a s p h y x i a t i o n , adequate a d e q u a t e ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e provided, p r o v i d e d , and a n d leak l e a k detection d e t e c t i o n evaluated. e v a l u a t e d . 6.15 6 . 1 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e cranes c r a n e s (PS ( P S 16A) 1 6 A ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e crane c r a n e barrier b a r r i e r shall s h a l l reduce r e d u c e the t h e probability p r o b a b i l i t y that t h a t errors e r r o r s and a n d hazards h a z a r d s will w i l l arise a r i s e during d u r i n g crane c r a n e operation o p e r a t i o n and a n d reduce r e d u c e the t h e possibility p o s s i b i l i t y of o f boom b o o m or o r load l o a d fall. f a l l . Relevant R e l e v a n t hazards h a z a r d s TR1727 T R 1 7 2 7 Substitution S u b s t i t u t i o n to t o TR1727 T R 1 7 2 7 ver v e r 5, 5 , Unmanned U n m a n n e d installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 57 5 7 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e • • Dropped D r o p p e d objects o b j e c t s impacting i m p a c t i n g e.g. e . g . personnel, p e r s o n n e l , critical c r i t i c a l equipment, e q u i p m e n t , CTV C T V or o r SOV, S O V , subsea s u b s e a cables c a b l e s etc. e t c . Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s The T h e offshore o f f s h o r e crane c r a n e and a n d davits d a v i t s shall s h a l l comply c o m p l y with w i t h TR1727 T R 1 7 2 7 Substitution S u b s t i t u t i o n for f o r unmanned u n m a n n e d installations. i n s t a l l a t i o n s . The T h e likelihood l i k e l i h o o d of o f crane c r a n e boom b o o m or o r load l o a d fall f a l l as a s well w e l l as a s hanging h a n g i n g loads l o a d s hitting h i t t i n g personnel p e r s o n n e l or o r critical c r i t i c a l equipment e q u i p m e n t shall s h a l l be b e reduced r e d u c e d as a s far f a r as a s practicably p r a c t i c a b l y possible. p o s s i b l e . Crane C r a n e coverage c o v e r a g e and a n d laydown l a y d o w n areas a r e a s shall s h a l l be b e arranged a r r a n g e d to t o promote p r o m o t e safe s a f e operations o p e r a t i o n s of o f the t h e cranes c r a n e s and a n d free, f r e e , unobstructed u n o b s t r u c t e d visibility v i s i b i l i t y to t o lay l a y down d o w n and a n d lifting l i f t i n g zones z o n e s for f o r operator o p e r a t o r of o f the t h e crane. c r a n e . DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e Substations S u b s t a t i o n s EN E N 13852-1 1 3 8 5 2 - 1 and a n d 3 3 C274-RA-R-SP-01003 C 2 7 4 - R A - R - S P - 0 1 0 0 3 - - Main M a i n Crane C r a n e System S y s t e m Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n There T h e r e shall s h a l l be b e no n o lifting l i f t i n g zones z o n e s above a b o v e unprotected u n p r o t e c t e d equipment e q u i p m e n t or o r piping, p i p i n g , containing c o n t a i n i n g flammable f l a m m a b l e or o r toxic t o x i c gas/liquid. g a s / l i q u i d . Lifting L i f t i n g zones z o n e s to t o SOV/CTV S O V / C T V shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d such s u c h that t h a t lifting l i f t i n g operations o p e r a t i o n s to t o the t h e SOV/CTV S O V / C T V can c a n be b e done d o n e leeward l e e w a r d of o f the t h e predominant p r e d o m i n a n t weather w e a t h e r conditions. c o n d i t i o n s . C274-RA-R-SP-01004 C 2 7 4 - R A - R - S P - 0 1 0 0 4 - - Davit D a v i t Crane C r a n e System S y s t e m Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n The T h e lifting l i f t i n g zones z o n e s should s h o u l d be b e located l o c a t e d away a w a y from f r o m cables c a b l e s to t o or o r from f r o m the t h e OSS O S S if i f practical. p r a c t i c a l . The T h e cable c a b l e protection p r o t e c t i o n system s y s t e m (CPS) ( C P S ) shall s h a l l be b e capable c a p a b l e of o f handling h a n d l i n g relevant r e l e v a n t dropped d r o p p e d object o b j e c t loads. l o a d s . The T h e lifting l i f t i n g zones z o n e s shall s h a l l be b e defined d e f i n e d and a n d available a v a i l a b l e as a s a a lifting l i f t i n g map. m a p . Deck D e c k load l o a d limitation l i m i t a t i o n chart c h a r t shall s h a l l be b e established. e s t a b l i s h e d . A A sign s i g n indicating i n d i c a t i n g maximum m a x i m u m weight w e i g h t and a n d loading l o a d i n g rating r a t i n g shall s h a l l be b e displayed d i s p l a y e d at a t each e a c h laydown l a y d o w n area. a r e a . C274-RA-R-SP-01005 C 2 7 4 - R A - R - S P - 0 1 0 0 5 - - GIS G I S Room R o o m Crane C r a n e System S y s t e m Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n The T h e cranes c r a n e s shall s h a l l be b e equipped e q u i p p e d with w i t h necessary n e c e s s a r y fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n means, m e a n s , The T h e crane c r a n e shall s h a l l be b e operable o p e r a b l e to t o a a safe s a f e position p o s i t i o n in i n the t h e event e v e n t of o f an a n accident. a c c i d e n t . The T h e davit d a v i t crane c r a n e shall s h a l l be b e capable c a p a b l e and a n d certified c e r t i f i e d to t o lower l o w e r injured i n j u r e d personnel p e r s o n n e l to t o CTV. C T V . Swinging S w i n g i n g load l o a d protection p r o t e c t i o n shall s h a l l be b e implemented i m p l e m e n t e d on o n laydown l a y d o w n areas a r e a s as a s required r e q u i r e d to t o prevent p r e v e n t impact i m p a c t to t o critical c r i t i c a l equipment e q u i p m e n t and a n d critical c r i t i c a l damage d a m a g e to t o load l o a d bearing b e a r i n g structures. s t r u c t u r e s . This T h i s is i s also a l s o relevant r e l e v a n t in i n all a l l foreseeable f o r e s e e a b l e lifting l i f t i n g zones z o n e s from f r o m cranes c r a n e s on o n the t h e OSS O S S and a n d use u s e of o f SOV S O V gangway g a n g w a y and a n d gangway g a n g w a y associated a s s o c i a t e d SOV S O V Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 58 5 8 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e associated a s s o c i a t e d crane c r a n e (if ( i f equipped). e q u i p p e d ) . The T h e boat b o a t landing, l a n d i n g , including i n c l u d i n g ladders l a d d e r s and a n d platforms, p l a t f o r m s , shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d with w i t h respect r e s p e c t to t o impact i m p a c t / / swinging s w i n g i n g loads l o a d s from f r o m material m a t e r i a l handling. h a n d l i n g . 6.16 6 . 1 6 Avoidance A v o i d a n c e of o f vessel v e s s e l collisions c o l l i s i o n s (PS ( P S 19) 1 9 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e Vessel V e s s e l Collision C o l l i s i o n Avoidance A v o i d a n c e System S y s t e m shall s h a l l reduce r e d u c e the t h e risk r i s k of o f vessel v e s s e l collisions. c o l l i s i o n s . The T h e surveillance s u r v e i l l a n c e of o f the t h e sector s e c t o r around a r o u n d the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n may m a y be b e performed p e r f o r m e d by b y a a central c e n t r a l surveillance s u r v e i l l a n c e unit, u n i t , a a local l o c a l surveillance s u r v e i l l a n c e unit u n i t (a ( a unit u n i t or o r vessel v e s s e l responsible r e s p o n s i b l e for f o r more m o r e than t h a n one o n e installation), i n s t a l l a t i o n ) , a a dedicated d e d i c a t e d standby s t a n d b y vessel v e s s e l or o r the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n itself. i t s e l f . Hazards H a z a r d s • • Ship S h i p collision c o l l i s i o n with w i t h infield i n f i e l d vessels v e s s e l s in i n transit t r a n s i t (powered ( p o w e r e d collision), c o l l i s i o n ) , e.g. e . g . Service S e r v i c e Operation O p e r a t i o n Vessel V e s s e l (SOV) ( S O V ) or o r Crew C r e w Transfer T r a n s f e r Vessel V e s s e l (CTV), ( C T V ) , • • Ship S h i p collision c o l l i s i o n with w i t h SOV S O V during d u r i n g approach a p p r o a c h (“drift ( “ d r i f t on” o n ” or o r “drift “ d r i f t off”) o f f ” ) • • Ship S h i p collision c o l l i s i o n whilst w h i l s t in i n position p o s i t i o n next n e x t to t o the t h e OSS O S S (“drift ( “ d r i f t on” o n ” or o r “drift “ d r i f t off”) o f f ” ) • • Collision C o l l i s i o n with w i t h fishing f i s h i n g vessel v e s s e l or o r passing p a s s i n g merchant m e r c h a n t vessel v e s s e l International I n t e r n a t i o n a l Association A s s o c i a t i o n of o f Marine M a r i n e Aids A i d s to t o Navigation N a v i g a t i o n and a n d Lighthouse L i g h t h o u s e Authorities A u t h o r i t i e s (IALA) ( I A L A ) Recommendation R e c o m m e n d a t i o n O-139, O - 1 3 9 , The T h e marking m a r k i n g of o f man-made m a n - m a d e offshore o f f s h o r e structures s t r u c t u r e s (2013) ( 2 0 1 3 ) Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s The T h e unmanned u n m a n n e d OSS O S S will w i l l not n o t be b e equipped e q u i p p e d with w i t h a a radar r a d a r system. s y s t e m . The T h e collision c o l l i s i o n avoidance a v o i d a n c e strategy s t r a t e g y is i s based b a s e d on o n surveillance s u r v e i l l a n c e by b y CTV/SOV C T V / S O V when w h e n personnel p e r s o n n e l is i s on o n the t h e OSS, O S S , in i n combination c o m b i n a t i o n with w i t h requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s to t o aids a i d s to t o navigational, n a v i g a t i o n a l , wind w i n d farm f a r m layout l a y o u t and a n d procedures p r o c e d u r e s for f o r infield i n f i e l d vessel v e s s e l movement. m o v e m e n t . The T h e OSS O S S design d e s i g n shall s h a l l incorporate i n c o r p o r a t e AIS. A I S . CCR C C R shall s h a l l be b e able a b l e to t o survey s u r v e y the t h e area a r e a around a r o u n d the t h e OSS O S S in i n all a l l directions d i r e c t i o n s by b y CCTV. C C T V . Field F i e l d layout l a y o u t Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 59 5 9 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e OSS O S S shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d minimum m i n i m u m 500 5 0 0 meter m e t e r behind b e h i n d the t h e straight s t r a i g h t line l i n e of o f wind w i n d turbines t u r b i n e s defining d e f i n i n g the t h e perimeter p e r i m e t e r of o f the t h e wind w i n d farm f a r m (towards ( t o w a r d s parallel p a r a l l e l navigational n a v i g a t i o n a l route). r o u t e ) . Wind W i n d farm f a r m internal i n t e r n a l transit t r a n s i t routes r o u t e s shall s h a l l allow a l l o w infield i n f i e l d vessels v e s s e l s to t o pass p a s s the t h e OSS O S S with w i t h minimum m i n i m u m 500 5 0 0 m m clearance. c l e a r a n c e . SOV S O V requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s (in ( i n the t h e event e v e n t SOV S O V should s h o u l d be b e used u s e d on o n the t h e windfarms) w i n d f a r m s ) The T h e SOV S O V shall s h a l l have h a v e minimum m i n i m u m DP D P class c l a s s 2 2 design. d e s i g n . Operational O p e r a t i o n a l procedure p r o c e d u r e shall s h a l l be b e in i n place p l a c e for f o r the t h e SOV S O V to t o approach a p p r o a c h and a n d connect c o n n e c t to t o the t h e OSS O S S on o n the t h e leeward l e e w a r d side s i d e of o f the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n with w i t h respect r e s p e c t to t o the t h e dominating d o m i n a t i n g environmental e n v i r o n m e n t a l forces, f o r c e s , such s u c h that t h a t SOV S O V will w i l l drift d r i f t away a w a y from f r o m installation i n s t a l l a t i o n if i f incapable i n c a p a b l e of o f maintaining m a i n t a i n i n g target t a r g e t position p o s i t i o n and/or a n d / o r heading. h e a d i n g . Aids A i d s to t o navigation n a v i g a t i o n (AtoN) ( A t o N ) The T h e following f o l l o w i n g AtoN A t o N measures m e a s u r e s shall s h a l l as a s minimum m i n i m u m be b e implemented i m p l e m e n t e d on o n the t h e OSS, O S S , each e a c h with w i t h an a n availability a v a i l a b i l i t y of o f no n o less l e s s than t h a n 99.0% 9 9 . 0 % (IALA ( I A L A Availability A v a i l a b i l i t y Category C a t e g o r y 2). 2 ) . • • AIS A I S base b a s e station s t a t i o n • • Foghorn F o g h o r n • • Marking M a r k i n g of o f the t h e substation s u b s t a t i o n in i n accordance a c c o r d a n c e international i n t e r n a t i o n a l and a n d national n a t i o n a l requirements. r e q u i r e m e n t s . • • DP D P laser l a s e r reflectors r e f l e c t o r s Communication C o m m u n i c a t i o n system s y s t e m System S y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e in i n place p l a c e for f o r communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n with w i t h vessel v e s s e l on o n collision c o l l i s i o n course. c o u r s e . SOV S O V and a n d CTV C T V shall s h a l l be b e equipped e q u i p p e d with w i t h necessary n e c e s s a r y equipment e q u i p m e n t to t o get g e t attention a t t e n t i o n from f r o m vessel v e s s e l on o n collision c o l l i s i o n course, c o u r s e , e.g.: e . g . : • • Signal S i g n a l lamps l a m p s with w i t h intensity i n t e n s i t y of o f minimum m i n i m u m 1000 1 0 0 0 candelas c a n d e l a s • • Megaphone M e g a p h o n e with w i t h sound s o u n d intensity i n t e n s i t y of o f 80 8 0 dBa d B a Fast F a s t rescue r e s c u e craft c r a f t on o n the t h e SOV S O V shall s h a l l be b e equipped e q u i p p e d with w i t h approved a p p r o v e d maritime m a r i t i m e VHF. V H F . