Classification: Internal Status: Final Expiry date: 1 of 69Classification: Internal Status: Final Expiry date: 2 of 69Doc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:Safety strategy for offshore substations MFW Battyk II & MFW Battyk IIIDoc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:Classification: Internal Status: Final Expiry date: 4 of 69• Visualize the connection between risk and hazard evaluatio ns specific to the offshore substation and the wind farm hazardsSafety strategy for offshore substations MFW Battyk II & MFW Baltyk IIIDoc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:This document describes the safety strategy for the offshore substation. The safety strategy is input to development of the concept and shall be further detailed during the engineering phase to document conclusions on safety aspects relevant for the development of the offshore substation and interface with the wind farm.The safety strategy describes how risks are to be managed based on the outcome of a systematic identification and evaluation of the hazards and effects which may arise on the specific installation.The aim of developing the specific safety strategy is to identify installation specific philosophies, strategies and requirements. This information shall outline the design principles for layout, configuration, arrangement, the selection and role of safety barriers to manage risk on the installation. Further the safety strategy shall define initial performance requirements and design requirements.In general, requirements in DNV-ST-0145 Offshore Substations shall apply, but this Safety Strategy provides supplementary requirements and clarification of safety barrier strategies applicable to the Baltyk II and Baltyk III Wind project. In case of conflicting requirements, the requirements in this safety strategy shall prevail.The document shall be used as specification for safety related aspects including detection and mitigation hazardous situations and events. This documentshall however not restrict designers in developing the most optimized design. The safety strategy shall be updated by Company during the engineering phases. Contractors who perform design of the OSS shall contribute with input to the strategy document, addressing specifics related to their proposed concept. If solutions chosen / proposed by Contractor conflicts with this document, Company shall be consulted.The safety strategy is structured according to the Company defined barrier systems, with the objective to:• Describe the need for and role of barriers that are established to manage risk related to major accidents.• Establish adequate understanding of the barriers in orderto make correct decisionsand understand their role.• Form a basis which can be used as a management tool to keep the integrity of the barriers intactduring operation and modifications.The safety strategy is a lifecycle document and shall follow the installations into the operation as documentation of the safety barriers and forfollow-up of the safety barriers. This safety strategy is established forthe project phase intended to suite engineering and construction work.This document describes Company minimum requirements. However, if national authority requirements are stricter these shall prevail.Classification: Internal Status: Final Expiry date: 