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FUNCTIONAL
F
U
N
C
T
I
O
N
A
L
SAFETY
S
A
F
E
T
Y
&
&
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true}
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
-
-
Keeping
K
e
e
p
i
n
g
up
u
p
with
w
i
t
h
design:
d
e
s
i
g
n
:
ISO26262.
I
S
O
2
6
2
6
2
.
Time
T
i
m
e
for
f
o
r
an
a
n
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
Addressing
A
d
d
r
e
s
s
i
n
g
concerns
c
o
n
c
e
r
n
s
around
a
r
o
u
n
d
emerging
e
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
technologies
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
e
s
Since
S
i
n
c
e
the
t
h
e
original
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
publication
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
on
o
n
15
1
5
November
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
2011
2
0
1
1
the
t
h
e
industry
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
has
h
a
s
undergone
u
n
d
e
r
g
o
n
e
several
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
signifi-
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
-
cant
c
a
n
t
changes.
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
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T
h
e
rapid
r
a
p
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d
deployment
d
e
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
of
o
f
ADAS
A
D
A
S
and
a
n
d
fully
f
u
l
l
y
autonomous
a
u
t
o
n
o
m
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u
s
connected
c
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n
n
e
c
t
e
d
technologies,
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
e
s
,
together
t
o
g
e
t
h
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r
with
w
i
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h
the
t
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e
associated
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
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e
d
cybersecurity
c
y
b
e
r
s
e
c
u
r
i
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y
threat
t
h
r
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a
t
has
h
a
s
seen
s
e
e
n
growing
g
r
o
w
i
n
g
inadequacies
i
n
a
d
e
q
u
a
c
i
e
s
in
i
n
the
t
h
e
original
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
iteration
i
t
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
ISO
I
S
O
26262.
2
6
2
6
2
.
As
A
s
a
a
result,
r
e
s
u
l
t
,
many
m
a
n
y
manufacturers
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
r
s
have
h
a
v
e
raised
r
a
i
s
e
d
concerns
c
o
n
c
e
r
n
s
that
t
h
a
t
ISO
I
S
O
26262:2011
2
6
2
6
2
:
2
0
1
1
no
n
o
longer
l
o
n
g
e
r
adequately
a
d
e
q
u
a
t
e
l
y
addresses
a
d
d
r
e
s
s
e
s
the
t
h
e
functional
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
of
o
f
modern
m
o
d
e
r
n
and
a
n
d
emerging
e
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
E/E
E
/
E
architectures.
a
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
e
s
.
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U
p
d
a
t
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
Hardware
H
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
qualification
q
u
a
l
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
has
h
a
s
two
t
w
o
main
m
a
i
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objectives:
o
b
j
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c
t
i
v
e
s
:
to
t
o
show
s
h
o
w
how
h
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w
the
t
h
e
part
p
a
r
t
fits
f
i
t
s
into
i
n
t
o
the
t
h
e
overall
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
system
s
y
s
t
e
m
and
a
n
d
to
t
o
assess
a
s
s
e
s
s
failure
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
modes.
m
o
d
e
s
.
Basic
B
a
s
i
c
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
components
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
can
c
a
n
be
b
e
qualified
q
u
a
l
i
f
i
e
d
with
w
i
t
h
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
qualification,
q
u
a
l
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
but
b
u
t
more
m
o
r
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complex
c
o
m
p
l
e
x
parts
p
a
r
t
s
require
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
evaluation
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
through
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
ASIL
A
S
I
L
decomposition
d
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
and
a
n
d
testing.
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
.
Hardware
H
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
components
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
are
a
r
e
typically
t
y
p
i
c
a
l
l
y
qualified
q
u
a
l
i
f
i
e
d
by
b
y
testing
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
part
p
a
r
t
in
i
n
a
a
variety
v
a
r
i
e
t
y
of
o
f
environmental
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
and
a
n
d
operational
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
conditions.
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
The
T
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test
t
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s
t
results
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
are
a
r
e
then
t
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e
n
analyzed
a
n
a
l
y
z
e
d
with
w
i
t
h
va-
v
a
-
rious
r
i
o
u
s
numerical
n
u
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
methods
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
and
a
n
d
presented
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
in
i
n
a
a
qualification
q
u
a
l
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
report
r
e
p
o
r
t
along
a
l
o
n
g
with
w
i
t
h
the
t
h
e
testing
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
procedure,
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
,
assump-
a
s
s
u
m
p
-
tions,
t
i
o
n
s
,
and
a
n
d
input
i
n
p
u
t
criteria.
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
.
©
©
Fotolia
F
o
t
o
l
i
a
2016
2
0
1
6
Currently
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
y
the
t
h
e
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
process
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
starts
s
t
a
r
t
s
with
w
i
t
h
planning
p
l
a
n
n
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
development.
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
.