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 60 6 0 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Systems S y s t e m s for f o r consequence c o n s e q u e n c e reduction r e d u c t i o n and a n d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n • • Evacuation E v a c u a t i o n of o f personnel p e r s o n n e l • • ESD E S D - - platform p l a t f o r m shutdown s h u t d o w n 6.17 6 . 1 7 Structural S t r u c t u r a l integrity i n t e g r i t y (PS ( P S 20) 2 0 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Load L o a d bearing b e a r i n g structure s t r u c t u r e shall s h a l l withstand w i t h s t a n d all a l l loading l o a d i n g situations s i t u a t i o n s under u n d e r normal n o r m a l operation o p e r a t i o n and a n d also a l s o ensure e n s u r e structural s t r u c t u r a l integrity i n t e g r i t y after a f t e r a a dimensioning d i m e n s i o n i n g accidental a c c i d e n t a l event. e v e n t . DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Main M a i n design d e s i g n principles p r i n c i p l e s Load L o a d bearing b e a r i n g structures s t r u c t u r e s shall s h a l l be b e sufficiently s u f f i c i e n t l y robust r o b u s t to t o ensure e n s u r e that t h a t local l o c a l damage d a m a g e or o r failure f a i l u r e will w i l l not n o t result r e s u l t in i n unacceptable u n a c c e p t a b l e consequences. c o n s e q u e n c e s . • • Slender, S l e n d e r , main m a i n load l o a d bearing b e a r i n g structural s t r u c t u r a l elements e l e m e n t s shall s h a l l be b e demonstrated d e m o n s t r a t e d to t o be b e redundant. r e d u n d a n t . • • Main M a i n load l o a d bearing b e a r i n g structures s t r u c t u r e s shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d so s o that t h a t water w a t e r penetration p e n e t r a t i o n through t h r o u g h outer o u t e r walls w a l l s facing f a c i n g the t h e sea s e a cannot c a n n o t lead l e a d to t o loss l o s s of o f main m a i n safety s a f e t y functions. f u n c t i o n s . The T h e topside t o p s i d e structural s t r u c t u r a l integrity i n t e g r i t y shall s h a l l be b e documented d o c u m e n t e d for f o r all a l l governing g o v e r n i n g conditions c o n d i t i o n s and a n d phases p h a s e s during d u r i n g the t h e platform p l a t f o r m lifetime, l i f e t i m e , i.e. i . e . from f r o m prefabrication, p r e f a b r i c a t i o n , assembly, a s s e m b l y , weighing, w e i g h i n g , site s i t e moves, m o v e s , barge b a r g e transportation t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and a n d installation i n s t a l l a t i o n to t o offshore o f f s h o r e hook-up, h o o k - u p , operation o p e r a t i o n and a n d abandonment. a b a n d o n m e n t . The T h e jacket j a c k e t and a n d topside t o p s i d e structure s t r u c t u r e shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d to t o withstand w i t h s t a n d the t h e Dimensioning D i m e n s i o n i n g Accidental A c c i d e n t a l Loads L o a d s (DAL) ( D A L ) associated a s s o c i a t e d with w i t h the t h e following f o l l o w i n g Major M a j o r Accident A c c i d e n t Hazards H a z a r d s (MAH) ( M A H ) where w h e r e relevant: r e l e v a n t : Fire, F i r e , Explosion, E x p l o s i o n , Dropped D r o p p e d objects, o b j e c t s , Extreme E x t r e m e Weather W e a t h e r and a n d Ship S h i p collisions. c o l l i s i o n s . Recognized R e c o g n i z e d models/methods m o d e l s / m e t h o d s and a n d competent c o m p e t e n t personnel p e r s o n n e l shall s h a l l be b e used u s e d to t o determine d e t e r m i n e the t h e corresponding c o r r e s p o n d i n g design d e s i g n accidental a c c i d e n t a l loads. l o a d s . DNV-RP-C204 D N V - R P - C 2 0 4 Structural S t r u c t u r a l design d e s i g n against a g a i n s t accidental a c c i d e n t a l loads l o a d s C256-EQ-Z-SP-00012 C 2 5 6 - E Q - Z - S P - 0 0 0 1 2 OSS O S S Substructure S u b s t r u c t u r e Technical T e c h n i c a l Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n C274-RA-S-SP-01000 C 2 7 4 - R A - S - S P - 0 1 0 0 0 - - - - Design D e s i g n Accidental A c c i d e n t a l Load L o a d Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n (DAL) ( D A L ) Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 61 6 1 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Dimensioning D i m e n s i o n i n g accidental a c c i d e n t a l loads l o a d s and a n d environmental e n v i r o n m e n t a l loads l o a d s shall s h a l l not n o t cause c a u s e the t h e loss l o s s of o f main m a i n safety s a f e t y function(s). f u n c t i o n ( s ) . Ship S h i p collision c o l l i s i o n It I t is i s not n o t considered c o n s i d e r e d practical p r a c t i c a l to t o design d e s i g n for f o r impact i m p a c t energies e n e r g i e s associated a s s o c i a t e d with w i t h a a passing p a s s i n g merchant m e r c h a n t vessel v e s s e l collision. c o l l i s i o n . This T h i s hazard h a z a r d shall s h a l l be b e addressed a d d r e s s e d by b y preventive p r e v e n t i v e measures m e a s u r e s (ref. ( r e f . PS19). P S 1 9 ) . C274-RA-N-FD-01001 C 2 7 4 - R A - N - F D - 0 1 0 0 1 - - - - Structural S t r u c t u r a l Design D e s i g n Brief B r i e f (Topside) ( T o p s i d e ) The T h e OSS O S S shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d to t o withstand w i t h s t a n d a a collision c o l l i s i o n of o f a a service s e r v i c e operation o p e r a t i o n vessel v e s s e l up u p to t o 6000t 6 0 0 0 t displacement. d i s p l a c e m e n t . For F o r ALS, A L S , a a ship s h i p impact i m p a c t speed s p e e d of o f minimum m i n i m u m 2.0 2 . 0 m/s m / s shall s h a l l be b e used u s e d with w i t h added a d d e d mass m a s s as a s per p e r requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s in i n DNV-ST-0145. D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 . Energy E n e r g y absorbed a b s o r b e d by b y striking s t r i k i n g vessel v e s s e l may m a y be b e taken t a k e n according a c c o r d i n g to t o DNV-RP-C204. D N V - R P - C 2 0 4 . Some S o m e structural s t r u c t u r a l damage d a m a g e is i s considered c o n s i d e r e d acceptable a c c e p t a b l e under u n d e r the t h e above a b o v e circumstances c i r c u m s t a n c e s provided p r o v i d e d the t h e overall o v e r a l l structural s t r u c t u r a l integrity i n t e g r i t y of o f the t h e platform p l a t f o r m is i s not n o t compromised. c o m p r o m i s e d . Collision C o l l i s i o n with w i t h vessel v e s s e l superstructure s u p e r s t r u c t u r e shall s h a l l be b e considered c o n s i d e r e d in i n design d e s i g n of o f the t h e topside. t o p s i d e . Safety S a f e t y critical c r i t i c a l equipment e q u i p m e n t or o r equipment e q u i p m e n t that t h a t could c o u l d cause c a u s e environmental e n v i r o n m e n t a l harm h a r m in i n case c a s e of o f a a collision c o l l i s i o n shall s h a l l not n o t be b e positioned p o s i t i o n e d at a t the t h e outer o u t e r faces f a c e s of o f the t h e topside. t o p s i d e . Layout L a y o u t around a r o u n d the t h e OSS O S S gangway g a n g w a y landing l a n d i n g areas a r e a s shall s h a l l prevent p r e v e n t SOV S O V DP D P failure f a i l u r e (drive-off/drift-off) ( d r i v e - o f f / d r i f t - o f f ) with w i t h inward i n w a r d movement m o v e m e n t of o f the t h e gangway g a n g w a y leading l e a d i n g to t o an a n escalating e s c a l a t i n g event, e v e n t , e.g. e . g . by b y causing c a u s i n g damage d a m a g e to t o safety s a f e t y critical c r i t i c a l equipment. e q u i p m e n t . Extreme E x t r e m e weather w e a t h e r Airgap A i r g a p requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s given g i v e n in i n DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 shall s h a l l be b e fulfilled. f u l f i l l e d . The T h e topside t o p s i d e shall s h a l l have h a v e positive p o s i t i v e air a i r gap g a p in i n all a l l conditions, c o n d i t i o n s , reference r e f e r e n c e is i s made m a d e to t o the t h e Offshore O f f s h o r e Substation S u b s t a t i o n Substructure S u b s t r u c t u r e technical t e c h n i c a l specification s p e c i f i c a t i o n for f o r details. d e t a i l s . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 62 6 2 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s III I I I Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 6.18 6 . 1 8 Human H u m a n Machine M a c h i n e Interface I n t e r f a c e and a n d Alarm A l a r m Management M a n a g e m e n t (PS ( P S 22) 2 2 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e Human H u m a n machine m a c h i n e interface i n t e r f a c e (HMI) ( H M I ) in i n central c e n t r a l control c o n t r o l room r o o m (CCR) ( C C R ) shall s h a l l provide p r o v i d e system s y s t e m information i n f o r m a t i o n presentation p r e s e n t a t i o n and a n d means m e a n s for f o r operator o p e r a t o r interactions. i n t e r a c t i o n s . HMI H M I provides p r o v i d e s the t h e physical p h y s i c a l interface i n t e r f a c e between b e t w e e n systems s y s t e m s and a n d facility f a c i l i t y operator, o p e r a t o r , maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e technicians t e c h n i c i a n s and a n d other o t h e r personnel p e r s o n n e l operating o p e r a t i n g and a n d monitoring m o n i t o r i n g the t h e facilities. f a c i l i t i e s . TR T R 4031 4 0 3 1 Automation A u t o m a t i o n technology t e c h n o l o g y -Offshore - O f f s h o r e wind w i n d The T h e HMI H M I shall s h a l l present p r e s e n t safety-related s a f e t y - r e l a t e d information i n f o r m a t i o n for f o r all a l l systems, s y s t e m s , including: i n c l u d i n g : • • Status S t a t u s of o f wind w i n d turbine t u r b i n e generators g e n e r a t o r s (start-stop, ( s t a r t - s t o p , trip/shutdown), t r i p / s h u t d o w n ) , substations, s u b s t a t i o n s , transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system s y s t e m and a n d grid g r i d connections c o n n e c t i o n s • • Status S t a t u s of o f navigational n a v i g a t i o n a l aids a i d s on o n the t h e wind w i n d turbine t u r b i n e generators g e n e r a t o r s and a n d substations s u b s t a t i o n s • • Electrical E l e c t r i c a l overview, o v e r v i e w , including i n c l u d i n g status/position s t a t u s / p o s i t i o n of o f high h i g h voltage v o l t a g e switches s w i t c h e s and a n d breakers, b r e a k e r s , local l o c a l isolations i s o l a t i o n s etc. e t c . • • Weather W e a t h e r monitoring/forecast, m o n i t o r i n g / f o r e c a s t , including i n c l u d i n g lightning, l i g h t n i n g , sea s e a state s t a t e etc. e t c . • • Fire F i r e detection d e t e c t i o n on o n wind w i n d turbine t u r b i n e generators g e n e r a t o r s and a n d in i n substations s u b s t a t i o n s • • Location L o c a t i o n of o f vessels v e s s e l s (service ( s e r v i c e operating o p e r a t i n g vessels, v e s s e l s , CTVs C T V s as a s well w e l l as a s other o t h e r vessels) v e s s e l s ) • • Location L o c a t i o n of o f helicopters h e l i c o p t e r s (where ( w h e r e relevant) r e l e v a n t ) • • Location L o c a t i o n of o f personnel p e r s o n n e l • • Status S t a t u s of o f work w o r k permits p e r m i t s / / work w o r k releases r e l e a s e s • • For F o r offshore o f f s h o r e structures: s t r u c t u r e s : External E x t e r n a l CCTV C C T V monitoring. m o n i t o r i n g . Internal I n t e r n a l CCTV C C T V monitoring m o n i t o r i n g to t o be b e considered. c o n s i d e r e d . Night N i g h t vision v i s i o n to t o be b e considered c o n s i d e r e d for f o r external e x t e r n a l cameras. c a m e r a s . • • Intruder I n t r u d e r detection d e t e c t i o n for f o r all a l l wind w i n d turbine t u r b i n e generators, g e n e r a t o r s , substations s u b s t a t i o n s • • Natural N a t u r a l ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n and a n d heating, h e a t i n g , ventilation, v e n t i l a t i o n , and a n d air a i r conditioning c o n d i t i o n i n g • • Shutdown S h u t d o w n hierarchy h i e r a r c h y overview o v e r v i e w and a n d status s t a t u s • • Fire F i r e & & gas g a s overview, o v e r v i e w , e.g.., e . g . . , per p e r main m a i n fire f i r e area a r e a and/or a n d / o r fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n area a r e a TR4036 T R 4 0 3 6 Operator O p e r a t o r station s t a t i o n HMI H M I – – Offshore O f f s h o r e Wind W i n d Power P o w e r EN E N 62682 6 2 6 8 2 Management M a n a g e m e n t of o f alarms a l a r m s systems s y s t e m s for f o r the t h e process p r o c e s s industries i n d u s t r i e s EEMUA E E M U A Publication P u b l i c a t i o n 191 1 9 1 Alarm A l a r m systems s y s t e m s - - a a guide g u i d e to t o design, d e s i g n , management m a n a g e m e n t and a n d procurement p r o c u r e m e n t EN E N ISO I S O 11064 1 1 0 6 4 Ergonomic E r g o n o m i c design d e s i g n of o f control c o n t r o l centers c e n t e r s Part P a r t 1: 1 : Principles P r i n c i p l e s for f o r the t h e design d e s i g n of o f control c o n t r o l centres c e n t r e s The T h e HMI H M I shall s h a l l include i n c l u d e a a main m a i n operating o p e r a t i n g interface i n t e r f a c e in i n CCR C C R and a n d allow a l l o w for f o r manual m a n u a l activation a c t i v a t i o n of o f critical c r i t i c a l safety s a f e t y functions. f u n c t i o n s . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 63 6 3 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e All A l l systems s y s t e m s and a n d HMI H M I designated d e s i g n a t e d critical c r i t i c a l for f o r safety s a f e t y or o r production p r o d u c t i o n shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d such s u c h that t h a t easy, e a s y , fast f a s t recovery r e c o v e r y methods m e t h o d s can c a n be b e employed e m p l o y e d to t o regain r e g a i n control c o n t r o l of o f the t h e system. s y s t e m . This T h i s includes i n c l u d e s management m a n a g e m e n t of o f software s o f t w a r e backups b a c k u p s and a n d system s y s t e m components c o m p o n e n t s as a s well w e l l as a s documentation d o c u m e n t a t i o n to t o facilitate f a c i l i t a t e recovery. r e c o v e r y . The T h e system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d for f o r continuous c o n t i n u o u s operation, o p e r a t i o n , such s u c h that t h a t system s y s t e m function f u n c t i o n is i s always a l w a y s maintained. m a i n t a i n e d . The T h e HMI H M I shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d to t o prevent p r e v e n t inadvertent i n a d v e r t e n t operations o p e r a t i o n s due d u e to t o operator o p e r a t o r misperception m i s p e r c e p t i o n and a n d unintended u n i n t e n d e d actions. a c t i o n s . EN E N 62682 6 2 6 8 2 and a n d EEMUA E E M U A 191 1 9 1 shall s h a l l be b e used u s e d as a s basis b a s i s for f o r design d e s i g n of o f alarm a l a r m functions. f u n c t i o n s . TR1494 T R 1 4 9 4 and a n d EEMUA E E M U A Guideline G u i d e l i n e 191 1 9 1 should s h o u l d be b e used u s e d for f o r guidance. g u i d a n c e . Failure F a i l u r e to t o execute e x e c u t e safety s a f e t y functions f u n c t i o n s on o n demand d e m a n d shall s h a l l initiate i n i t i a t e an a n alarm a l a r m in i n CCR. C C R . The T h e HMI H M I facilities f a c i l i t i e s shall s h a l l include i n c l u d e detailed d e t a i l e d safety s a f e t y system s y s t e m information i n f o r m a t i o n such s u c h as a s input i n p u t and a n d output o u t p u t status, s t a t u s , alarms, a l a r m s , status s t a t u s of o f inhibit, i n h i b i t , override o v e r r i d e and a n d suppression s u p p r e s s i o n and a n d safety s a f e t y system s y s t e m fault f a u l t indication. i n d i c a t i o n . Number N u m b e r of o f visual v i s u a l display d i s p l a y units u n i t s shall s h a l l depend d e p e n d on o n the t h e result r e s u l t of o f the t h e function f u n c t i o n and a n d work w o r k task t a s k analysis. a n a l y s i s . Failure F a i l u r e to t o execute e x e c u t e safety s a f e t y functions f u n c t i o n s shall s h a l l initiate i n i t i a t e an a n alarm a l a r m in i n CCR. C C R . HMI H M I control c o n t r o l functions f u n c t i o n s • • Initiate I n i t i a t e shutdowns s h u t d o w n s (ESD ( E S D / / process p r o c e s s level) l e v e l ) • • ESD E S D level l e v e l reset r e s e t • • F&G F & G reset r e s e t (e.g., ( e . g . , per p e r fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n area) a r e a ) • • F&G F & G common c o m m o n reset r e s e t of o f inhibits i n h i b i t s and a n d overrides o v e r r i d e s (e.g., ( e . g . , per p e r fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n area) a r e a ) • • ESD E S D common c o m m o n reset r e s e t of o f inhibits i n h i b i t s and a n d overrides o v e r r i d e s • • Firefighting F i r e f i g h t i n g release r e l e a s e Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s in i n EN E N ISO I S O 11064 1 1 0 6 4 “Ergonomic “ E r g o n o m i c design d e s i g n of o f control c o n t r o l centers c e n t e r s Part P a r t 1: 1 : Principles P r i n c i p l e s for f o r the t h e design d e s i g n of o f control c o n t r o l centres” c e n t r e s ” shall s h a l l be b e adhered a d h e r e d to t o Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 64 6 4 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 6.19 6 . 1 9 Safety S a f e t y & & automation a u t o m a t i o n system s y s t e m security s e c u r i t y (PS ( P S 23) 2 3 ) Role R o l e and a n d Need N e e d for f o r Barrier B a r r i e r Reference R e f e r e n c e The T h e Safety- S a f e t y - and a n d Automation A u t o m a t i o n Systems, S y s t e m s , including i n c l u d i n g other o t h e r control c o n t r o l and a n d monitoring m o n i t o r i n g facilities, f a c i l i t i e s , shall s h a l l be b e protected p r o t e c t e d against a g a i n s t threats t h r e a t s such s u c h as a s unauthorized u n a u t h o r i z e d access a c c e s s and a n d malware m a l w a r e that t h a t may m a y be b e introduced i n t r o d u c e d due d u e to t o external e x t e r n a l data d a t a communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n and a n d information i n f o r m a t i o n exchange, e x c h a n g e , i.e., i . e . , by b y application a p p l i c a t i o n of o f security s e c u r i t y measures m e a s u r e s of o f the t h e technical t e c h n i c a l networks. n e t w o r k s . Barriers B a r r i e r s shall s h a l l be b e installed i n s t a l l e d to t o prevent p r e v e n t intruders i n t r u d e r s to t o access a c c e s s the t h e topside t o p s i d e deck d e c k levels l e v e l s of o f the t h e OSS. O S S . TR1658 T R 1 6 5 8 Information I n f o r m a t i o n Security S e c u r i t y of o f Industrial I n d u s t r i a l Automation A u t o m a t i o n and a n d Control C o n t r o l Systems S y s t e m s CCTV C C T V surveillance s u r v e i l l a n c e of o f lower l o w e r deck/top d e c k / t o p of o f jacket j a c k e t where w h e r e unauthorized u n a u t h o r i z e d personnel p e r s o n n e l may m a y access a c c e s s shall s h a l l be b e installed. i n s t a l l e d . IEC I E C 62443 6 2 4 4 3 Network N e t w o r k and a n d system s y s t e m security s e c u r i t y for f o r industrial-process i n d u s t r i a l - p r o c e s s measurement m e a s u r e m e n t and a n d control c o n t r o l Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 65 6 5 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 7 7 Additional A d d i t i o n a l information i n f o r m a t i o n 7.1 7 . 1 Abbreviations A b b r e v i a t i o n s and a n d definitions d e f i n i t i o n s AIS A I S Automatic A u t o m a t i c identification i d e n t i f i c a t i o n system s y s t e m ALARP A L A R P As A s low l o w as a s reasonably r e a s o n a b l y practical p r a c t i c a l (term ( t e r m is i s related r e l a t e d to t o reducing r e d u c i n g risk r i s k level) l e v e l ) ALS A L S Accidental A c c i d e n t a l limit l i m i t state s t a t e CAP C A P Critical C r i t i c a l action a c t i o n panel p a n e l CCR C C R Central C e n t r a l control c o n t r o l room r o o m CCTV C C T V Closed-circuit C l o s e d - c i r c u i t television t e l e v i s i o n CTV C T V Crew C r e w transfer t r a n s f e r vessel v e s s e l DNV D N V Det D e t norske n o r s k e Veritas V e r i t a s DP D P Dynamic D y n a m i c positioning p o s i t i o n i n g EER E E R Escape, E s c a p e , evacuation e v a c u a t i o n and a n d rescue r e s c u e ESD E S D Emergency E m e r g e n c y shutdown s h u t d o w n ESI E S I Electrical E l e c t r i c a l System S y s t e m Infrastructure I n f r a s t r u c t u r e F&G F & G Fire F i r e and a n d gas g a s GA G A General G e n e r a l alarm a l a r m GIS G I S Gas G a s insulated i n s u l a t e d switchboard s w i t c h b o a r d GWP G W P Global-warming G l o b a l - w a r m i n g potential p o t e n t i a l HMI H M I Human-machine H u m a n - m a c h i n e interface i n t e r f a c e HVAC H V A C Heating, H e a t i n g , ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n and a n d air a i r conditioning c o n d i t i o n i n g IP I P Internet I n t e r n e t Protocol P r o t o c o l IR I R Infra-red I n f r a - r e d MCP M C P Manual M a n u a l call c a l l points p o i n t s MFW M F W Morska M o r s k a Farma F a r m a Wiatrowa W i a t r o w a MOB M O B Man M a n overboard o v e r b o a r d boat b o a t ONS O N S Onshore O n s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n OSS O S S Offshore O f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n PA P A Public P u b l i c address a d d r e s s P&C P & C Process P r o c e s s and a n d Control C o n t r o l POB P O B People P e o p l e on o n board b o a r d PRV P R V Pressure P r e s s u r e release r e l e a s e valve v a l v e SAR S A R Search S e a r c h and a n d Rescue R e s c u e SCADA S C A D A Supervisory S u p e r v i s o r y Control C o n t r o l and a n d Data D a t a Acquisition A c q u i s i t i o n SF6 S F 6 Sulfur S u l f u r Hexafluoride H e x a f l u o r i d e SOV S O V Service S e r v i c e operation o p e r a t i o n vessel v e s s e l TETRA T E T R A Terrestrial T e r r e s t r i a l Trunked T r u n k e d Radio R a d i o UHF U H F Ultra-high U l t r a - h i g h frequency f r e q u e n c y UPS U P S Uninterrupted U n i n t e r r u p t e d power p o w e r supply s u p p l y UV U V Ultraviolet U l t r a v i o l e t VHF V H F Very V e r y high h i g h frequency f r e q u e n c y VRLA V R L A Valve V a l v e regulated r e g u l a t e d lead–acid l e a d – a c i d WTG W T G Wind W i n d turbine t u r b i n e generator g e n e r a t o r Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 66 6 6 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 7.2 7 . 2 Definitions D e f i n i t i o n s Fire F i r e division d i v i s i o n class c l a s s A A Fire F i r e rated r a t e d physical p h y s i c a l division d i v i s i o n between b e t w e e n two t w o fire f i r e areas. a r e a s . A A division d i v i s i o n made m a d e of o f non-combustible n o n - c o m b u s t i b l e materials m a t e r i a l s fulfilling f u l f i l l i n g the t h e following f o l l o w i n g criteria: c r i t e r i a : 1. 1 . it i t shall s h a l l be b e sufficiently s u f f i c i e n t l y braced b r a c e d 2. 2 . it i t shall s h a l l prevent p r e v e n t the t h e propagation p r o p a g a t i o n of o f flames f l a m e s and a n d smoke s m o k e for f o r a a minimum m i n i m u m of o f one o n e hour h o u r of o f the t h e standardized s t a n d a r d i z e d fire f i r e test t e s t following f o l l o w i n g the t h e temperature-time t e m p e r a t u r e - t i m e curve c u r v e defined d e f i n e d in i n ISO I S O 834-1, 8 3 4 - 1 , 3. 3 . it i t is i s designed d e s i g n e d so s o that t h a t the t h e average a v e r a g e temperature t e m p e r a t u r e and a n d the t h e temperature t e m p e r a t u r e at a t any a n y single s i n g l e point p o i n t on o n the t h e unexposed u n e x p o s e d side s i d e does d o e s not n o t exceed e x c e e d 140 1 4 0 degrees d e g r e e s C C and a n d 180 1 8 0 degrees d e g r e e s C C respectively r e s p e c t i v e l y above a b o v e the t h e initial i n i t i a l temperature t e m p e r a t u r e within w i t h i n the t h e time t i m e limits l i m i t s stated s t a t e d below: b e l o w : Class C l a s s A-60: A - 6 0 : 60 6 0 minutes m i n u t e s Class C l a s s A-30: A - 3 0 : 30 3 0 minutes m i n u t e s Class C l a s s A-15: A - 1 5 : 15 1 5 minutes m i n u t e s Class C l a s s A- A - 0: 0 : 0 0 minutes m i n u t e s Fire F i r e division d i v i s i o n class c l a s s H H Fire F i r e rated r a t e d physical p h y s i c a l division d i v i s i o n between b e t w e e n two t w o fire f i r e areas. a r e a s . A A division d i v i s i o n made m a d e of o f non-combustible n o n - c o m b u s t i b l e materials m a t e r i a l s fulfilling f u l f i l l i n g the t h e following f o l l o w i n g criteria: c r i t e r i a : 1. 1 . it i t shall s h a l l be b e sufficiently s u f f i c i e n t l y braced, b r a c e d , 2. 2 . it i t shall s h a l l prevent p r e v e n t the t h e propagation p r o p a g a t i o n of o f flames f l a m e s and a n d smoke s m o k e for f o r a a minimum m i n i m u m of o f two t w o hours h o u r s of o f the t h e standardized s t a n d a r d i z e d fire f i r e test t e s t following f o l l o w i n g the t h e described d e s c r i b e d time- t i m e - temperature t e m p e r a t u r e curve c u r v e defined d e f i n e d in i n EN E N 1363-2, 1 3 6 3 - 2 , 3. 3 . it i t is i s designed d e s i g n e d so s o that t h a t the t h e average a v e r a g e temperature t e m p e r a t u r e and a n d the t h e temperature t e m p e r a t u r e at a t any a n y single s i n g l e point p o i n t on o n the t h e unexposed u n e x p o s e d side s i d e does d o e s not n o t exceed e x c e e d 140 1 4 0 degrees d e g r e e s C C and a n d 180 1 8 0 degrees d e g r e e s C C respectively r e s p e c t i v e l y above a b o v e the t h e initial i n i t i a l temperature t e m p e r a t u r e within w i t h i n the t h e time t i m e limits l i m i t s stated s t a t e d below: b e l o w : Class C l a s s H- H - 120: 1 2 0 : 120 1 2 0 minutes m i n u t e s Class C l a s s H-60: H - 6 0 : 60 6 0 minutes m i n u t e s Class C l a s s H-0: H - 0 : 0 0 minutes m i n u t e s Offshore O f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n Offshore O f f s h o r e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n which w h i c h receives r e c e i v e s the t h e electrical e l e c t r i c a l power p o w e r produced p r o d u c e d at a t the t h e wind w i n d turbine t u r b i n e generators, g e n e r a t o r s , transform t r a n s f o r m the t h e voltage v o l t a g e to t o a a higher h i g h e r level l e v e l suited s u i t e d for f o r export e x p o r t to t o shore s h o r e and a n d export e x p o r t the t h e power p o w e r to t o onshore. o n s h o r e . Offshore O f f s h o r e windfarm w i n d f a r m The T h e offshore o f f s h o r e area a r e a where w h e r e the t h e wind w i n d turbine t u r b i n e generators g e n e r a t o r s are a r e located. l o c a t e d . Offshore O f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n is i s located l o c a t e d within w i t h i n the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e wind w i n d farm. f a r m . 7.3 7 . 3 Changes C h a n g e s from f r o m previous p r e v i o u s version v e r s i o n Revision R e v i s i o n no. n o . 