5 of 69Safety strategy for offshore substations MFW Baltyk II & MFW Baltyk IIIDoc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:This safety strategy covers the offshore substation (structures, equipment and control of the OSS) and subsea installations within the scour protection area around the jacket.Target group for this document is the Company project organization, Company operations organization and project engineering, design Contractors and authorities. Furthermore, the document can be used as supporting documentation to Authority submissions.Classification: Internal Status: Final Expiry date: 6 of 69Safety strategy for offshore substations MFW Baltyk II & MFW Baltyk IIIDoc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:The offshore substation (OSS) will be normally unmanned and visited for inspection and maintenance activities. The control of the substation and the wind farm will be from a permanently manned control room within the maintenance base located onshore. Emergency offshore shelter at OSS shall be designed for 12 persons onboard (PoB) during normal operation. During offshore hook-up and commissioning and planned maintenance operations it should be possible to temporarily support up to 24 PoB when based on the vessel spread used to support the installation and commissioning The OSS will be supported by a jacket structure and is envisaged to be comprised of a cellar/cable deck (lower level), main deck, utility deck and a roof level.Classification: Internal Status: Final Expiry date: 7 of 69<A=71/0ÿ7*J4*J/8*2ÿ345ÿ*/Aÿ8A*4ÿ8ÿ/+12ÿ/12*,87ÿ1,ÿ,*ÿ84/1,ÿ8ÿ1,30:*,*ÿ8A*ÿ8A*4ÿ84/1,ÿ ÿÿ @A*ÿ<B*4ÿ<42:81,ÿ28Cÿ43ÿDEF7ÿ17ÿ7<018ÿ1,8ÿ8Bÿ7*</4/8*ÿ<B*4ÿ<42:81,ÿ84/1,7GÿHÿ/,2ÿIÿ84/1,ÿ@A*ÿ8Bÿ84/1,7ÿ/4*ÿ ÿ@A*ÿ337A4*ÿ7:K78/81,ÿB100ÿ8=<1/00=ÿ,8/1,ÿ Lÿ@Bÿ<*4/81,/0ÿ84/1,7ÿ LÿH:;101/4=ÿM.ÿ457ÿÿ Lÿ@4/,7345*4Gÿ0*4Gÿ/,2ÿ7A:,8ÿ4*/84ÿ/4*/ÿ LÿN.ÿO9%ÿ7B18AJ*/4ÿ457Gÿÿ LÿH:;101/4=ÿJ*,*4/84ÿ Lÿ&14*ÿ7:<<4*771,GÿN.Hÿ/,2ÿK/88*4=ÿ457ÿ LÿMP*4ÿ/4*/Q810*8ÿ45ÿ Lÿ4/,*7ÿ34ÿ5/8*41/0ÿA/,201,Jÿ Lÿ)3ÿB18Aÿ<771K1018=ÿ34ÿN*01ÿA178ÿR5*2*+/ÿ4ÿ7<*1/0ÿ01387Sÿ Lÿ,840Gÿ/:85/81,ÿ/,2ÿ8*0*5ÿ457ÿ LÿT:K01ÿ45ÿ :<ÿ8ÿ!'''ÿ8,7ÿ217<0/*5*,8ÿ@A*ÿ%V.ÿ4ÿ8A*ÿ@.ÿB100ÿ,8ÿ78/=ÿ,,*8*2ÿBA*,ÿ<*47,,*0ÿ/4*ÿ,K/42ÿK:8ÿ0/8*2ÿ1,ÿ 0/,21,Jÿ/4*/7ÿ34ÿ:7*ÿ3ÿ7*4+1*ÿ337A4*ÿ+*77*0ÿR%V.Sÿ/,2ÿB/0Pÿ8ÿB4PÿK412J*ÿ7A/00ÿK*ÿ1,78/00*2ÿ@A*ÿ%V.ÿ71W*ÿ/,ÿK*ÿ ÿÿI/7*ÿ/7*ÿ34ÿ/*77ÿ8ÿ8A*ÿV%%ÿ17ÿK=ÿ@.ÿ2:41,Jÿ8A*ÿ<*4/81,7ÿ<A/7*ÿ+1/ÿ/*77ÿ0/22*47ÿ345ÿ7*/ÿ0*+*0ÿ9,ÿ/22181,Gÿ LÿU4P7A<ÿ/,2ÿ784/J*ÿ,8/1,*4ÿ 8A*ÿ31*02ÿ/8ÿ/ÿ2178/,*ÿ:8712*ÿ8A*ÿ7/3*8=ÿW,*ÿ @A*ÿV%%ÿB100ÿK*ÿ+1718*2ÿ/<<4;15/8*0=ÿ,*ÿ/ÿ=*/4ÿ34ÿ4:81,*ÿ1,7<*81,ÿ/,2ÿ5/1,8*,/,*ÿ/81+181*7ÿ/,2ÿ*+*4=ÿ8A4**ÿ XYZÿ\]^_`]abÿca^aÿ @A*ÿK*0Bÿ1,345/81,ÿ17ÿ*;84/8*2ÿ345ÿ4*3ÿ =*/47ÿ34ÿ/ÿ<0/,,*2ÿ:8/J*ÿ5/1,8*,/,*ÿ/5</1J,ÿ ÿLÿd Lÿde"#$"f"%T"''''-g'eÿRhHÿ)#'-?"''!ÿ4*+ÿeSÿI/08=Pÿ99ÿ"ÿh*8*/,ÿ*71J,ÿI/717ÿÿ "#$"f"%T"''''-g'eÿRhHÿ)#'-?"''dÿ4*+ÿeSÿI/08=Pÿ999ÿ"ÿh*8*/,ÿ*71J,ÿI/717ÿ ÿ012345ÿ74814395ÿ28ÿ22783ÿ774147ÿÿ145ÿÿÿÿ 145ÿÿ ÿÿ !"#$"%"&"''''(ÿÿÿ )*+ÿ,ÿ'-ÿ ./012ÿ3456ÿÿ ÿÿ 0/77131/81,6ÿ9,8*4,/0ÿ %8/8:76ÿ&1,/0ÿ#;<14=ÿ2/8*6ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ>ÿ3ÿ!>ÿ ?