This
T
h
i
s
plan
p
l
a
n
should
s
h
o
u
l
d
be
b
e
a
a
part
p
a
r
t
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
overall
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
plan
p
l
a
n
for
f
o
r
the
t
h
e
complete
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
product
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
process,
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
,
and
a
n
d
should
s
h
o
u
l
d
include
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
the
t
h
e
measures
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
and
a
n
d
methods
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
to
t
o
be
b
e
used
u
s
e
d
for
f
o
r
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
design.
d
e
s
i
g
n
.
After
A
f
t
e
r
planning,
p
l
a
n
n
i
n
g
,
the
t
h
e
next
n
e
x
t
step
s
t
e
p
is
i
s
to
t
o
use
u
s
e
the
t
h
e
previous
p
r
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v
i
o
u
s
activities
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
such
s
u
c
h
as
a
s
the
t
h
e
technical
t
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
concept
c
o
n
c
e
p
t
and
a
n
d
the
t
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system
s
y
s
t
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m
design
d
e
s
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g
n
specification
s
p
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c
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n
to
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r
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v
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hardware
h
a
r
d
w
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r
e
safety
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t
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requirements.
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e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
.
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T
h
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e
requirements
r
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q
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i
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e
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typically
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y
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y
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requirements
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e
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t
s
and
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t
t
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e
s
of
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v
a
r
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o
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s
safety
s
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f
e
t
y
mechanisms
m
e
c
h
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n
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s
m
s
and
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d
are
a
r
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used
u
s
e
d
when
w
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n
designing
d
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s
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n
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g
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t
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hardware.
h
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r
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w
a
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.
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H
o
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r
,
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l
s
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s
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g
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mechanisms,
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e
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h
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n
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m
s
,
such
s
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c
h
as
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s
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e
n
t
s
for
f
o
r
target
t
a
r
g
e
t
values
v
a
l
u
e
s
for
f
o
r
random
r
a
n
d
o
m
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
failures.
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
.
SAFETY
S
A
F
E
T
Y
&
&
SECURITY
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
-
-
Report
R
e
p
o
r
t
granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true}
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
-
-
Keeping
K
e
e
p
i
n
g
up
u
p
with
w
i
t
h
design:
d
e
s
i
g
n
:
ISO26262.
I
S
O
2
6
2
6
2
.
Time
T
i
m
e
for
f
o
r
an
a
n
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
The
T
h
e
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
process
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
includes
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
architectural
a
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
a
l
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
and
a
n
d
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
detailed
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
design.
d
e
s
i
g
n
.
The
T
h
e
former
f
o
r
m
e
r
represents
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
all
a
l
l
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
components
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
and
a
n
d
their
t
h
e
i
r
interactions,
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
while
w
h
i
l
e
the
t
h
e
latter
l
a
t
t
e
r
details
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
the
t
h
e
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
at
a
t
electrical
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
a
l
schematic
s
c
h
e
m
a
t
i
c
level
l
e
v
e
l
by
b
y
determining
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
interconnection
i
n
t
e
r
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
and
a
n
d
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
elements
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
that
t
h
a
t
make
m
a
k
e
up
u
p
the
t
h
e
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
components.
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
.
Generally,
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
,
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
requirements
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
as
a
s
well
w
e
l
l
as
a
s
non-safety
n
o
n
-
s
a
f
e
t
y
requirements
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
are
a
r
e
included
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
in
i
n
this
t
h
i
s
process
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
to
t
o
create
c
r
e
a
t
e
a
a
single
s
i
n
g
l
e
integrated
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
design.
d
e
s
i
g
n
.
In
I
n
the
t
h
e
creation
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
architecture,
a
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
e
,
components
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
are
a
r
e
given
g
i
v
e
n
the
t
h
e
highest
h
i
g
h
e
s
t
ASIL
A
S
I
L
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
requirements
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
they
t
h
e
y
implement.
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
.
If
I
f
a
a
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
element
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
is
i
s
made
m
a
d
e
up
u
p
of
o
f
sub-elements
s
u
b
-
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
with
w
i
t
h
different
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
or
o
r
no
n
o
ASILs,
A
S
I
L
s
,
then
t
h
e
n
each
e
a
c
h
of
o
f
these
t
h
e
s
e
sub-elements
s
u
b
-
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
should
s
h
o
u
l
d
be
b
e
treated
t
r
e
a
t
e
d
with
w
i
t
h
the
t
h
e
highest
h
i
g
h
e
s
t
ASIL
A
S
I
L
among
a
m
o
n
g
them,
t
h
e
m
,
if
i
f
criteria
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
for
f
o
r
coexis-
c
o
e
x
i
s
-
tence
t
e
n
c
e
can
c
a
n
be
b
e
proved.
p
r
o
v
e
d
.