02: 0 2 : General G e n e r a l - - Minor M i n o r updates u p d a t e s on o n wording w o r d i n g and a n d references. r e f e r e n c e s . Section S e c t i o n 4 4 - - Additional A d d i t i o n a l hazards h a z a r d s identified. i d e n t i f i e d . Section S e c t i o n 6 6 - - References R e f e r e n c e s to t o relevant r e l e v a n t FEED F E E D reports r e p o r t s added a d d e d in i n section s e c t i o n 6 6 – – Safety S a f e t y strategies. s t r a t e g i e s . Appendices A p p e n d i c e s – – New N e w appendix a p p e n d i x B B and a n d Appendix A p p e n d i x C C added. a d d e d . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 67 6 7 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 8 8 References R e f e r e n c e s 1. 1 . DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Offshore O f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s - - Rules R u l e s and a n d standards s t a n d a r d s 2. 2 . C274-EQ-Z-SP-00001_04 C 2 7 4 - E Q - Z - S P - 0 0 0 0 1 _ 0 4 - - Metocean M e t o c e a n Design D e s i g n Basis B a s i s 3. 3 . C275-EQ-Z-SP-00002_04 C 2 7 5 - E Q - Z - S P - 0 0 0 0 2 _ 0 4 - - Metocean M e t o c e a n Design D e s i g n Basis. B a s i s . 4. 4 . C256-EQ-Z-CA-00001_02 C 2 5 6 - E Q - Z - C A - 0 0 0 0 1 _ 0 2 Clarification C l a r i f i c a t i o n of o f ice i c e strength s t r e n g t h coefficient c o e f f i c i e n t for f o r 5. 5 . TR1055 T R 1 0 5 5 rev r e v 9 9 Performance P e r f o r m a n c e Standards S t a n d a r d s for f o r safety s a f e t y systems s y s t e m s and a n d barriers b a r r i e r s - - offshore o f f s h o r e 6. 6 . TR1803 T R 1 8 0 3 Hoses H o s e s and a n d couplings c o u p l i n g s 7. 7 . IEC I E C 61508 6 1 5 0 8 8. 8 . IEC I E C 61511 6 1 5 1 1 9. 9 . EN E N 54 5 4 series s e r i e s 10. 1 0 . NFPA N F P A 101, 1 0 1 , Life L i f e Safety S a f e t y Code C o d e 11. 1 1 . NFPA N F P A 850, 8 5 0 , Recommended R e c o m m e n d e d Practice P r a c t i c e for f o r Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n for f o r Electric E l e c t r i c Generating G e n e r a t i n g Plants P l a n t s and a n d High H i g h Voltage V o l t a g e Direct D i r e c t Current C u r r e n t Converter C o n v e r t e r Stations S t a t i o n s 12. 1 2 . IEEE I E E E 979 9 7 9 - - Guide G u i d e for f o r Substation S u b s t a t i o n Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n 13. 1 3 . NFPA N F P A 11 1 1 Standard S t a n d a r d for f o r Low, L o w , Medium, M e d i u m , and a n d High-Expansion H i g h - E x p a n s i o n Foam, F o a m , Chapter C h a p t e r 7 7 Compressed C o m p r e s s e d Air A i r Foam F o a m Systems S y s t e m s 14. 1 4 . NFPA N F P A 750 7 5 0 Standard S t a n d a r d on o n Water W a t e r Mist M i s t Fire F i r e Protection P r o t e c t i o n Systems S y s t e m s 15. 1 5 . NFPA N F P A 2001 2 0 0 1 Standard S t a n d a r d for f o r Clean C l e a n Agent A g e n t Fire F i r e Extinguishing E x t i n g u i s h i n g Systems S y s t e m s 16. 1 6 . IEC I E C 60332 6 0 3 3 2 Test T e s t on o n electrical e l e c t r i c a l cables c a b l e s under u n d e r fire f i r e conditions c o n d i t i o n s 17. 1 7 . GL0644 G L 0 6 4 4 Guideline G u i d e l i n e Coat C o a t back b a c k on o n Steel S t e e l Structure S t r u c t u r e 18. 1 8 . EN E N 1838:2013, 1 8 3 8 : 2 0 1 3 , Lighting L i g h t i n g applications a p p l i c a t i o n s - - Emergency E m e r g e n c y lighting l i g h t i n g 19. 1 9 . IEC61850 I E C 6 1 8 5 0 20. 2 0 . SOLAS S O L A S Chapter C h a p t e r III I I I – – Life L i f e Saving S a v i n g Appliances A p p l i a n c e s and a n d arrangements a r r a n g e m e n t s I I 21. 2 1 . CAP C A P 437 4 3 7 Standards S t a n d a r d s for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e helicopter h e l i c o p t e r landing l a n d i n g areas a r e a s 22. 2 2 . ISO I S O 3864 3 8 6 4 Graphical G r a p h i c a l symbols s y m b o l s — — Safety S a f e t y colors c o l o r s and a n d safety s a f e t y signs s i g n s 23. 2 3 . ISO I S O 7010 7 0 1 0 Graphical G r a p h i c a l symbols s y m b o l s — — Safety S a f e t y colors c o l o r s and a n d safety s a f e t y signs s i g n s – – Registered R e g i s t e r e d safety s a f e t y signs s i g n s 24. 2 4 . TR3021 T R 3 0 2 1 Electrical E l e c t r i c a l system s y s t e m design, d e s i g n , offshore o f f s h o r e units u n i t s 25. 2 5 . TR1727 T R 1 7 2 7 Substitution S u b s t i t u t i o n to t o TR1727 T R 1 7 2 7 ver. v e r . 5, 5 , Unmanned U n m a n n e d installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s 26. 2 6 . DNV-RP-C204 D N V - R P - C 2 0 4 Structural S t r u c t u r a l design d e s i g n against a g a i n s t accidental a c c i d e n t a l loads l o a d s 27. 2 7 . TR T R 4031 4 0 3 1 Automation A u t o m a t i o n technology t e c h n o l o g y -Offshore - O f f s h o r e wind w i n d (HOLD ( H O L D not n o t yet y e t issued) i s s u e d ) 28. 2 8 . EN E N 62682 6 2 6 8 2 Management M a n a g e m e n t of o f alarms a l a r m s systems s y s t e m s for f o r the t h e process p r o c e s s industries i n d u s t r i e s 29. 2 9 . EEMUA E E M U A Publication P u b l i c a t i o n 191 1 9 1 Alarm A l a r m systems s y s t e m s - - a a guide g u i d e to t o design, d e s i g n , management m a n a g e m e n t and a n d procurement p r o c u r e m e n t 30. 3 0 . EN E N ISO I S O 11064 1 1 0 6 4 Ergonomic E r g o n o m i c design d e s i g n of o f control c o n t r o l centers c e n t e r s Part P a r t 1: 1 : Principles P r i n c i p l e s for f o r the t h e design d e s i g n of o f control c o n t r o l centres c e n t r e s 31. 3 1 . IEC I E C 61508 6 1 5 0 8 Functional F u n c t i o n a l safety s a f e t y of o f electrical/electronic/programmable e l e c t r i c a l / e l e c t r o n i c / p r o g r a m m a b l e electronic e l e c t r o n i c safety-related s a f e t y - r e l a t e d systems s y s t e m s - - Part P a r t 1: 1 : General G e n e r a l requirements r e q u i r e m e n t s 32. 3 2 . C256-EQ-Z-SP-00009 C 2 5 6 - E Q - Z - S P - 0 0 0 0 9 Offshore O f f s h o r e Substation S u b s t a t i o n (OSS) ( O S S ) Topside T o p s i d e Technical T e c h n i c a l Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n 33. 3 3 . C256-EQ-Z-SP-00012 C 2 5 6 - E Q - Z - S P - 0 0 0 1 2 OSS O S S Substructure S u b s t r u c t u r e Technical T e c h n i c a l Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n 34. 3 4 . TR1658 T R 1 6 5 8 Information I n f o r m a t i o n Security S e c u r i t y of o f Industrial I n d u s t r i a l Automation A u t o m a t i o n and a n d Control C o n t r o l Systems S y s t e m s 35. 3 5 . IEC I E C 62443 6 2 4 4 3 Network N e t w o r k and a n d system s y s t e m security s e c u r i t y for f o r industrial-process i n d u s t r i a l - p r o c e s s measurement m e a s u r e m e n t and a n d control c o n t r o l Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 68 6 8 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 9 9 Appendices A p p e n d i c e s 9.1 9 . 1 Appendix A p p e n d i x A A - - Specification S p e c i f i c a t i o n for f o r active a c t i v e fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n systems s y s t e m s Water W a t e r mist m i s t system s y s t e m The T h e water w a t e r mist m i s t systems s y s t e m s shall s h a l l provide p r o v i d e a a quick q u i c k and a n d reliable r e l i a b l e discharge d i s c h a r g e of o f water w a t e r mist m i s t at a t a a sufficient s u f f i c i e n t density d e n s i t y and a n d at a t sufficient s u f f i c i e n t duration d u r a t i o n for f o r fire f i r e suppression s u p p r e s s i o n and a n d control. c o n t r o l . Operating O p e r a t i n g devices d e v i c e s shall s h a l l include i n c l u d e water w a t e r mist m i s t releasing r e l e a s i n g devices d e v i c e s or o r valves, v a l v e s , discharge d i s c h a r g e controls, c o n t r o l s , and a n d shutdown s h u t d o w n equipment e q u i p m e n t necessary n e c e s s a r y for f o r successful s u c c e s s f u l performance p e r f o r m a n c e of o f the t h e system. s y s t e m . Easily E a s i l y accessible a c c e s s i b l e manual m a n u a l release r e l e a s e facilities f a c i l i t i e s shall s h a l l be b e provided p r o v i d e d at a t main m a i n entrances e n t r a n c e s to t o the t h e areas. a r e a s . The T h e ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n (fans ( f a n s and/or a n d / o r dampers) d a m p e r s ) shall s h a l l be b e closed c l o s e d and a n d the t h e area a r e a disconnected d i s c o n n e c t e d before b e f o r e release r e l e a s e of o f water w a t e r mist m i s t systems. s y s t e m s . The T h e water w a t e r mist m i s t cabinet c a b i n e t shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d outside o u t s i d e of o f the t h e protected p r o t e c t e d space. s p a c e . Compatible C o m p a t i b l e materials m a t e r i a l s shall s h a l l be b e used u s e d throughout t h r o u g h o u t the t h e system, s y s t e m , e.g. e . g . nozzle n o z z l e / / distribution d i s t r i b u t i o n piping. p i p i n g . The T h e water w a t e r mist m i s t skid s k i d including i n c l u d i n g compressed c o m p r e s s e d gas g a s bottles b o t t l e s shall s h a l l be b e certified c e r t i f i e d for f o r the t h e actual a c t u a l maximum m a x i m u m operating o p e r a t i n g pressure. p r e s s u r e . Release R e l e a s e duration d u r a t i o n and a n d design d e s i g n should s h o u l d be b e in i n accordance a c c o r d a n c e with w i t h contractor’s c o n t r a c t o r ’ s recommendations, r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , and/or a n d / o r typically t y p i c a l l y range r a n g e from f r o m 5 5 up u p to t o 30 3 0 minutes m i n u t e s as a s indicated i n d i c a t e d in i n NFPA N F P A 750 7 5 0 depending d e p e n d i n g on o n application. a p p l i c a t i o n . IMO I M O MSC/CIRC: M S C / C I R C : 668, 6 6 8 , 728, 7 2 8 , 913 9 1 3 & & 1165 1 1 6 5 can c a n also a l s o be b e consulted. c o n s u l t e d . Inert I n e r t gas g a s system s y s t e m The T h e inert i n e r t gas g a s firefighting f i r e f i g h t i n g system s y s t e m shall s h a l l provide p r o v i d e a a quick q u i c k and a n d reliable r e l i a b l e discharge d i s c h a r g e of o f gaseous g a s e o u s agents a g e n t s for f o r fire f i r e mitigation m i t i g a t i o n at a t sufficient s u f f i c i e n t concentration c o n c e n t r a t i o n and a n d at a t sufficient s u f f i c i e n t duration d u r a t i o n for f o r fire f i r e suppression s u p p r e s s i o n and a n d control, c o n t r o l , whilst w h i l s t retaining r e t a i n i n g an a n atmosphere a t m o s p h e r e non-harmful n o n - h a r m f u l to t o humans. h u m a n s . Inert I n e r t gas g a s system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e one o n e central c e n t r a l system s y s t e m with w i t h valve-controlled v a l v e - c o n t r o l l e d distribution d i s t r i b u t i o n system s y s t e m to t o direct d i r e c t the t h e system s y s t e m toward t o w a r d intended i n t e n d e d room. r o o m . The T h e inert i n e r t gas g a s system s y s t e m shall s h a l l have h a v e 2x100% 2 x 1 0 0 % capacity c a p a c i t y to t o provide p r o v i d e back-up b a c k - u p coverage c o v e r a g e if i f e.g. e . g . inert i n e r t gas g a s system s y s t e m is i s unintentionally u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y released. r e l e a s e d . The T h e ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n (fans ( f a n s and/or a n d / o r dampers) d a m p e r s ) shall s h a l l be b e closed c l o s e d and a n d the t h e area a r e a isolated i s o l a t e d before b e f o r e release r e l e a s e of o f gaseous g a s e o u s systems. s y s t e m s . The T h e room r o o m where w h e r e the t h e gaseous g a s e o u s agent a g e n t is i s released r e l e a s e d shall s h a l l be b e sufficiently s u f f i c i e n t l y tight t i g h t to t o maintain m a i n t a i n the t h e prescribed p r e s c r i b e d concentration c o n c e n t r a t i o n for f o r the t h e pre-determined p r e - d e t e r m i n e d time t i m e period p e r i o d of o f minimum m i n i m u m 10 1 0 minutes. m i n u t e s . The T h e compressed c o m p r e s s e d gas g a s bottles b o t t l e s shall s h a l l be b e certified c e r t i f i e d for f o r the t h e actual a c t u a l maximum m a x i m u m operating o p e r a t i n g pressure. p r e s s u r e . The T h e gas g a s bottles b o t t l e s shall s h a l l be b e located l o c a t e d outside o u t s i d e of o f the t h e protected p r o t e c t e d room r o o m and a n d the t h e location l o c a t i o n is i s to t o be b e carefully c a r e f u l l y chosen c h o s e n with w i t h respect r e s p e c t to t o easy e a s y replenishment. r e p l e n i s h m e n t . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 69 6 9 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : In I n order o r d e r to t o enable e n a b l e personnel p e r s o n n e l to t o evacuate e v a c u a t e before b e f o r e gas g a s discharge, d i s c h a r g e , appropriate a p p r o p r i a t e means m e a n s for f o r warning w a r n i n g of o f gas g a s release r e l e a s e prior p r i o r to t o release r e l e a s e shall s h a l l be b e provided, p r o v i d e d , i.e. i . e . clearly c l e a r l y visual v i s u a l and a n d audible a u d i b l e alarms. a l a r m s . All A l l rooms r o o m s protected p r o t e c t e d by b y gaseous g a s e o u s agents a g e n t s shall s h a l l be b e furnished f u r n i s h e d with w i t h clear c l e a r audible a u d i b l e and a n d visual v i s u a l means m e a n s for f o r system s y s t e m status s t a t u s annunciation a n n u n c i a t i o n on o n the t h e outside o u t s i d e at a t the t h e room r o o m entries. e n t r i e s . Where W h e r e appropriate, a p p r o p r i a t e , the t h e system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e monitored m o n i t o r e d to t o enable e n a b l e the t h e detection d e t e c t i o n of o f faults f a u l t s which w h i c h may m a y affect a f f e c t the t h e operational o p e r a t i o n a l efficiency e f f i c i e n c y of o f the t h e system. s y s t e m . Protection P r o t e c t i o n by b y use u s e of o f CO2 C O 2 or o r other o t h e r noxious n o x i o u s and a n d poisonous p o i s o n o u s gases g a s e s is i s not n o t allowed. a l l o w e d . Fixed F i x e d foam f o a m system s y s t e m Foam F o a m system s y s t e m shall s h a l l provide p r o v i d e a a quick q u i c k and a n d reliable r e l i a b l e supply s u p p l y of o f firefighting f i r e f i g h t i n g foams f o a m s with w i t h the t h e correct c o r r e c t foam f o a m concentration c o n c e n t r a t i o n for f o r a a minimum m i n i m u m pre-determined p r e - d e t e r m i n e d time t i m e period. p e r i o d . A A fixed f i x e d self-contained s e l f - c o n t a i n e d foam f o a m system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e used u s e d for f o r transformer t r a n s f o r m e r areas. a r e a s . The T h e foam f o a m shall s h a l l be b e expansion e x p a n s i o n type t y p e foam f o a m suitable s u i t a b l e to t o maintain m a i n t a i n a a protective p r o t e c t i v e foam f o a m layer. l a y e r . The T h e design d e s i g n of o f foam f o a m systems s y s t e m s shall s h a l l be b e based b a s e d on o n recognized r e c o g n i z e d international i n t e r n a t i o n a l standard, s t a n d a r d , e.g. e . g . NFPA N F P A 11. 