@A@BÿDEFGÿ H00"=*/4ÿI1,2ÿ47*ÿ-'ÿ5ÿ/J+*ÿ7*/ÿ0*+*0ÿ/4*ÿ7KI,ÿ1,ÿ&1L:4*ÿ(ÿ34ÿM/08=Nÿ99ÿ/,2ÿ31L:4*ÿ(ÿ34ÿM/08=Nÿ999ÿ ÿ ÿ OPQRSTÿVÿWÿXYYWZT[Sÿ\P]^ÿS_`Tÿa_Sÿb[YcZdÿeeÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ OPQRSTÿfÿWÿXYYWZT[Sÿ\P]^ÿS_`Tÿa_Sÿb[YcZdÿeeeÿ ÿ ÿ • Ail year NORTH 20% Wind speed (m/s) ■ >'29 ■ 36 -2B ■ 24 -26 □ 22-24 □ 20-22 EAST 018-20 O16-1B Q 14 - 16 □ 12-14 □ 10-12 33-10 ■ S-8 ■ 4-8 10% SOUTH NORTH Wind speed in.'s ■ =■*» ■ 26-28 ■ 24-26 ■ ■22-24 020-22 EAST niB.2d 016-18 0'4-16 ■ U-14 □ 10-12 ■ 6-10 •A€S1Safety strategy for offshore substations MFW Baltyk II & MFW Baltyk IIIDoc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:All-year wave rose for Baltyk II and Baltyk III are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively.Classification: Internal Status: Final Expiry date: 10 of 69Classification: Internal Status: Final Expiry date: 11 of 69Safety strategy for offshore substations MFW Baltyk II & MFW Baltyk IIIDoc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:The current rose at surface for Baltyk Hand Baltyk III are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 respectively.Baltyk II - 0 m - All year Current speed (cmls)Figure 7 - Current rose at surface at Baltyk IIFigure 8 - Current rose at surface at Baltyk IIISafety strategy for offshore substations MFW Baltyk II & MFW Baltyk IIIDoc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:Wet snow may accumulate on surfacesand vertical structures, e.g. communication mast. Atmospheric icing is possible. Estimated ice thickness (data for 50 yrs available) at 100 meters on cylinders and non-rotating structure elements is approx. 30 mm. Specific assessment atmospheric icing on OSS is not performed. Sea spray icing is caused by freezing sea spray. Sea spray icing can be expected up to 25 meters above sea level and with the thickest ice layer of up to 80 mm (100 yrs) between 5-10 meter. There will also be ice accumulation below 5 m but not during extreme storm when large waves will transport heat to the lower region of the structure and the ice is exposed to thermal and mechanical deterioration. These values are equal fSea ice can occur at Baltyk II & III and an average ice season is in range of 10-20 days while maximum duration is about 40 days. Expected frequency of occurrence of iceis5times per 50 years. The sea ice thickness at 100 years return period is estimated in ref /C256-EQ-Z-CA-00001_02 1 to be 0,37 m for Baltyk II and 0,40m for Baltyk III.There are fishing activities within both wind farms and along the route for the export power cables. Within the wind farms the type of fishing gear used is bottom nets. There are also fishing vessels passing through the wind farms as there is an area for trawl fishing north of the wind farm areas.There are ship navigation routes both south of and north of the wind farms. AIS data show very low density of ship traffic in the vicinity of the wind farms as per today. When WTGs are present in the future and the sea maps are marked, the ship traffic is expected to be even lower. The OSS is located within the windfarm surrounded by the WTGs.Reference is given to Appendix E of the Contract.In general, systems that are easy to design, operate and maintain will be safer than more complex designs. This is also valid fordesign of safety systems. In priority it is recommended to develop our plant designs in the following order, ref Figure 9:Classification: Internal Status: Final Expiry date: 12 of 69Safety strategy for offshore substation Doc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:Elimination of hazard - design it out Substitution - use something less hazardous3. Manuel procedures Administrative controls - training and work scheduling Design for operation with low complexityPersonnel and asset risk shall meet the risk tolerance criteria provided by s risk matrix shown in Figure 10. The consequence categories are described in Table 1. The interpretation of colours is described in Table 2.