These
T
h
e
s
e
criteria
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
are
a
r
e
defined
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
in
i
n
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
Part
P
a
r
t
9
9
and
a
n
d
detail
d
e
t
a
i
l
how
h
o
w
coexistence
c
o
e
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
is
i
s
derived
d
e
r
i
v
e
d
from
f
r
o
m
the
t
h
e
manner
m
a
n
n
e
r
in
i
n
which
w
h
i
c
h
sub-elements
s
u
b
-
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
interact
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
with
w
i
t
h
each
e
a
c
h
other
o
t
h
e
r
with
w
i
t
h
regard
r
e
g
a
r
d
to
t
o
violation
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
goals.
g
o
a
l
s
.
In
I
n
short,
s
h
o
r
t
,
this
t
h
i
s
means
m
e
a
n
s
that
t
h
a
t
if
i
f
it
i
t
can
c
a
n
be
b
e
proved
p
r
o
v
e
d
that
t
h
a
t
a
a
lower-ASIL
l
o
w
e
r
-
A
S
I
L
sub-element
s
u
b
-
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
does
d
o
e
s
not
n
o
t
contribute
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
to
t
o
the
t
h
e
violati-
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
-
on
o
n
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
goal
g
o
a
l
of
o
f
a
a
higher-ASIL
h
i
g
h
e
r
-
A
S
I
L
sub-element,
s
u
b
-
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
,
then
t
h
e
n
the
t
h
e
sub-elements
s
u
b
-
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
may
m
a
y
keep
k
e
e
p
their
t
h
e
i
r
separate
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
ASILs.
A
S
I
L
s
.
Once
O
n
c
e
the
t
h
e
detailed
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
has
h
a
s
been
b
e
e
n
created
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
based
b
a
s
e
d
on
o
n
the
t
h
e
architecture,
a
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
e
,
the
t
h
e
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
should
s
h
o
u
l
d
be
b
e
analy-
a
n
a
l
y
-
zed
z
e
d
regarding
r
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
if
i
f
it
i
t
meets
m
e
e
t
s
the
t
h
e
requirements
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
derived
d
e
r
i
v
e
d
from
f
r
o
m
its
i
t
s
ASIL.
A
S
I
L
.
It
I
t
is
i
s
possible
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
that
t
h
a
t
this
t
h
i
s
process
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
has
h
a
s
to
t
o
be
b
e
performed
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
e
d
in
i
n
an
a
n
iterative
i
t
e
r
a
t
i
v
e
manner
m
a
n
n
e
r
in
i
n
which
w
h
i
c
h
the
t
h
e
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
analysis
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
requires
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
s
going
g
o
i
n
g
back
b
a
c
k
to
t
o
modify
m
o
d
i
f
y
the
t
h
e
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
architecture
a
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
e
or
o
r
component
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
design.
d
e
s
i
g
n
.
These
T
h
e
s
e
measures
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
are
a
r
e
then
t
h
e
n
used
u
s
e
d
for
f
o
r
evaluation
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
architectural
a
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
a
l
metrics
m
e
t
r
i
c
s
and
a
n
d
evaluation
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
goal
g
o
a
l
violations
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
due
d
u
e
to
t
o
random
r
a
n
d
o
m
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
failures.
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
.
Lastly,
L
a
s
t
l
y
,
the
t
h
e
results
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
from
f
r
o
m
the
t
h
e
analysis
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
are
a
r
e
compared
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
to
t
o
various
v
a
r
i
o
u
s
target
t
a
r
g
e
t
values
v
a
l
u
e
s
for
f
o
r
the
t
h
e
different
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
ASILs.
A
S
I
L
s
.
Finally,
F
i
n
a
l
l
y
,
the
t
h
e
diagnostic
d
i
a
g
n
o
s
t
i
c
coverage
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
of
o
f
each
e
a
c
h
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
mechanisms
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
s
must
m
u
s
t
be
b
e
evaluated
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
e
d
in
i
n
order
o
r
d
e
r
to
t
o
find
f
i
n
d
the
t
h
e
faults
f
a
u
l
t
s
that
t
h
a
t
retain
r
e
t
a
i
n
the
t
h
e
possibility
p
o
s
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
of
o
f
violating
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
n
g
a
a
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
goal
g
o
a
l
after
a
f
t
e
r
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
measures
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
have
h
a
v
e
been
b
e
e
n
included
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
in
i
n
the
t
h
e
system.
s
y
s
t
e
m
.
The
T
h
e
diagnostic
d
i
a
g
n
o
s
t
i
c
coverage
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
with
w
i
t
h
respect
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
to
t
o
residual
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
faults
f
a
u
l
t
s
is
i
s
defined
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
as
a
s
the
t
h
e
part
p
a
r
t
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
failure
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
rate
r
a
t
e
(of
(
o
f
faults
f
a
u
l
t
s
of
o
f
a
a
single-point
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
p
o
i
n
t
origin)
o
r
i
g
i
n
)
in
i
n
an
a
n
element
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
that
t
h
a
t
is
i
s
covered
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
by
b
y
a
a
certain
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
mechanism.
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
.