1 1 . The T h e self-contained s e l f - c o n t a i n e d foam f o a m system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e designed d e s i g n e d to t o operate o p e r a t e in i n freezing f r e e z i n g conditions. c o n d i t i o n s . Foam F o a m concentrate c o n c e n t r a t e shall s h a l l be b e of o f a a quality q u a l i t y which w h i c h withstands w i t h s t a n d s freezing f r e e z i n g conditions. c o n d i t i o n s . The T h e foam f o a m system s y s t e m shall s h a l l be b e released r e l e a s e d upon u p o n signal s i g n a l from f r o m the t h e instrumented i n s t r u m e n t e d fire f i r e and a n d gas g a s detection d e t e c t i o n system s y s t e m as a s well w e l l as a s by b y manual m a n u a l release. r e l e a s e . The T h e foam f o a m system s y s t e m shall s h a l l as a s a a minimum m i n i m u m have h a v e the t h e following f o l l o w i n g monitoring m o n i t o r i n g with w i t h signal s i g n a l transfer t r a n s f e r and a n d alarms a l a r m s to t o control c o n t r o l room: r o o m : • • Volume V o l u m e water/foam w a t e r / f o a m • • Pressure P r e s s u r e propellant p r o p e l l a n t • • Alarm A l a r m upon u p o n released r e l e a s e d system s y s t e m Foam F o a m release r e l e a s e valves v a l v e s shall s h a l l fail f a i l in i n last l a s t position p o s i t i o n upon u p o n loss l o s s of o f signal s i g n a l from f r o m F&G F & G logic l o g i c supplied s u p p l i e d with w i t h diagnostics d i a g n o s t i c s alarm a l a r m to t o CCR. C C R . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 70 7 0 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 9.2 9 . 2 Appendix A p p e n d i x B B - - Emergency E m e r g e n c y shutdown s h u t d o w n philosophy p h i l o s o p h y and a n d shutdown s h u t d o w n hierarchy h i e r a r c h y 9.2.1 9 . 2 . 1 Introduction I n t r o d u c t i o n are a r e separate s e p a r a t e entities, e n t i t i e s , each e a c h consists c o n s i s t s of o f a a wind w i n d farm f a r m with w i t h WTG’s, W T G ’ s , one o n e offshore o f f s h o r e substation, s u b s t a t i o n , and a n d one o n e onshore o n s h o r e substation. s u b s t a t i o n . The T h e onshore o n s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s are a r e co-located c o - l o c a t e d in i n same s a m e area, a r e a , separated s e p a r a t e d by b y some s o m e distance d i s t a n c e and a n d fence. f e n c e . Each E a c h development d e v e l o p m e n t consists c o n s i s t s of o f two t w o independent i n d e p e n d e n t power p o w e r transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n trains t r a i n s (A ( A & & B B system) s y s t e m ) through t h r o u g h the t h e OSS O S S and a n d the t h e ONS. O N S . From F r o m the t h e ONS O N S each e a c h wind w i n d farm f a r m continues c o n t i n u e s with w i t h one o n e power p o w e r cable c a b l e each e a c h to t o the t h e Third T h i r d party p a r t y owned o w n e d TSO T S O station. s t a t i o n . are a r e controlled c o n t r o l l e d from f r o m the t h e common c o m m o n onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l centre c e n t r e located l o c a t e d in i n Leba, L e b a , approximately a p p r o x i m a t e l y 80 8 0 km k m driving d r i v i n g distance d i s t a n c e by b y car c a r to t o the t h e onshore o n s h o r e substations. s u b s t a t i o n s . 9.2.2 9 . 2 . 2 Control C o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system s y s t e m In I n normal n o r m a l operation o p e r a t i o n the t h e electrical e l e c t r i c a l transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system s y s t e m is i s controlled c o n t r o l l e d and a n d protected p r o t e c t e d by b y the t h e control c o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system. s y s t e m . The T h e control c o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system s y s t e m monitor m o n i t o r the t h e transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system s y s t e m and a n d will w i l l disconnect d i s c o n n e c t parts p a r t s of, o f , or o r the t h e whole w h o l e system s y s t e m in i n the t h e event e v e n t of o f a a failure f a i l u r e in i n the t h e system. s y s t e m . Such S u c h disconnection d i s c o n n e c t i o n is i s performed p e r f o r m e d by b y electrical e l e c t r i c a l protection p r o t e c t i o n systems, s y s t e m s , interlocks, i n t e r l o c k s , intertrips i n t e r t r i p s etc. e t c . In I n modern m o d e r n control c o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n systems s y s t e m s the t h e protection p r o t e c t i o n functions f u n c t i o n s are a r e performed p e r f o r m e d by b y IEDs I E D s (Intelligent ( I n t e l l i g e n t Electronic E l e c t r o n i c Devices) D e v i c e s ) communicating c o m m u n i c a t i n g on o n a a 61850 6 1 8 5 0 system. s y s t e m . The T h e protection p r o t e c t i o n system s y s t e m contains c o n t a i n s several s e v e r a l layers l a y e r s of o f protection, p r o t e c t i o n , and a n d it i t is i s normally n o r m a l l y one o n e protection p r o t e c t i o n function f u n c t i o n for f o r each e a c h type t y p e of o f error e r r o r in i n an a n IED. I E D . In I n addition a d d i t i o n there t h e r e are a r e spare s p a r e protection p r o t e c t i o n functions f u n c t i o n s in i n another a n o t h e r IED. I E D . It I t may m a y be b e further f u r t h e r additional a d d i t i o n a l layers l a y e r s of o f spare s p a r e protection p r o t e c t i o n included i n c l u d e d in i n the t h e system. s y s t e m . High-voltage H i g h - v o l t a g e systems s y s t e m s have h a v e an a n increased i n c r e a s e d level l e v e l of o f safety, s a f e t y , and a n d it i t is i s normal n o r m a l to t o have h a v e redundant r e d u n d a n t primary p r i m a r y protection p r o t e c t i o n functions f u n c t i o n s and a n d two t w o secondary s e c o n d a r y protection p r o t e c t i o n functions f u n c t i o n s as a s back-up. b a c k - u p . The T h e protection p r o t e c t i o n system s y s t e m is i s a a fast-acting f a s t - a c t i n g system s y s t e m and a n d normally n o r m a l l y acting a c t i n g within w i t h i n milliseconds m i l l i s e c o n d s when w h e n an a n internal i n t e r n a l failure f a i l u r e is i s detected. d e t e c t e d . To T o have h a v e selectivity s e l e c t i v i t y the t h e secondary s e c o n d a r y protection p r o t e c t i o n normally n o r m a l l y has h a s 50-100 5 0 - 1 0 0 milliseconds m i l l i s e c o n d s delay d e l a y for f o r a a controlled c o n t r o l l e d shutdown s h u t d o w n of o f the t h e faulty f a u l t y part. p a r t . 9.2.3 9 . 2 . 3 Safety S a f e t y functions f u n c t i o n s for f o r emergency e m e r g e n c y events e v e n t s In I n addition a d d i t i o n to t o a a robust r o b u s t and a n d efficient e f f i c i e n t control c o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system, s y s t e m , it i t shall s h a l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e safety s a f e t y functions f u n c t i o n s to t o handle h a n d l e abnormal a b n o r m a l conditions c o n d i t i o n s which w h i c h are a r e not n o t managed m a n a g e d by b y the t h e control c o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system. s y s t e m . Potential P o t e n t i a l incidents i n c i d e n t s which w h i c h may m a y occur o c c u r in i n the t h e production p r o d u c t i o n and a n d transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n of o f wind w i n d power p o w e r is i s limited l i m i t e d to t o incidents i n c i d e n t s related r e l a t e d to t o high, h i g h , medium, m e d i u m , and a n d low l o w voltage v o l t a g e equipment, e q u i p m e n t , diesel d i e s e l fuel, f u e l , and a n d batteries b a t t e r i e s (e.g. ( e . g . high h i g h hydrogen h y d r o g e n concentration, c o n c e n t r a t i o n , smoke, s m o k e , or o r flame f l a m e detection). d e t e c t i o n ) . For F o r offshore o f f s h o r e installations, i n s t a l l a t i o n s , potential p o t e n t i a l risk r i s k for f o r ship s h i p collision c o l l i s i o n is i s also a l s o relevant. r e l e v a n t . Shutdown S h u t d o w n functions f u n c t i o n s allocated a l l o c a t e d to t o these t h e s e safety s a f e t y functions f u n c t i o n s are a r e denoted d e n o t e d emergency e m e r g e n c y shutdown s h u t d o w n (ESD) ( E S D ) functions f u n c t i o n s to t o distinct d i s t i n c t them t h e m from f r o m those t h o s e initiated i n i t i a t e d by b y the t h e control c o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system. s y s t e m . The T h e emergency e m e r g e n c y shutdown s h u t d o w n function f u n c t i o n is i s a a safety s a f e t y barrier b a r r i e r which w h i c h shall s h a l l be b e independent i n d e p e n d e n t of, o f , and a n d in i n addition a d d i t i o n to, t o , the t h e normal n o r m a l control c o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system. s y s t e m . [However, [ H o w e v e r , some s o m e shutdown s h u t d o w n functions f u n c t i o n s may m a y be b e performed p e r f o r m e d via v i a the t h e protection p r o t e c t i o n system s y s t e m when w h e n independence i n d e p e n d e n c e from f r o m control c o n t r o l of o f the t h e incident i n c i d e n t can c a n be b e demonstrated, d e m o n s t r a t e d , e.g. e . g . closing c l o s i n g or o r opening o p e n i n g of o f breaker b r e a k e r on o n another a n o t h e r installation.] i n s t a l l a t i o n . ] An A n abnormal a b n o r m a l condition c o n d i t i o n on o n one o n e of o f the t h e facilities f a c i l i t i e s may m a y partly p a r t l y or o r fully f u l l y affect a f f e c t the t h e other o t h e r facilities: f a c i l i t i e s : 1. 1 . Wind W i n d turbine t u r b i n e generators g e n e r a t o r s (WTG’s) ( W T G ’ s ) 2. 2 . Offshore O f f s h o r e Substation S u b s t a t i o n (OSS) ( O S S ) 3. 3 . Onshore O n s h o r e Substation S u b s t a t i o n (ONS) ( O N S ) 4. 4 . 3. 3 . Party P a r t y TSO T S O station s t a t i o n 5. 5 . [Onshore [ O n s h o r e control c o n t r o l centre c e n t r e due d u e to t o investigation i n v e s t i g a t i o n and a n d potential p o t e n t i a l rectifying r e c t i f y i n g the t h e event] e v e n t ] Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 71 7 1 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Abnormal A b n o r m a l conditions c o n d i t i o n s at a t 3. 3 . party p a r t y TSO T S O station s t a t i o n can c a n affect a f f e c t one o n e or o r both b o t h wind w i n d farms. f a r m s . However, H o w e v e r , it i t is i s not n o t expected e x p e c t e d to t o have h a v e automatic a u t o m a t i c ESD E S D actions a c t i o n s between b e t w e e n the t h e 3 3 party p a r t y TSO T S O station s t a t i o n and a n d the t h e B. B . The T h e consequences c o n s e q u e n c e s at a t B B of o f an a n abnormal a b n o r m a l condition c o n d i t i o n at a t TSO T S O area a r e a are a r e expected e x p e c t e d to t o be b e handled h a n d l e d by b y the t h e normal n o r m a l control c o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system. s y s t e m . Hardware H a r d w a r e transfer t r a n s f e r of o f ESD E S D signals s i g n a l s between b e t w e e n installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s via v i a the t h e ESD E S D logic l o g i c solver s o l v e r should s h o u l d be b e avoided. a v o i d e d . Such S u c h communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n should s h o u l d be b e via v i a dedicated d e d i c a t e d redundant r e d u n d a n t fibre, f i b r e , alternatively a l t e r n a t i v e l y via v i a control c o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system. s y s t e m . It I t is i s expected e x p e c t e d that t h a t the t h e control c o n t r o l and a n d protection p r o t e c t i o n system s y s t e m on o n installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s upstream u p s t r e a m and a n d downstream d o w n s t r e a m of o f the t h e affected a f f e c t e d installation i n s t a l l a t i o n is i s intact i n t a c t to t o perform p e r f o r m the t h e required r e q u i r e d control c o n t r o l and a n d shutdown s h u t d o w n based b a s e d on o n the t h e response/power r e s p o n s e / p o w e r transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n from f r o m the t h e affected a f f e c t e d installation. i n s t a l l a t i o n . 9.2.4 9 . 2 . 