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 <0.001% (<10* 5 /vr)Figure 10 - | |t Risk Tolerance Criteria, 9x8 matrix for activities with major accident potential outcome (internal reference R-105890, RM100)w4x"4*0/8*2ÿ100,*77ÿw18yÿ /7*,*ÿ345ÿw4xuÿ 4*78418*2ÿw4xÿ4ÿ <*45/,*,8ÿy*/08yÿ*33*87ÿ €1~yÿ0*+*0ÿ3ÿ5*21/0ÿ 84*/85*,8uÿ7*41:7ÿ 3:,81,/0ÿ15</145*,8ÿ ÿÿ "%y48ÿ8*45ÿ15</87ÿz4*7818:81,ÿ815*ÿ{-ÿ=*/4|ÿ,ÿ<<:0/81,7ÿz,/81,/0ÿ4ÿ 4*~1,/0|uÿ*7=78*57ÿ4ÿ*,+14,5*,8/00=ÿ7*,7181+*ÿ/4*/7ÿ3ÿ,/81,/0ÿ4ÿ 4*~1,/0ÿ15<48/,*ÿ "t*21:5ÿ8*45ÿ15</87ÿz4*7818:81,ÿ815*ÿ-"(ÿ=*/47|ÿ,ÿ<<:0/81,7ÿz0/0|uÿ *7=78*57ÿ4ÿ*,+14,5*,8/00=ÿ7*,7181+*ÿ/4*/7ÿ3ÿ0/0ÿ15<48/,*ÿÿÿ !ÿsÿ%*+*4*ÿ -"(ÿ3/8/0181*7ÿ4ÿw4x" 4*0/8*2ÿ100,*77ÿsÿ*;<7:4*ÿ w18yÿ71~,131/,8ÿ013*ÿ 7y48*,1,~ÿ*33*87ÿ ÿÿ "t*21:5ÿ8*45ÿ15</87ÿz4*7818:81,ÿ815*ÿ-"(ÿ=*/47|ÿ,ÿ<<:0/81,7ÿ z,/81,/0ÿ4ÿ4*~1,/0|uÿ*7=78*57ÿ4ÿ*,+14,5*,8/00=ÿ7*,7181+*ÿ/4*/7ÿ3ÿ ,/81,/0ÿ4ÿ4*~1,/0ÿ15<48/,*ÿ "},~ÿ8*45ÿ15</87ÿz4*7818:81,ÿ815*ÿ("-'ÿ=*/47|ÿ,ÿ<<:0/81,7ÿz0/0|uÿ *7=78*57ÿ4ÿ*,+14,5*,8/00=ÿ7*,7181+*ÿ/4*/7ÿ3ÿ,/81,/0ÿ15<48/,*ÿÿÿ �‚ÿsÿt/v4ÿ >"'ÿ3/8/0181*7ÿ4ÿ100,*77sÿ *;<7:4*ÿ/7*7ÿw18yÿ 71~,131/,8ÿ013*ÿ7y48*,1,~ÿ *33*87ÿ/,2sÿ4ÿ0/4~*4ÿ</487ÿ 3ÿ1,78/00/81,sÿ<0/,8sÿ331*ÿ"}/4~*ÿ10ÿ7<100ÿ1,ÿ<<:0/8*2ÿ/4*/ÿÿ "},~ÿ8*45ÿ15</87ÿz4*7818:81,ÿ815*ÿ("-'ÿ=*/47|ÿ,ÿ<<:0/81,7ÿz,/81,/0ÿ 4ÿ~0/0|uÿ*7=78*57ÿ4ÿ*,+14,5*,8/00=ÿ7*,7181+*ÿ/4*/7ÿ3ÿ~0/0ÿ4ÿ ,/81,/0ÿ15<48/,*ÿ ".*4=ÿ0,~ÿ4ÿ<*45/,*,8ÿ15</87ÿz4*7818:81,ÿ815*ÿƒÿ-'ÿ=*/47|ÿ,ÿ <<:0/81,7ÿz4*~1,/0|uÿ*7=78*57ÿ4ÿ*,+14,5*,8/00=ÿ7*,7181+*ÿ/4*/7ÿ 3ÿ4*~1,/0ÿ15<48/,*ÿ „‚ÿsÿ/8/784<y1ÿ'"''ÿ3/8/0181*7ÿ4ÿ100,*77sÿ *;<7:4*ÿ/7*7ÿw18yÿ 71~,131/,8ÿ013*ÿ7y48*,1,~ÿ *33*87ÿ/,2sÿ4ÿ5/1,ÿ</48ÿ3ÿ 1,78/00/81,sÿ<0/,8sÿ331*ÿ"}/4~*ÿ10ÿ7<100ÿ1,ÿ2*,7*0=ÿ<<:0/8*2ÿ/4*/ÿÿ ".*4=ÿ0,~ÿ4ÿ<*45/,*,8ÿ15</87ÿz4*7818:81,ÿ815*ÿƒ-'ÿ=*/47|ÿ,ÿ <<:0/81,7ÿz,/81,/0ÿ4ÿ~0/0|uÿ*7=78*57ÿ4ÿ*,+14,5*,8/00=ÿ7*,7181+*ÿ /4*/7ÿ3ÿ~0/0ÿ4ÿ,/81,/0ÿ15<48/,*ÿ ?‚ÿsÿ#;84*5*ÿ t4*ÿ8y/,ÿ''ÿ3/8/0181*7ÿ 100,*77sÿ*;<7:4*ÿ/7*7ÿ w18yÿ71~,131/,8ÿ013*ÿ 7y48*,1,~ÿ*33*87ÿ/,2s4ÿ 077ÿ3ÿ 1,78/00/81,s<0/,8s331*ÿ"}/4~*ÿ/,2ÿ0,~"0/781,~ÿ10ÿ7<100ÿ07*ÿ8ÿ2*,7*0=ÿ<<:0/8*2ÿ7y4*01,*ÿ ÿ ‚ÿ,7*…:*,*ÿ/8*~4=ÿ�uÿ„ÿ/,2ÿ?ÿ/4*ÿ,712*4*2ÿ5/v4ÿ/12*,87ÿ1,ÿ#…:1,4ÿ ÿ012345ÿ74814395ÿ28ÿ22783ÿ774147ÿÿ145ÿÿÿÿ 145ÿÿ ÿÿ !"#$"%"&"''''(ÿÿÿ )*+ÿ,ÿ'-ÿ ./012ÿ3456ÿÿ ÿÿ 0/77131/81,6ÿ9,8*4,/0ÿ %8/8:76ÿ&1,/0ÿ#;<14=ÿ2/8*6ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ->ÿ3ÿ!?ÿ @ABCDÿFÿGDHIJKLMKNOÿNPÿINOHDQRDOIDÿSKTLAIMUÿIAMDVNJKDHÿSWOMDJOACÿXQRKONJÿJDPDJDOIDÿYZ[\]^]_ÿ Y`FaaUÿDoc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:Table 2 Interpretation of colours in design phase (internal reference R -11452, RM100)The following main safety functions are further defined for the OSS:• The main load carrying capacity (structure) shall be intact until the installation has been evacuated (in manned scenarios), which means that there must not be extensive deformation or collapse of the whole or considerable parts ofthe installation before evacuation.