A
A
tribute
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
to
t
o
the
t
h
e
existing
e
x
i
s
t
i
n
g
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
is
i
s
the
t
h
e
fact
f
a
c
t
that
t
h
a
t
changes
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
to
t
o
section
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
5
5
(governing
(
g
o
v
e
r
n
i
n
g
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
development)
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
)
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
are
a
r
e
confined
c
o
n
f
i
n
e
d
to:
t
o
:
The
T
h
e
evaluation
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
goal
g
o
a
l
violations
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
due
d
u
e
to
t
o
random
r
a
n
d
o
m
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
failures
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
has
h
a
s
seen
s
e
e
n
an
a
n
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
to
t
o
the
t
h
e
Probabi-
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
-
listic
l
i
s
t
i
c
Metric
M
e
t
r
i
c
for
f
o
r
(Random)
(
R
a
n
d
o
m
)
Hardware
H
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
Failures,
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
,
Method
M
e
t
h
o
d
1.
1
.
Currently
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
y
this
t
h
i
s
is
i
s
defined
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
as
a
s
the
t
h
e
sum
s
u
m
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
single
s
i
n
g
l
e
point,
p
o
i
n
t
,
residual
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
and
a
n
d
multipoint
m
u
l
t
i
p
o
i
n
t
fault
f
a
u
l
t
metrics,
m
e
t
r
i
c
s
,
expressed
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
in
i
n
Failure
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
In
I
n
Time
T
i
m
e
(FITs)
(
F
I
T
s
)
-
-
The
T
h
e
number
n
u
m
b
e
r
of
o
f
failures
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
that
t
h
a
t
can
c
a
n
be
b
e
expected
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
in
i
n
one
o
n
e
billion
b
i
l
l
i
o
n
(1×109)
(
1
×
1
0
9
)
device-hours
d
e
v
i
c
e
-
h
o
u
r
s
of
o
f
operation:
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
:
Method
M
e
t
h
o
d
1
1
requires
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
s
that
t
h
a
t
each
e
a
c
h
cause
c
a
u
s
e
of
o
f
a
a
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
goal
g
o
a
l
violation
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
due
d
u
e
to
t
o
random
r
a
n
d
o
m
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
failures
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
is
i
s
compared
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
to
t
o
a
a
target
t
a
r
g
e
t
failure
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
rate
r
a
t
e
class.
c
l
a
s
s
.
The
T
h
e
update,
u
p
d
a
t
e
,
recognising
r
e
c
o
g
n
i
s
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
impact
i
m
p
a
c
t
of
o
f
increasingly
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
l
y
complex
c
o
m
p
l
e
x
E/E
E
/
E
systems
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
on
o
n
functional
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety,
s
a
f
e
t
y
,
seeks
s
e
e
k
s
to
t
o
in-
i
n
-
crease
c
r
e
a
s
e
target
t
a
r
g
e
t
values
v
a
l
u
e
s
by
b
y
up
u
p
to
t
o
one
o
n
e
order
o
r
d
e
r
of
o
f
magnitude
m
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
for
f
o
r
items
i
t
e
m
s
composed
c
o
m
p
o
s
e
d
of
o
f
multiple
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
systems.
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
.
(Clause
(
C
l
a
u
s
e
13
1
3
of
o
f
section
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
8
8
describes
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
s
a
a
new
n
e
w
approach
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
to
t
o
defining
d
e
f
i
n
i
n
g
complexity
c
o
m
p
l
e
x
i
t
y
in
i
n
the
t
h
e
qualification
q
u
a
l
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
components.)
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
.
)
Related
R
e
l
a
t
e
d
to
t
o
the
t
h
e
above
a
b
o
v
e
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
is
i
s
the
t
h
e
addition
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
a
a
residual
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
risk
r
i
s
k
assessment,
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
,
which
w
h
i
c
h
will
w
i
l
l
be
b
e
applied
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
if
i
f
the
t
h
e
target
t
a
r
g
e
t
values
v
a
l
u
e
s
for
f
o
r
Method
M
e
t
h
o
d
1
1
are
a
r
e
not
n
o
t
met.
m
e
t
.
In
I
n
another
a
n
o
t
h
e
r
minor
m
i
n
o
r
“update”
“
u
p
d
a
t
e
”
the
t
h
e
SC
S
C
has
h
a
s
suggested
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
e
d
that
t
h
a
t
an
a
n
earlier
e
a
r
l
i
e
r
proposal
p
r
o
p
o
s
a
l
for
f
o
r
a
a
new
n
e
w
“residual
“
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
risk
r
i
s
k
assessment
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
method”
m
e
t
h
o
d
”
be
b
e
withdrawn.
w
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
n
.
The
T
h
e
final
f
i
n
a
l
addition
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
to
t
o
section
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
5
5
is
i
s
the
t
h
e
inclusion
i
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
of
o
f
example
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
architectures
a
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
e
s
for
f
o
r
fault
f
a
u
l
t
tolerant
t
o
l
e
r
a
n
t
implementation.
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
.