4 Shutdown S h u t d o w n principles p r i n c i p l e s The T h e ESD E S D functions f u n c t i o n s are a r e arranged a r r a n g e d in i n a a three-structure t h r e e - s t r u c t u r e level l e v e l hierarchy h i e r a r c h y designed d e s i g n e d to t o suit s u i t the t h e installation i n s t a l l a t i o n with w i t h the t h e largest l a r g e s t need, n e e d , i.e. i . e . the t h e OSS. O S S . The T h e ESD E S D hierarchy h i e r a r c h y consist c o n s i s t of o f the t h e following f o l l o w i n g shutdown s h u t d o w n levels: l e v e l s : • • ESD E S D 1: 1 : Total T o t a l shutdown s h u t d o w n of o f facility f a c i l i t y ESD E S D 1 1 is i s the t h e highest h i g h e s t level l e v e l of o f shutdown s h u t d o w n and a n d shall s h a l l be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d manually m a n u a l l y only. o n l y . • • ESD E S D 2: 2 : Facility F a c i l i t y shutdown. s h u t d o w n . Disconnection D i s c o n n e c t i o n of o f all a l l incoming i n c o m i n g Electrical E l e c t r i c a l power p o w e r to t o the t h e facility f a c i l i t y (e.g. ( e . g . shutdown s h u t d o w n of o f A A & & B B system) s y s t e m ) • • ESD E S D 3A/3B 3 A / 3 B System S y s t e m shutdown. s h u t d o w n . Disconnection D i s c o n n e c t i o n of o f single s i n g l e transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system s y s t e m (System ( S y s t e m A A or o r System S y s t e m B) B ) The T h e specific s p e c i f i c shut s h u t down d o w n actions a c t i o n s for f o r each e a c h level l e v e l may m a y vary v a r y between b e t w e e n facilities, f a c i l i t i e s , e.g. e . g . WTG’s W T G ’ s will w i l l be b e different d i f f e r e n t from f r o m substations. s u b s t a t i o n s . A A principle p r i n c i p l e shut s h u t down d o w n hierarchy h i e r a r c h y for f o r an a n offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n is i s shown s h o w n below b e l o w in i n figure f i g u r e 1. 1 . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 72 7 2 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : Figure F i g u r e 1 1 ESD E S D hierarchy. h i e r a r c h y . Notes N o t e s to t o figure f i g u r e 1 1 ESD E S D hierarchy: h i e r a r c h y : 1. 1 . ESD E S D 3A/3B 3 A / 3 B denotes d e n o t e s transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system s y s t e m A A and a n d system s y s t e m B. B . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 73 7 3 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 2. 2 . A A time t i m e delay d e l a y of o f e.g. e . g . 2 2 hours h o u r s should s h o u l d be b e implemented i m p l e m e n t e d before b e f o r e shutdown s h u t d o w n is i s activated. a c t i v a t e d . The T h e time t i m e delay d e l a y could c o u l d be b e longer l o n g e r as a s the t h e control/protection c o n t r o l / p r o t e c t i o n system s y s t e m still s t i l l operates o p e r a t e s and a n d safeguard s a f e g u a r d the t h e transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system. s y s t e m . NB! N B ! Loss L o s s of o f communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n is i s understood u n d e r s t o o d as a s loss l o s s of o f both b o t h MPLS M P L S communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n lines l i n e s between b e t w e e n installation i n s t a l l a t i o n and a n d CCR C C R at a t same s a m e time. t i m e . 3. 3 . On O n automatic a u t o m a t i c fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n in i n a a power p o w e r transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n train, t r a i n , a a signal s i g n a l to t o be b e sent s e n t to t o WTGs W T G s control c o n t r o l system s y s t e m to t o perform p e r f o r m a a controlled c o n t r o l l e d stop s t o p (soft ( s o f t stop) s t o p ) of o f WTGs. W T G s . 4. 4 . Time T i m e delay d e l a y for f o r activation a c t i v a t i o n of o f ESD E S D level l e v e l 3 3 to t o be b e implemented i m p l e m e n t e d to t o allow a l l o w a a fast f a s t soft s o f t stop s t o p of o f WTGs. W T G s . 5. 5 . OSS: O S S : For F o r each e a c h incoming i n c o m i n g inter-array i n t e r - a r r a y cable c a b l e to t o the t h e transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system s y s t e m the t h e breaker b r e a k e r on o n the t h e WTG W T G closest c l o s e s t to t o the t h e OSS O S S and a n d the t h e onshore o n s h o r e breaker b r e a k e r on o n export e x p o r t cable c a b l e shall s h a l l be b e opened o p e n e d to t o de-energize d e - e n e r g i z e the t h e transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system. s y s t e m . ONS: O N S : The T h e onshore o n s h o r e breaker b r e a k e r on o n the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e export e x p o r t cable c a b l e and a n d the t h e breaker b r e a k e r on o n the t h e transfer t r a n s f e r cable c a b l e to t o the t h e transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n substation s u b s t a t i o n shall s h a l l be b e opened o p e n e d to t o de-energize d e - e n e r g i z e the t h e onshore o n s h o r e transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system. s y s t e m . Inter-trip I n t e r - t r i p to t o open o p e n export e x p o r t cable c a b l e offshore o f f s h o r e breaker b r e a k e r and a n d breaker b r e a k e r at a t transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n substation s u b s t a t i o n recommended. r e c o m m e n d e d . 6. 6 . Automatic A u t o m a t i c firefighting f i r e f i g h t i n g system s y s t e m released r e l e a s e d automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y upon u p o n confirmed c o n f i r m e d fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n while w h i l e transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system s y s t e m is i s still s t i l l running r u n n i n g down d o w n and a n d energized. e n e r g i z e d . 7. 7 . ESD E S D push p u s h button b u t t o n initiate i n i t i a t e hard h a r d stop s t o p of o f WTGs W T G s (due ( d u e to t o breakers b r e a k e r s on o n IAC I A C open) o p e n ) of, o f , and a n d immediate i m m e d i a t e electrical e l e c t r i c a l isolation i s o l a t i o n of o f power p o w e r train. t r a i n . 8. 8 . On O n the t h e utility u t i l i t y shut s h u t down d o w n level, l e v e l , shut s h u t down d o w n and a n d isolation i s o l a t i o n of o f utility u t i l i t y systems, s y s t e m s , utility u t i l i t y equipment e q u i p m e n t and a n d support s u p p o r t functions f u n c t i o n s to t o the t h e transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n trains t r a i n s shall s h a l l be b e executed e x e c u t e d by b y the t h e electrical e l e c t r i c a l protection p r o t e c t i o n system s y s t e m and a n d fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n system s y s t e m according a c c o r d i n g to t o developed d e v e l o p e d Cause C a u s e and a n d effect e f f e c t diagrams, d i a g r a m s , e.g. e . g . electrical e l e c t r i c a l isolation i s o l a t i o n of o f GIS G I S switchboard s w i t c h b o a r d upon u p o n confirmed c o n f i r m e d detection d e t e c t i o n of o f lack l a c k of o f isolation i s o l a t i o n gas. g a s . Release R e l e a s e of o f fire f i r e protection p r o t e c t i o n system s y s t e m for f o r utility u t i l i t y areas, a r e a s , e.g. e . g . diesel d i e s e l generator g e n e r a t o r shall s h a l l be b e executed e x e c u t e d by b y fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n system. s y s t e m . 9.2.4.1 9 . 2 . 4 . 1 Wind W i n d turbine t u r b i n e generators g e n e r a t o r s The T h e individual i n d i v i d u a l WTGs W T G s are a r e controlled c o n t r o l l e d according a c c o r d i n g to t o the t h e turbine t u r b i n e vendors v e n d o r s own o w n hazard h a z a r d and a n d risk r i s k evaluations e v a l u a t i o n s which w h i c h form f o r m the t h e basis b a s i s for f o r the t h e design d e s i g n and a n d type t y p e approval a p p r o v a l of o f the t h e WTG. W T G . In I n the t h e event e v e n t of o f shutdown s h u t d o w n of o f a a transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n train, t r a i n , the t h e WTGs W T G s are a r e prevented p r e v e n t e d from f r o m delivering d e l i v e r i n g the t h e power p o w e r and a n d will w i l l be b e stopped. s t o p p e d . Either E i t h e r by b y signal s i g n a l for f o r controlled c o n t r o l l e d rundown r u n d o w n of o f the t h e WTG W T G or o r an a n emergency e m e r g e n c y stop s t o p initiated i n i t i a t e d by b y the t h e control c o n t r o l system s y s t e m for f o r the t h e turbine. t u r b i n e . Detection D e t e c t i o n of o f events e v e n t s on o n a a WTG W T G and a n d the t h e status s t a t u s of o f actions a c t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e alarmed a l a r m e d and a n d displayed d i s p l a y e d in i n the t h e onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l room. r o o m . 9.2.4.2 9 . 2 . 4 . 2 Offshore O f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n (OSS) ( O S S ) ESD E S D functions f u n c t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e realised r e a l i s e d according a c c o r d i n g to t o DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 by b y using u s i n g a a separate s e p a r a t e logic l o g i c solver. s o l v e r . Alternatively, A l t e r n a t i v e l y , upon u p o n agreement a g r e e m e n t with w i t h Owner, O w n e r , the t h e fire f i r e and a n d gas g a s logic l o g i c solver s o l v e r can c a n be b e used. u s e d . The T h e logic l o g i c solver, s o l v e r , or o r the t h e fire f i r e and a n d gas g a s logic l o g i c solver, s o l v e r , shall s h a l l be b e mutually m u t u a l l y independent i n d e p e n d e n t of o f the t h e control c o n t r o l and a n d alarm a l a r m system s y s t e m related r e l a t e d to t o the t h e same s a m e equipment e q u i p m e n t under u n d e r control. c o n t r o l . The T h e defined d e f i n e d ESD E S D actions a c t i o n s shall s h a l l be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y and a n d manually m a n u a l l y by b y pushbuttons p u s h b u t t o n s at a t defined d e f i n e d locations. l o c a t i o n s . Initiating I n i t i a t i n g event, e v e n t , detection d e t e c t i o n and a n d status s t a t u s shall s h a l l be b e alarmed a l a r m e d and a n d displayed d i s p l a y e d in i n onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l room. r o o m . The T h e following f o l l o w i n g shutdown s h u t d o w n levels l e v e l s for f o r Offshore O f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n are a r e assumed a s s u m e d (ref ( r e f also a l s o figure f i g u r e 1): 1 ) : ESD-1 E S D - 1 - - Total T o t a l shutdown s h u t d o w n of o f facility. f a c i l i t y . Total T o t a l substation s u b s t a t i o n shutdown s h u t d o w n will w i l l isolate i s o l a t e the t h e substation s u b s t a t i o n from f r o m the t h e grid g r i d and a n d de-energize d e - e n e r g i z e the t h e substation. s u b s t a t i o n . UPS U P S power p o w e r will w i l l be b e isolated i s o l a t e d after a f t e r a a predefined p r e d e f i n e d time t i m e delay. d e l a y . Only O n l y systems s y s t e m s left l e f t operating o p e r a t i n g are a r e Nav N a v aid a i d systems s y s t e m s including i n c l u d i n g marking m a r k i n g lights. l i g h t s . ESD-1 E S D - 1 should s h o u l d be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d if i f there t h e r e is i s a a danger d a n g e r of o f a a catastrophic c a t a s t r o p h i c incident i n c i d e n t e.g. e . g . an a n external e x t e r n a l owned o w n e d vessel v e s s e l can c a n collide c o l l i d e with w i t h the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation. s u b s t a t i o n . Decision D e c i s i o n to t o activate a c t i v a t e ESD-1 E S D - 1 will w i l l be b e made m a d e upon u p o n evaluation e v a l u a t i o n of o f the t h e ship s h i p Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 74 7 4 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : surveillance s u r v e i l l a n c e of o f the t h e area, a r e a , or o r by b y a a responsible r e s p o n s i b l e personnel p e r s o n n e l visiting v i s i t i n g the t h e facility. f a c i l i t y . It I t is i s expected e x p e c t e d that t h a t personnel p e r s o n n e l on o n the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n in i n such s u c h case c a s e are a r e in i n radio r a d i o contact c o n t a c t with w i t h onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l room r o o m and a n d can c a n request r e q u e s t a a shutdown s h u t d o w n to t o be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d from f r o m the t h e control c o n t r o l room. r o o m . Hence H e n c e pushbutton p u s h b u t t o n for f o r ESD-1 E S D - 1 level l e v e l is i s not n o t required r e q u i r e d installed i n s t a l l e d on o n the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation. s u b s t a t i o n . Upon U p o n ESD-1 E S D - 1 the t h e following f o l l o w i n g shall s h a l l be b e initiated: i n i t i a t e d : • • Muster M u s t e r alarm a l a r m on o n OSS O S S • • Shutdown S h u t d o w n of o f diesel d i e s e l generator g e n e r a t o r • • Prevent P r e v e n t start s t a r t of o f diesel d i e s e l generator g e n e r a t o r • • ESD-2 E S D - 2 level l e v e l which w h i c h entails: e n t a i l s : o o Both B o t h transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system s y s t e m A A and a n d B B be b e isolated i s o l a t e d and a n d de-energized, d e - e n e r g i z e d , o o All A l l WTGs W T G s connected c o n n e c t e d to t o the t h e substation s u b s t a t i o n are a r e given g i v e n stop s t o p command, c o m m a n d , alternatively a l t e r n a t i v e l y WTG’s W T G ’ s will w i l l