• Installation parts with functions that are vital to combat accidents and/or ensure safe shutdown shall be intact until the emergency activity has been completed or the facility has been evacuated.• Mustering areas, evacuation means, and other areas defined as "safe areas" shall be protected so that they remain intact until the facility has been evacuated• At least one escape route for personnel in other areas than the area(s) exposed to the initial accidental event shall be intact until all personnel have escaped to safe area.The annual probability of loss of the main safety functions shall be lower than 1 x 10 4 for each ofthe following accidental loads:• Heat loads (e.g. due to fires in combustible materials such as transformer oil, diesel etc.)• Smoke and toxic loads (e.g. due fires in combustible materials such as transformer oil, diesel etc.)• Exp losion loads (e.g. related to transformer failure)• Impact loads (e.g. collision loads from vessels, dropped object loads from lifting operations, etc.)• Extreme environmental loads, such as o Wind, wave, currentBased on a perceived well known and controllable risk picture, these quantitative criteria may be assumed complied with by using the following minimum design criteria:• Platform structural integrity and robust layout shall secure safe escape from all areas of the platform during an incident, maintaining the main safety functions• The fire protection design shall ensure that a fire or explosion in the equipment is contained and will not lead to escalation to other areas or parts of the electrical system. 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The company performance standards for O&G offshore facilities are provided inTR1055. Relevant performance standard definitions are used in this safety strategy for the OSS in order to provide a comparable basis towards the standardized barrier definitions within the Company, see Table 3. The role and need for barriers according to this structure are provided in chapter 6.Figure 11 - Barrier diagram indicating barrier functions (shown in red) to prevent unwanted events and consequencesSafety strategy for offshore substations Doc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:Reduce probability of fault, hazard and accident situationsIdentify conditions that can lead to fault, hazard and accident situationsReduce possibility of fault, hazard and accident situations developing into unwanted eventSafety strategy for offshore substations Doc. No. C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Rev. no. 01 Valid from:The following preliminary hazards have been identified (to be evaluated and further detailed in next phase/revision), ref Table 4.This section provides a description of the risksand consequences related to the hazards identified in section 4.Ship collision with Service Operation Vessel (SOV). Crew Transfer Vessel (CTV). fishing vessel or passing merchant vessel. Collision may happen during vessel approach to transfer people via walk to work bridge, boat landing or for cargo handling. Reason for collision may be operator failure, failure of dynamic position system, vessel steering system or propulsion system, e.g. black-out of machinery.Subjects: Context, Hazards, Safety in design, Barrier functions, Performance standards, safety strategies Remarks: Updated: Valid from: 18/03/2022 Responsible publisher: Authority to approvedeviations: Date/Signature: Date/Signature: Responsible (Organisation unit/ Name): Wenche Kristin Rettedal/Offshore Substation Structural Lead Date/Signature: Recommended (Organisation unit/ Name): Jens Olav Rundsag/Engineering Manager Vigdis Iren Birkedal/SSU Manager Date/Signature: Approved by (Organisation unit/ Name): Lars G. Trodal/Facilities Manager Meindert Jan van der Velde/Project Manager OperationDistribution: Classification: Internal Expiry date: Status FinalTitle: Safety strategy for offshore substations MFW Baltyk II & MFW Baltyk III Contract no.: Document no: C256-EQ-S-FD-00003 Project: MFW Baltyk 11 & MFW Baltyk IIIbNOHDQRDOIDÿ bAMDVNJcÿ -ÿrÿ(ÿsÿt1,4ÿ >ÿsÿt2*4/8*ÿ ÿsÿ%*41:7ÿ defgheijÿlemhnlÿmopÿ t*21/0ÿ84*/85*,8uÿ1,v:4=uÿ 9,v:4=uÿ*+*,8ÿ4ÿw4x" %*41:7ÿ1,v:4=uÿ*+*,8ÿ4ÿMitigation and sharing of risk Risk level Single red risk is generally intolerable and far beyond the Group's risk tolerance criteria. Mitigating actions mustbe implemented as soon as possible. ORANGE Singleorange risk is generally intolerable, and mitigating actionsmustbe implemented. YELLOW Mitigating actions shall be identified based on the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable)/ BAT (Best Available Technology) principle or other applicable principles subject to relevantjurisdiction(s). Risks in the green zone are generally tolerable and actions are normally not required. GREEN# Barriers # Barriers Alarm and Communication System for use in Emergency Situations PS2 Natural ventilation and HVAC PS14 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) PS3 Leak d etection PS15 Layout Design Principles and Explosion Barriers PS4 Emergency Shut Down (ESD) PS16A Offshore cranes PS5 Open drain PS16B N/A PS6 Ignition source control PS17A N/A PS7 Fire Detection PS17B N/A PS8 N/A PS18 N/A PS9 Active Fire Protection PS19 Avoidance of vessel collisions PS10 Passive Fire Protection PS20 Structural integrity PS22 Human Machine Interface and Alarm Management PS11 Emergency Power and Lightning PS12 Process Safety PS23 Safety & automation system security■ID Hazard PS 19, 20 Ship collision with Service Operation Vessel (SOV), Crew Transfer Vessel (CTV), fishing vessel or passing merchant vessel 2 SOV loss position causing gangway impact to critical equipment/structures orpersonnel 15, 19 3 15 Explosion as result of internal arcing fault in oil filed transformers and rupture/release of explosive gas and oil mist 5. 7,10, 14, 15 5 Fire in electrical systems (short circuit, overload, malfunction of equipment). Heat ortoxicsmoke 7,10,12, 14,15 6 Fire in hydrocarbon systems (Hydraulic Oils, diesel engine, etc.). Heat or toxic smoke exposure to 5, 7,10, 12, 15 7 Explosion due to explosive atmosphere from battery hydrogen release 2.3,6 8 2,3 Oxygen deprivation / asphyxia and greenhouse gas release due to leaks of SF6 from gas-insulated switchgear(GIS)and gas -insulated busbars (GIB), e.g inert gas for fire suppression. 2 9 Handling / exposure to SF6 decomposition products after internal arc fault. 10 Dropped objects 15, 16A 11 Man overboard 14 12 Loss of containment / spills to environment 1, 3 13 Hurricane/ adverse weather 20 14 Accumulation of snow and ice 2 15 Security incidents 15, 23 16 Global structural failure 20 17 Personnel injury due to electricshock 14 18 Personnel injury due to material handling 15 14, 20 19 Excessive buildup of bird guano