SAFETY
S
A
F
E
T
Y
&
&
SECURITY
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
-
-
Report
R
e
p
o
r
t
granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true}
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
-
-
Keeping
K
e
e
p
i
n
g
up
u
p
with
w
i
t
h
design:
d
e
s
i
g
n
:
ISO26262.
I
S
O
2
6
2
6
2
.
Time
T
i
m
e
for
f
o
r
an
a
n
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
Edition
E
d
i
t
i
o
n
2
2
addresses
a
d
d
r
e
s
s
e
s
shortcomings
s
h
o
r
t
c
o
m
i
n
g
s
of
o
f
current
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
standards
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
Presently
P
r
e
s
e
n
t
l
y
ISO
I
S
O
26262-6
2
6
2
6
2
-
6
specifies
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
s
what
w
h
a
t
steps
s
t
e
p
s
should
s
h
o
u
l
d
be
b
e
taken
t
a
k
e
n
during
d
u
r
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
of
o
f
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
components
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
to
t
o
ensure
e
n
s
u
r
e
product
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
safety.
s
a
f
e
t
y
.
There
T
h
e
r
e
are
a
r
e
seven
s
e
v
e
n
phases
p
h
a
s
e
s
that
t
h
a
t
govern
g
o
v
e
r
n
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
development:
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
:
Clause
C
l
a
u
s
e
5
5
Initiation
I
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
development.
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
.
Clause
C
l
a
u
s
e
6
6
Safety
S
a
f
e
t
y
requirements
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
specification.
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
.
Clause
C
l
a
u
s
e
7
7
Architectural
A
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
a
l
design.
d
e
s
i
g
n
.
Clause
C
l
a
u
s
e
8
8
Unit
U
n
i
t
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
and
a
n
d
implementation.
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
.
Clause
C
l
a
u
s
e
9
9
Unit
U
n
i
t
testing.
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
.
Clause
C
l
a
u
s
e
10
1
0
Integration
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
testing.
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
.
Clause
C
l
a
u
s
e
11
1
1
Safety
S
a
f
e
t
y
requirements
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
verification.
v
e
r
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
.
These
T
h
e
s
e
clauses
c
l
a
u
s
e
s
governing
g
o
v
e
r
n
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
of
o
f
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
are
a
r
e
critical
c
r
i
t
i
c
a
l
in
i
n
ensuring
e
n
s
u
r
i
n
g
functional
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
standards
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
are
a
r
e
clearly
c
l
e
a
r
l
y
determined
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d
and
a
n
d
adhered
a
d
h
e
r
e
d
to.
t
o
.
©
©
Fotolia
F
o
t
o
l
i
a
2016
2
0
1
6
Clause
C
l
a
u
s
e
5
5
describes
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
s
the
t
h
e
initiation
i
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
development.
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
.
During
D
u
r
i
n
g
this
t
h
i
s
phase,
p
h
a
s
e
,
the
t
h
e
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
process
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
to
t
o
be
b
e
used
u
s
e
d
must
m
u
s
t
be
b
e
selected,
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
,
as
a
s
well
w
e
l
l
as
a
s
which
w
h
i
c
h
tools
t
o
o
l
s
will
w
i
l
l
be
b
e
used.
u
s
e
d
.
If
I
f
model-based
m
o
d
e
l
-
b
a
s
e
d
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
forms
f
o
r
m
s
part
p
a
r
t
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
development,
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
,
then
t
h
e
n
the
t
h
e
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
plan
p
l
a
n
will
w
i
l
l
need
n
e
e
d
to
t
o
inclu-
i
n
c
l
u
-
de,
d
e
,
among
a
m
o
n
g
other
o
t
h
e
r
things,
t
h
i
n
g
s
,
the
t
h
e
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
of
o
f
one
o
n
e
or
o
r
more
m
o
r
e
models,
m
o
d
e
l
s
,
the
t
h
e
implementation
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
based
b
a
s
e
d
on
o
n
those
t
h
o
s
e
models,
m
o
d
e
l
s
,
and
a
n
d
plans
p
l
a
n
s
to
t
o
confirm
c
o
n
f
i
r
m
that
t
h
a
t
the
t
h
e
implementation
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
behaves
b
e
h
a
v
e
s
the
t
h
e
same
s
a
m
e
as
a
s
the
t
h
e
model.
m
o
d
e
l
.
The
T
h
e
primary
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
objective
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
requirements
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
specification
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
phase
p
h
a
s
e
is
i
s
to
t
o
identify
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
y
all
a
l
l
software-based
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
-
b
a
s
e
d
func-
f
u
n
c
-
tions
t
i
o
n
s
which
w
h
i
c
h
could
c
o
u
l
d
potentially
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
l
y
impact
i
m
p
a
c
t
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
by
b
y
either:
e
i
t
h
e
r
:
Directly
D
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
producing
p
r
o
d
u
c
i
n
g
an
a
n
unsafe
u
n
s
a
f
e
state,
s
t
a
t
e
,
such
s
u
c
h
as
a
s
a
a
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
module
m
o
d
u
l
e
which
w
h
i
c
h
controls
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
traction
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
while
w
h
i
l
e
braking,
b
r
a
k
i
n
g
,
or
o
r
failing
f
a
i
l
i
n
g
to
t
o
correctly
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
l
y
handle
h
a
n
d
l
e
a
a
hardware
h
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
or
o
r
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
fault.
f
a
u
l
t
.