stop s t o p immediately i m m e d i a t e l y when w h e n OSS O S S shut s h u t down, d o w n , o o Breakers B r e a k e r s on o n OSS O S S side s i d e on o n export e x p o r t cables c a b l e s shall s h a l l be b e open, o p e n , the t h e need n e e d for f o r opening o p e n i n g breakers b r e a k e r s on o n ONS O N S side s i d e to t o be b e evaluated, e v a l u a t e d , Nav N a v aids, a i d s , fire f i r e alarm a l a r m system s y s t e m and a n d fire f i r e extinguishing e x t i n g u i s h i n g system s y s t e m shall s h a l l still s t i l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e for f o r the t h e duration d u r a t i o n of o f their t h e i r required r e q u i r e d battery b a t t e r y time. t i m e . Monitoring M o n i t o r i n g of o f ship s h i p collision c o l l i s i o n should s h o u l d be b e available a v a i l a b l e via v i a UPS. U P S . ESD E S D 1 1 should s h o u l d be b e available a v a i l a b l e for f o r remote r e m o t e reset r e s e t from f r o m CCR C C R if i f it i t is i s verified v e r i f i e d by b y surveillances s u r v e i l l a n c e s systems s y s t e m s that t h a t collision c o l l i s i o n did d i d not n o t happen, h a p p e n , (i.e. ( i . e . last-minute l a s t - m i n u t e averting). a v e r t i n g ) . ESD-2 E S D - 2 Substation S u b s t a t i o n shutdown s h u t d o w n (A ( A & & B B system). s y s t e m ) . ESD-2 E S D - 2 shut s h u t down d o w n the t h e substation s u b s t a t i o n transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n systems s y s t e m s A A & & B B and a n d isolate i s o l a t e the t h e substation s u b s t a t i o n from f r o m the t h e grid. g r i d . Auxiliary A u x i l i a r y generator, g e n e r a t o r , UPS U P S power p o w e r and a n d utility u t i l i t y systems s y s t e m s are a r e still s t i l l connected c o n n e c t e d and a n d available. a v a i l a b l e . ESD2 E S D 2 shall s h a l l be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d as a s follows: f o l l o w s : • • Automatically A u t o m a t i c a l l y with w i t h time t i m e delay d e l a y upon u p o n loss l o s s of o f communication c o m m u n i c a t i o n with w i t h control c o n t r o l system s y s t e m between b e t w e e n onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l room r o o m and a n d substation s u b s t a t i o n (i.e., ( i . e . , loss l o s s of o f signal s i g n a l resulting r e s u l t i n g in i n no n o information i n f o r m a t i o n from f r o m the t h e C&P C & P on o n installation i n s t a l l a t i o n shown s h o w n on o n the t h e screens s c r e e n s in i n the t h e CCR), C C R ) , • • Manually M a n u a l l y from f r o m onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l room r o o m • • Potentially P o t e n t i a l l y manually m a n u a l l y from f r o m pushbuttons p u s h b u t t o n s at a t OSS O S S if i f found f o u n d required r e q u i r e d by b y the t h e safety s a f e t y strategy. s t r a t e g y . Upon U p o n ESD-2 E S D - 2 the t h e following f o l l o w i n g shall s h a l l be b e initiated: i n i t i a t e d : • • ESD E S D level l e v e l 3A 3 A and a n d ESD E S D level l e v e l 3B 3 B • • Start S t a r t diesel d i e s e l generator. g e n e r a t o r . ESD-3A, E S D - 3 A , ESD-3B E S D - 3 B System S y s t e m shutdown. s h u t d o w n . ESD E S D 3 3 level l e v e l shut s h u t down d o w n each e a c h individual i n d i v i d u a l power p o w e r transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n system, s y s t e m , i.e. i . e . system s y s t e m A A or o r system s y s t e m B, B , in i n the t h e event e v e n t of o f an a n emergency e m e r g e n c y incident i n c i d e n t affects a f f e c t s one o n e of o f the t h e areas a r e a s where w h e r e the t h e individual i n d i v i d u a l train t r a i n is i s located. l o c a t e d . The T h e individual i n d i v i d u a l train t r a i n is i s also a l s o isolated i s o l a t e d from f r o m the t h e grid. g r i d . Shutdown S h u t d o w n of o f an a n individual i n d i v i d u a l train t r a i n e.g. e . g . system s y s t e m A A do d o not n o t affect a f f e c t the t h e other o t h e r train, t r a i n , system s y s t e m B, B , which w h i c h will w i l l continue c o n t i n u e its i t s power p o w e r transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n to t o shore. s h o r e . ESD E S D 3A/3B 3 A / 3 B shall s h a l l be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d as a s follows: f o l l o w s : • • Automatically A u t o m a t i c a l l y with w i t h time t i m e delay d e l a y upon u p o n confirmed c o n f i r m e d fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n within w i t h i n one o n e of o f the t h e areas a r e a s for f o r the t h e individual i n d i v i d u a l systems s y s t e m s (i.e. ( i . e . transformer t r a n s f o r m e r area, a r e a , switchgear s w i t c h g e a r rooms, r o o m s , electrical e l e c t r i c a l equipment e q u i p m e n t rooms), r o o m s ) , o o The T h e confirmed c o n f i r m e d fire f i r e detection d e t e c t i o n shall s h a l l • • send s e n d stop s t o p signal s i g n a l to t o WTGs W T G s for f o r controlled c o n t r o l l e d and a n d fast f a s t rundown r u n d o w n of o f the t h e turbines. t u r b i n e s . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 75 7 5 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : • • immediately i m m e d i a t e l y initiate i n i t i a t e the t h e fire f i r e extinguishing e x t i n g u i s h i n g system s y s t e m for f o r the t h e area a r e a where w h e r e fire f i r e is i s confirmed. c o n f i r m e d . • • Manually M a n u a l l y from f r o m pushbuttons p u s h b u t t o n s in i n the t h e field f i e l d • • Manually M a n u a l l y from f r o m CCR. C C R . Upon U p o n ESD E S D 3A/3B 3 A / 3 B the t h e following f o l l o w i n g shall s h a l l be b e initiated: i n i t i a t e d : • • Activate A c t i v a t e general g e n e r a l alarm. a l a r m . • • Isolate/de-energize I s o l a t e / d e - e n e r g i z e the t h e affected a f f e c t e d room r o o m or o r equipment e q u i p m e n t from f r o m the t h e transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n power p o w e r (i.e. ( i . e . shutdown s h u t d o w n the t h e transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n train). t r a i n ) . WTGs W T G s connected c o n n e c t e d to t o the t h e individual i n d i v i d u a l system s y s t e m is i s automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y shut s h u t down d o w n as a s consequence c o n s e q u e n c e of o f no n o possibility p o s s i b i l i t y to t o deliver d e l i v e r the t h e power. p o w e r . • • Isolate I s o l a t e the t h e system s y s t e m from f r o m the t h e grid. g r i d . Equipment E q u i p m e n t shut s h u t down. d o w n . Utility U t i l i t y systems, s y s t e m s , utility u t i l i t y areas a r e a s and a n d other o t h e r areas a r e a s e.g. e . g . auxiliary a u x i l i a r y diesel d i e s e l generator g e n e r a t o r and a n d diesel d i e s e l system, s y s t e m , are a r e monitored m o n i t o r e d by b y fire f i r e and a n d gas g a s detection d e t e c t i o n system s y s t e m and a n d are a r e shut s h u t down d o w n by b y fire f i r e and a n d gas g a s detection d e t e c t i o n system s y s t e m and a n d the t h e control c o n t r o l system. s y s t e m . Equipment E q u i p m e n t shut s h u t down d o w n of o f individual i n d i v i d u a l equipment e q u i p m e n t shall s h a l l be b e automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y initiated i n i t i a t e d in i n the t h e event e v e n t fire f i r e is i s detected d e t e c t e d in i n equipment e q u i p m e n t or o r in i n the t h e area a r e a the t h e equipment e q u i p m e n t is i s located. l o c a t e d . Equipment E q u i p m e n t shut s h u t down d o w n shall s h a l l also a l s o be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d if i f flammable f l a m m a b l e or o r toxic t o x i c gas g a s is i s detected d e t e c t e d in i n an a n area a r e a with w i t h equipment e q u i p m e n t which w h i c h contain c o n t a i n gas g a s or o r which w h i c h in i n a a failure f a i l u r e condition c o n d i t i o n is i s able a b l e to t o produce p r o d u c e flammable/toxic f l a m m a b l e / t o x i c gas, g a s , e.g. e . g . batteries, b a t t e r i e s , Upon U p o n equipment e q u i p m e n t shutdown s h u t d o w n the t h e following f o l l o w i n g shall s h a l l be b e initiated: i n i t i a t e d : • • Equipment E q u i p m e n t shall s h a l l be b e stopped s t o p p e d and a n d electrically e l e c t r i c a l l y isolated i s o l a t e d • • Alarm A l a r m and a n d status s t a t u s signal s i g n a l to t o onshore o n s h o r e control c o n t r o l room r o o m • • Alarm A l a r m personnel p e r s o n n e l onboard o n b o a r d OSS O S S Active A c t i v e fire f i r e protection, p r o t e c t i o n , mechanical m e c h a n i c a l ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n and a n d closure c l o s u r e of o f fire f i r e dampers d a m p e r s shall s h a l l be b e controlled c o n t r o l l e d as a s required r e q u i r e d by b y the t h e fire f i r e and a n d gas g a s logic. l o g i c . 9.2.4.3 9 . 2 . 4 . 3 Onshore O n s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n (ONS) ( O N S ) To T o be b e developed d e v e l o p e d in i n separate s e p a r a t e document. d o c u m e n t . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 76 7 6 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 9.3 9 . 3 Appendix A p p e n d i x C C – – Assessment A s s e s s m e n t of o f emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r and a n d UPS U P S The T h e assessment a s s e s s m e n t intends i n t e n d s to t o document d o c u m e n t the t h e background b a c k g r o u n d for f o r the t h e chosen c h o s e n solution s o l u t i o n for f o r emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r and a n d duration d u r a t i o n of o f operation o p e r a t i o n of o f the t h e UPS U P S based b a s e d on o n relevant r e l e v a n t parts p a r t s of o f DNV-ST-0145. D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 . 1. 1 . OSS O S S is i s defined d e f i n e d as a s type t y p e A A substation s u b s t a t i o n – – i.e. i . e . unmanned u n m a n n e d substation, s u b s t a t i o n , persons p e r s o n s are a r e onboard o n b o a r d only o n l y for f o r inspection i n s p e c t i o n and a n d maintenance, m a i n t e n a n c e , no n o overnight o v e r n i g h t stays s t a y s on o n OSS O S S are a r e planned. p l a n n e d . However H o w e v e r possibility p o s s i b i l i t y for f o r emergency e m e r g e n c y overnight o v e r n i g h t stay s t a y is i s available a v a i l a b l e in i n the t h e event e v e n t personnel p e r s o n n e l cannot c a n n o t be b e picked p i c k e d up u p from f r o m the t h e substation s u b s t a t i o n as a s planned. p l a n n e d . 2. 2 . DNV D N V definition d e f i n i t i o n of o f island i s l a n d condition: c o n d i t i o n : - - An A n offshore o f f s h o r e substation s u b s t a t i o n is i s in i n islanded i s l a n d e d condition c o n d i t i o n when w h e n the t h e electrical e l e c t r i c a l connection c o n n e c t i o n with w i t h the t h e external e x t e r n a l grid g r i d is i s not n o t available. a v a i l a b l e . Consideration C o n s i d e r a t i o n of o f islanded i s l a n d e d condition c o n d i t i o n is i s mandatory m a n d a t o r y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s of o f type t y p e B B and a n d C, C , see s e e [DNV-ST-0145 [ D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 section s e c t i o n 3.3.2]. 3 . 3 . 2 ] . For F o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s of o f type t y p e A, A , see s e e [3.3.2], [ 3 . 3 . 2 ] , the t h e same s a m e requirement r e q u i r e m e n t applies a p p l i e s unless u n l e s s it i t is i s assured a s s u r e d that t h a t evacuation e v a c u a t i o n of o f personnel p e r s o n n e l on o n board b o a r d can c a n be b e initiated i n i t i a t e d immediately i m m e d i a t e l y upon u p o n the t h e occurrence o c c u r r e n c e of o f islanded i s l a n d e d condition. c o n d i t i o n . Possibility P o s s i b i l i t y of o f immediate i m m e d i a t e evacuation e v a c u a t i o n presumes p r e s u m e s availability a v a i l a b i l i t y of o f primary p r i m a r y means m e a n s of o f evacuation e v a c u a t i o n on o n or o r in i n direct d i r e c t vicinity v i c i n i t y of o f the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation. s u b s t a t i o n . Evaluated E v a l u a t e d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n time t i m e shall s h a l l in i n no n o case c a s e exceed e x c e e d 30 3 0 minutes. m i n u t e s . Emergency E m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s shall s h a l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e during d u r i n g islanded i s l a n d e d condition. c o n d i t i o n . [Comment: [ C o m m e n t : offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s is i s type t y p e A A and a n d could c o u l d be b e designed d e s i g n e d without w i t h o u t possibility p o s s i b i l i t y for f o r island i s l a n d mode m o d e condition. c o n d i t i o n . The T h e CTV C T V will w i l l be b e in i n the t h e area a r e a while w h i l e personnel p e r s o n n e l are a r e on o n board b o a r d the t h e substation. s u b s t a t i o n . The T h e substation s u b s t a t i o n can c a n be b e evacuated e v a c u a t e d within w i t h i n 30 3 0 minutes m i n u t e s using u s i n g the t h e CTV, C T V , maybe m a y b e slightly s l i g h t l y more m o r e than t h a n 30 3 0 minutes m i n u t e s if i f using u s i n g the t h e SOV. S O V . However, H o w e v e r , all a l l emergency e m e r g e n c y systems s y s t e m s are a r e intact, i n t a c t , and a n d power p o w e r supplied s u p p l i e d by b y UPS.] U P S . ] 3. 