The
T
h
e
requirements
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
for
f
o
r
each
e
a
c
h
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
component
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
that
t
h
a
t
is
i
s
identified
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
e
d
in
i
n
the
t
h
e
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
must
m
u
s
t
be
b
e
determined,
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d
,
including
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
such
s
u
c
h
things
t
h
i
n
g
s
as
a
s
timing
t
i
m
i
n
g
requirements
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
and
a
n
d
the
t
h
e
interface
i
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
e
between
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
the
t
h
e
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
component
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
and
a
n
d
other
o
t
h
e
r
system
s
y
s
t
e
m
components.
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
.
During
D
u
r
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
architectural
a
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
a
l
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
phase,
p
h
a
s
e
,
a
a
high-level
h
i
g
h
-
l
e
v
e
l
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
for
f
o
r
each
e
a
c
h
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
component
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
must
m
u
s
t
be
b
e
developed.
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
.
The
T
h
e
conformance
c
o
n
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
of
o
f
this
t
h
i
s
architectural
a
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
a
l
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
must
m
u
s
t
be
b
e
verified
v
e
r
i
f
i
e
d
against
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
measurable
m
e
a
s
u
r
a
b
l
e
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
objectives.
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
s
.
SAFETY
S
A
F
E
T
Y
&
&
SECURITY
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
-
-
Report
R
e
p
o
r
t
granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true}
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
-
-
Keeping
K
e
e
p
i
n
g
up
u
p
with
w
i
t
h
design:
d
e
s
i
g
n
:
ISO26262.
I
S
O
2
6
2
6
2
.
Time
T
i
m
e
for
f
o
r
an
a
n
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
Thereafter
T
h
e
r
e
a
f
t
e
r
each
e
a
c
h
subsystem
s
u
b
s
y
s
t
e
m
is
i
s
designed
d
e
s
i
g
n
e
d
and
a
n
d
implemented
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d
as
a
s
prescribed
p
r
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
in
i
n
the
t
h
e
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
and
a
n
d
implementation
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
phase.
p
h
a
s
e
.
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
requires
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
s
extensive
e
x
t
e
n
s
i
v
e
testing
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
to
t
o
verify
v
e
r
i
f
y
both
b
o
t
h
the
t
h
e
individual
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
elements
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
as
a
s
well
w
e
l
l
as
a
s
complete
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
and
a
n
d
integra-
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
-
ted
t
e
d
systems:
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
:
-
Unit
U
n
i
t
testing
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
is
i
s
covered
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
in
i
n
clause
c
l
a
u
s
e
9.
9
.
The
T
h
e
goal
g
o
a
l
of
o
f
unit
u
n
i
t
testing
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
is
i
s
to
t
o
individually
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
l
y
test
t
e
s
t
the
t
h
e
correctness
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
n
e
s
s
of
o
f
each
e
a
c
h
low-level
l
o
w
-
l
e
v
e
l
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
module.
m
o
d
u
l
e
.
-
Clause
C
l
a
u
s
e
10
1
0
covers
c
o
v
e
r
s
integration
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
testing.
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
.
The
T
h
e
purpose
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
of
o
f
integration
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
testing
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
is
i
s
to
t
o
validate
v
a
l
i
d
a
t
e
the
t
h
e
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
of
o
f
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
systems
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
comprising
c
o
m
p
r
i
s
i
n
g
multiple
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
units.
u
n
i
t
s
.
Finally,
F
i
n
a
l
l
y
,
clause
c
l
a
u
s
e
11
1
1
describes
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
s
the
t
h
e
safety-requirements
s
a
f
e
t
y
-
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
verification
v
e
r
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
process
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
to
t
o
be
b
e
completed
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
in
i
n
order
o
r
d
e
r
to
t
o
ensure
e
n
s
u
r
e
that
t
h
a
t
the
t
h
e
embedded
e
m
b
e
d
d
e
d
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
works
w
o
r
k
s
correctly
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
l
y
in
i
n
its
i
t
s
target
t
a
r
g
e
t
environment.
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
Once
O
n
c
e
again,
a
g
a
i
n
,
section
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
6
6
covering
c
o
v
e
r
i
n
g
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
has
h
a
s
only
o
n
l
y
undergone
u
n
d
e
r
g
o
n
e
a
a
few
f
e
w
minor
m
i
n
o
r
updates
u
p
d
a
t
e
s
in
i
n
Edition
E
d
i
t
i
o
n
2:
2
:
-
The
T
h
e
requirements
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
defining
d
e
f
i
n
i
n
g
properties
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
i
e
s
are
a
r
e
to
t
o
be
b
e
modified
m
o
d
i
f
i
e
d
to
t
o
include
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
a
a
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
analysis
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
to
t
o
confirm
c
o
n
f
i
r
m
the
t
h
e
properties
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
i
e
s
-
The
T
h
e
requirements
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
defining
d
e
f
i
n
i
n
g
functions
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
will
w
i
l
l
call
c
a
l
l
for
f
o
r
the
t
h
e
inclusion
i
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
of
o
f
a
a
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
analysis
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
identifying
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
y
i
n
g
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
mechanisms
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
s
to
t
o
detect
d
e
t
e
c
t
and
a
n
d
react
r
e
a
c
t
to
t
o
software
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
failures.
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
.
Whilst
W
h
i
l
s
t
semiconductors
s
e
m
i
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
s
are
a
r
e
recognized
r
e
c
o
g
n
i
z
e
d
as
a
s
playing
p
l
a
y
i
n
g
a
a
pivotal
p
i
v
o
t
a
l
role
r
o
l
e
in
i
n
E/E
E
/
E
technologies,
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
e
s
,
under
u
n
d
e
r
ISO
I
S
O
26262:2011
2
6
2
6
2
:
2
0
1
1
these
t
h
e
s
e
are
a
r
e
not
n
o
t
covered
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
as
a
s
separate,
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
,
unique
u
n
i
q
u
e
entities:
e
n
t
i
t
i
e
s
:
Instead
I
n
s
t
e
a
d
manufacturers
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
r
s
have
h
a
v
e
to
t
o
rely
r
e
l
y
on
o
n
ISO
I
S
O
26262-10
2
6
2
6
2
-
1
0
Annex
A
n
n
e
x
A
A
to
t
o
define
d
e
f
i
n
e
functional
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
pertaining
p
e
r
t
a
i
n
i
n
g
to
t
o
microcontrollers.
m
i
c
r
o
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
r
s
.
In
I
n
this
t
h
i
s
form
f
o
r
m
the
t
h
e
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
describes:
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
s
:
-
How
H
o
w
to
t
o
apply
a
p
p
l
y
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
definitions
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
to
t
o
semiconductor
s
e
m
i
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
devices
d
e
v
i
c
e
s
-
Component,
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
,
part,
p
a
r
t
,
sub-part
s
u
b
-
p
a
r
t
-
MCU
M
C
U
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
example
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
-
Qualitative
Q
u
a
l
i
t
a
t
i
v
e
and
a
n
d
quantitative
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
a
t
i
v
e
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
analyses
a
n
a
l
y
s
e
s
for
f
o
r
microcontrollers
m
i
c
r
o
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
r
s
-
Failure
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
rates
r
a
t
e
s
for
f
o
r
microcontrollers
m
i
c
r
o
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
r
s
-
Example
E
x
a
m
p
l
e
quantitative
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
a
t
i
v
e
analysis
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
-
FMEA
F
M
E
A
based
b
a
s
e
d
-
Example
E
x
a
m
p
l
e
dependent
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
failure
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
analysis
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
-
Examples
E
x
a
m
p
l
e
s
of
o
f
methods
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
for
f
o
r
systematic
s
y
s
t
e
m
a
t
i
c
fault
f
a
u
l
t
detection
d
e
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
and
a
n
d
avoidance
a
v
o
i
d
a
n
c
e
measures
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
-
Hardware
H
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
design
d
e
s
i
g
n
verification
v
e
r
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
-
Supporting
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
documentation
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
The
T
h
e
upcoming
u
p
c
o
m
i
n
g
Part
P
a
r
t
11
1
1
in
i
n
the
t
h
e
next
n
e
x
t
edition
e
d
i
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
will
w
i
l
l
strengthen
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
the
t
h
e
focus
f
o
c
u
s
on
o
n
semiconductor
s
e
m
i
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
require-
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
-
ments
m
e
n
t
s
and
a
n
d
ensure
e
n
s
u
r
e
the
t
h
e
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
remains
r
e
m
a
i
n
s
relevant
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
when
w
h
e
n
applied
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
to
t
o
systems
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
commonly
c
o
m
m
o
n
l
y
used
u
s
e
d
in
i
n
ADAS
A
D
A
S
and
a
n
d
fully
f
u
l
l
y
autonomous
a
u
t
o
n
o
m
o
u
s
driving
d
r
i
v
i
n
g
architectures.
a
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
e
s
.
©
©
Fotolia
F
o
t
o
l
i
a
2016
2
0
1
6
SAFETY
S
A
F
E
T
Y
&
&
SECURITY
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
-
-
Report
R
e
p
o
r
t
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ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
-
-
Keeping
K
e
e
p
i
n
g
up
u
p
with
w
i
t
h
design:
d
e
s
i
g
n
:
ISO26262.