3 . Emergency E m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s - - Emergency E m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s are a r e those t h o s e services s e r v i c e s that t h a t are a r e essential e s s e n t i a l for f o r safety s a f e t y in i n an a n emergency e m e r g e n c y condition. c o n d i t i o n . Examples E x a m p l e s of o f equipment e q u i p m e n t and a n d systems s y s t e m s for f o r emergency e m e r g e n c y services: s e r v i c e s : -equipment - e q u i p m e n t and a n d systems s y s t e m s that t h a t need n e e d to t o be b e in i n operation o p e r a t i o n in i n order o r d e r to t o maintain, m a i n t a i n , at a t least, l e a s t , those t h o s e services s e r v i c e s that t h a t are a r e required r e q u i r e d to t o be b e supplied s u p p l i e d from f r o m the t h e emergency e m e r g e n c y source s o u r c e of o f electrical e l e c t r i c a l power p o w e r -equipment - e q u i p m e n t and a n d systems s y s t e m s that t h a t need n e e d to t o be b e in i n operation o p e r a t i o n in i n order o r d e r to t o maintain, m a i n t a i n , at a t least, l e a s t , those t h o s e services s e r v i c e s that t h a t are a r e required r e q u i r e d to t o be b e supplied s u p p l i e d from f r o m transitional t r a n s i t i o n a l source(s) s o u r c e ( s ) of o f emergency e m e r g e n c y electrical e l e c t r i c a l power p o w e r -equipment - e q u i p m e n t and a n d systems s y s t e m s for f o r starting s t a r t i n g and a n d control c o n t r o l of o f emergency e m e r g e n c y generator g e n e r a t o r sets s e t s -equipment - e q u i p m e n t and a n d systems s y s t e m s for f o r starting s t a r t i n g and a n d control c o n t r o l of o f diesel d i e s e l engines e n g i n e s for f o r emergency e m e r g e n c y fire-fighting f i r e - f i g h t i n g pumps, p u m p s , if i f any. a n y . Requirements R e q u i r e m e n t s for f o r emergency e m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s are a r e given g i v e n in i n [DNV-ST-0145 [ D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 section s e c t i o n 5.5.3]. 5 . 5 . 3 ] . 4. 4 . Emergency E m e r g e n c y condition c o n d i t i o n - - An A n emergency e m e r g e n c y condition c o n d i t i o n is i s a a condition c o n d i t i o n under u n d e r which w h i c h services s e r v i c e s needed n e e d e d for f o r normal n o r m a l operational o p e r a t i o n a l and a n d habitable h a b i t a b l e conditions c o n d i t i o n s are a r e not n o t in i n working w o r k i n g order o r d e r due d u e to t o a a failure f a i l u r e of o f the t h e main m a i n source s o u r c e of o f auxiliary a u x i l i a r y power p o w e r system s y s t e m as a s a a consequence c o n s e q u e n c e of o f a a malfunction m a l f u n c t i o n or o r an a n accidental a c c i d e n t a l event e v e n t including i n c l u d i n g fire, f i r e , flooding, f l o o d i n g , extreme e x t r e m e waves w a v e s and a n d similar. s i m i l a r . Worst W o r s t case c a s e scenarios s c e n a r i o s and a n d necessary n e c e s s a r y emergency e m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s and a n d procedures p r o c e d u r e s shall s h a l l be b e considered c o n s i d e r e d during d u r i n g the t h e design d e s i g n process. p r o c e s s . At A t least l e a s t the t h e emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r consumers c o n s u m e r s given g i v e n in i n Table T a b l e 5-2 5 - 2 shall s h a l l be b e available a v a i l a b l e during d u r i n g emergency e m e r g e n c y condition. c o n d i t i o n . A A schematic s c h e m a t i c presentation p r e s e n t a t i o n of o f the t h e emergency e m e r g e n c y condition c o n d i t i o n is i s given g i v e n in i n DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 Appendix A p p e n d i x C. C . [Comment: [ C o m m e n t : Services S e r v i c e s needed n e e d e d for f o r habitable h a b i t a b l e conditions c o n d i t i o n s are a r e not n o t relevant r e l e v a n t for f o r OSS O S S as a s the t h e substations s u b s t a t i o n s are a r e not n o t intended i n t e n d e d for f o r planned p l a n n e d overnight o v e r n i g h t stay. s t a y . This T h i s should s h o u l d also a l s o be b e reason r e a s o n to t o relax r e l a x on o n the t h e duration d u r a t i o n of o f emergency e m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s given g i v e n in i n table t a b l e 5-2.] 5 - 2 . ] Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 77 7 7 of o f 78 7 8 granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true} Safety S a f e t y strategy s t r a t e g y for f o r offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s Doc. D o c . No. N o . C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 C 2 5 6 - E Q - S - F D - 0 0 0 0 3 Rev. R e v . no. n o . 02 0 2 Valid V a l i d from: f r o m : 5. 5 . DNV D N V Section S e c t i o n 5.5.2 5 . 5 . 2 Main M a i n power p o w e r of o f auxiliary a u x i l i a r y power p o w e r system s y s t e m - - On O n offshore o f f s h o r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s of o f type t y p e B B and a n d C, C , main m a i n source s o u r c e of o f power p o w e r supply s u p p l y for f o r auxiliary a u x i l i a r y power p o w e r system s y s t e m required r e q u i r e d for f o r islanded i s l a n d e d condition c o n d i t i o n shall s h a l l be b e dedicated d e d i c a t e d generator g e n e r a t o r set(s) s e t ( s ) located l o c a t e d on o n the t h e offshore o f f s h o r e substation. s u b s t a t i o n . [Comment: [ C o m m e n t : Since S i n c e OSS O S S are a r e substations s u b s t a t i o n s of o f type t y p e A A it i t is i s not n o t a a requirement r e q u i r e m e n t to t o have h a v e a a main m a i n source s o u r c e of o f power p o w e r supply s u p p l y for f o r auxiliary a u x i l i a r y power p o w e r system s y s t e m for f o r island i s l a n d condition.] c o n d i t i o n . ] 6. 6 . 5.5.3 5 . 5 . 3 Emergency E m e r g e n c y power p o w e r supply s u p p l y of o f auxiliary a u x i l i a r y power p o w e r system. s y s t e m . - - Includes I n c l u d e s emergency e m e r g e n c y generator g e n e r a t o r and a n d batteries. b a t t e r i e s . The T h e emergency e m e r g e n c y source s o u r c e of o f electric e l e c t r i c power p o w e r is i s a a source s o u r c e of o f electric e l e c t r i c power p o w e r intended i n t e n d e d in i n the t h e event e v e n t of o f outage o u t a g e of o f main m a i n power p o w e r supply s u p p l y for f o r auxiliary a u x i l i a r y power p o w e r system s y s t e m to t o supply s u p p l y electric e l e c t r i c power p o w e r to t o the t h e emergency e m e r g e n c y switchboard s w i t c h b o a r d (ESB) ( E S B ) and/or a n d / o r equipment e q u i p m e n t for f o r emergency e m e r g e n c y services. s e r v i c e s . Requirements: R e q u i r e m e n t s : a) a ) Self-contained, S e l f - c o n t a i n e d , safe s a f e location, l o c a t i o n , separate s e p a r a t e from f r o m auxiliary a u x i l i a r y power, p o w e r , automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y connected c o n n e c t e d to t o emergency e m e r g e n c y switchboard, s w i t c h b o a r d , if i f it i t is i s a a generator g e n e r a t o r it i t shall s h a l l be b e automatically a u t o m a t i c a l l y started s t a r t e d and a n d in i n 45 4 5 seconds s e c o n d s supply s u p p l y at a t least l e a s t the t h e services s e r v i c e s required r e q u i r e d in i n Table T a b l e 5-2 5 - 2 upon u p o n loss l o s s of o f main m a i n power p o w e r supply. s u p p l y . [Comment: [ C o m m e n t : According A c c o r d i n g to t o point p o i n t 6 6 a.) a . ) it i t is i s clear c l e a r that t h a t the t h e emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r supply s u p p l y do d o not n o t need n e e d to t o consist c o n s i s t of o f an a n emergency e m e r g e n c y generator. g e n e r a t o r . Hence, H e n c e , sufficient s u f f i c i e n t battery b a t t e r y capacity c a p a c i t y is i s acceptable a c c e p t a b l e as a s emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r supply.] s u p p l y . ] 7. 7 . 5.5.3.4 5 . 5 . 3 . 4 Capacity C a p a c i t y of o f emergency e m e r g e n c y source s o u r c e of o f power p o w e r - - Shall S h a l l supply s u p p l y emergency e m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s listed l i s t e d in i n table t a b l e 5-2. 5 - 2 . The T h e electrical e l e c t r i c a l power p o w e r available a v a i l a b l e shall s h a l l be b e sufficient s u f f i c i e n t to t o supply s u p p l y all a l l services s e r v i c e s essential e s s e n t i a l for f o r safety s a f e t y in i n an a n emergency, e m e r g e n c y , with w i t h due d u e regard r e g a r d being b e i n g paid p a i d to t o such s u c h services s e r v i c e s as a s may m a y be b e operated o p e r a t e d simultaneously, s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , also a l s o taking t a k i n g into i n t o account a c c o u n t starting s t a r t i n g currents c u r r e n t s and a n d transitory t r a n s i t o r y nature n a t u r e of o f certain c e r t a i n loads. l o a d s . [Comment: [ C o m m e n t : Table T a b l e 5-2 5 - 2 also a l s o list l i s t required r e q u i r e d duration d u r a t i o n for f o r emergency e m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s but b u t it i t don’t d o n ’ t reflect r e f l e c t the t h e difference d i f f e r e n c e in i n Type T y p e A A substation s u b s t a t i o n which w h i c h is i s evacuated e v a c u a t e d immediately i m m e d i a t e l y and a n d Type T y p e B B & & C C substation s u b s t a t i o n which w h i c h can c a n be b e inhabited. i n h a b i t e d . For F o r substation s u b s t a t i o n type t y p e A A as a s for f o r OSS, O S S , the t h e need n e e d of o f emergency e m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s is i s limited l i m i t e d to t o escape e s c a p e and a n d evacuation e v a c u a t i o n to t o CTV, C T V , firefighting, f i r e f i g h t i n g , F&G F & G detection, d e t e c t i o n , and a n d potential p o t e n t i a l CCTV C C T V surveillance s u r v e i l l a n c e for f o r a a period p e r i o d (to ( t o be b e decided) d e c i d e d ) after a f t e r evacuation. e v a c u a t i o n . There T h e r e is i s no n o planned p l a n n e d overnight o v e r n i g h t stay s t a y on o n OSS O S S which w h i c h would w o u l d require r e q u i r e long l o n g duration d u r a t i o n of o f emergency e m e r g e n c y power, p o w e r , e.g. e . g . while w h i l e waiting w a i t i n g for f o r transport t r a n s p o r t to t o shore.] s h o r e . ] Conclusion: C o n c l u s i o n : The T h e substations s u b s t a t i o n s have h a v e two t w o main m a i n power p o w e r systems s y s t e m s (system ( s y s t e m A A & & system s y s t e m B) B ) supplied s u p p l i e d from f r o m the t h e grid g r i d via v i a EATs. E A T s . I.e. I . e . redundant r e d u n d a n t main m a i n power. p o w e r . In I n addition a d d i t i o n the t h e substations s u b s t a t i o n s are a r e equipped e q u i p p e d with w i t h a a diesel d i e s e l generator g e n e r a t o r each e a c h which w h i c h can c a n operate o p e r a t e for f o r 7 7 days d a y s in i n island i s l a n d mode m o d e condition, c o n d i t i o n , but b u t not n o t defined d e f i n e d as a s emergency e m e r g e n c y generator. g e n e r a t o r . Finally F i n a l l y the t h e substations s u b s t a t i o n s are a r e provided p r o v i d e d with w i t h redundant r e d u n d a n t UPS U P S battery b a t t e r y banks b a n k s providing p r o v i d i n g emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r for f o r a a total t o t a l of o f 3 3 hours h o u r s if i f the t h e main m a i n power p o w e r and a n d diesel d i e s e l generators g e n e r a t o r s fails. f a i l s . Substations S u b s t a t i o n s are a r e unmanned u n m a n n e d and a n d no n o planned p l a n n e d overnight o v e r n i g h t stay, s t a y , personnel p e r s o n n e l are a r e evacuated e v a c u a t e d to t o the t h e CTV C T V located l o c a t e d on o n the t h e field. f i e l d . Hence H e n c e the t h e need n e e d for f o r several s e v e r a l of o f the t h e emergency e m e r g e n c y services s e r v i c e s are a r e limited l i m i t e d after a f t e r the t h e personnel p e r s o n n e l is i s evacuated. e v a c u a t e d . UPS U P S with w i t h 3 3 hours h o u r s duration d u r a t i o n as a s emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r after a f t e r loss l o s s of o f main m a i n and a n d auxiliary a u x i l i a r y power p o w e r is i s considered c o n s i d e r e d sufficient. s u f f i c i e n t . However H o w e v e r it i t may m a y be b e seen s e e n as a s a a deviation d e v i a t i o n to t o current c u r r e n t wording w o r d i n g in i n DNV-ST-0145 D N V - S T - 0 1 4 5 re. r e . requirement r e q u i r e m e n t of o f 18 1 8 hours h o u r s emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r as a s DNV D N V do d o not n o t describe d e s c r i b e substation s u b s t a t i o n of o f Type T y p e A A very v e r y well. w e l l . But B u t there t h e r e is i s no n o logic l o g i c of o f having h a v i n g 18 1 8 hours h o u r s duration d u r a t i o n of o f emergency e m e r g e n c y power p o w e r for f o r a a substation s u b s t a t i o n of o f Type T y p e A A which w h i c h is i s expect e x p e c t shall s h a l l be b e evacuated e v a c u a t e d when w h e n there t h e r e is i s no n o power p o w e r from f r o m the t h e grid g r i d available. a v a i l a b l e . Classification: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : Internal I n t e r n a l Status: S t a t u s : Final F i n a l Expiry E x p i r y date: d a t e : 78 7 8 of o f 78 7 8 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.20