I
S
O
2
6
2
6
2
.
Time
T
i
m
e
for
f
o
r
an
a
n
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
Part
P
a
r
t
11
1
1
sets
s
e
t
s
the
t
h
e
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
for
f
o
r
semiconductor
s
e
m
i
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
functional
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
Part
P
a
r
t
11,
1
1
,
which
w
h
i
c
h
is
i
s
currently
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
y
in
i
n
the
t
h
e
CD
C
D
stage,
s
t
a
g
e
,
has
h
a
s
been
b
e
e
n
developed
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
from
f
r
o
m
ISO/PAS
I
S
O
/
P
A
S
19451-1
1
9
4
5
1
-
1
(which
(
w
h
i
c
h
addresses
a
d
d
r
e
s
s
e
s
se-
s
e
-
miconductors)
m
i
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
s
)
and
a
n
d
elements
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
from
f
r
o
m
the
t
h
e
current
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
ISO
I
S
O
26262-10.
2
6
2
6
2
-
1
0
.
This
T
h
i
s
section
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
will,
w
i
l
l
,
for
f
o
r
the
t
h
e
first
f
i
r
s
t
time,
t
i
m
e
,
offer
o
f
f
e
r
guidance
g
u
i
d
a
n
c
e
on:
o
n
:
-
Fault
F
a
u
l
t
injection
i
n
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
-
Sensors
S
e
n
s
o
r
s
and
a
n
d
transducers
t
r
a
n
s
d
u
c
e
r
s
-
Production
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
and
a
n
d
operation
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
-
Confirmation
C
o
n
f
i
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
measures
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
and
a
n
d
audits
a
u
d
i
t
s
Highlighting
H
i
g
h
l
i
g
h
t
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
focus
f
o
c
u
s
on
o
n
semiconductors
s
e
m
i
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
s
the
t
h
e
introduction
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
to
t
o
this
t
h
i
s
section
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
defines
d
e
f
i
n
e
s
key
k
e
y
concepts,
c
o
n
c
e
p
t
s
,
such
s
u
c
h
as:
a
s
:
-
The
T
h
e
meaning
m
e
a
n
i
n
g
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e
m
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S
e
m
i
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
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s
a
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analysis
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a
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y
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i
s
Because
B
e
c
a
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e
semiconductors
s
e
m
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o
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c
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i
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variety
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electronic
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l
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systems,
s
y
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everything
e
v
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i
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motor
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t
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controllers
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o
n
t
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o
l
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e
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to
t
o
sophisticated
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o
p
h
i
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ADAS
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D
A
S
it’s
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s
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b
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d
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i
m
p
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describe
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c
r
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b
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specific
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p
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s
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m
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c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
use
u
s
e
cases
c
a
s
e
s
that
t
h
a
t
cover:
c
o
v
e
r
:
-
Multi-core
M
u
l
t
i
-
c
o
r
e
components
c
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m
p
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t
s
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Digital
D
i
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components,
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memories
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d
mixed
m
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d
signal
s
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devices
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s
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Programmable
P
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a
m
m
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logic
l
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devices
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S
e
n
s
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r
s
,
transducers
t
r
a
n
s
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e
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Moreover,
M
o
r
e
o
v
e
r
,
to
t
o
eliminate
e
l
i
m
i
n
a
t
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m
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o
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d
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the
t
h
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use
u
s
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cases
c
a
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section
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
11
1
1
also
a
l
s
o
contains
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
s
six
s
i
x
annexes
a
n
n
e
x
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s
of
o
f
clearly
c
l
e
a
r
l
y
laid
l
a
i
d
out
o
u
t
examples.
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
s
.
©
©
Fotolia
F
o
t
o
l
i
a
2016
2
0
1
6
SAFETY
S
A
F
E
T
Y
&
&
SECURITY
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
-
-
Report
R
e
p
o
r
t
granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true}
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
-
-
Keeping
K
e
e
p
i
n
g
up
u
p
with
w
i
t
h
design:
d
e
s
i
g
n
:
ISO26262.
I
S
O
2
6
2
6
2
.
Time
T
i
m
e
for
f
o
r
an
a
n
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
During
D
u
r
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
development
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
of
o
f
this
t
h
i
s
section,
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
,
the
t
h
e
subcommittee
s
u
b
c
o
m
m
i
t
t
e
e
has
h
a
s
given
g
i
v
e
n
careful
c
a
r
e
f
u
l
consideration
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
to
t
o
the
t
h
e
application
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
to
t
o
various
v
a
r
i
o
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s
stages
s
t
a
g
e
s
of
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operation,
o
p
e
r
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t
i
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n
,
thereby
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h
e
r
e
b
y
addressing
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d
d
r
e
s
s
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
following
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
issues:
i
s
s
u
e
s
:
-
Intellectual
I
n
t
e
l
l
e
c
t
u
a
l
property
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
-
Dependent
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
failure
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
analysis
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
-
Fault
F
a
u
l
t
injection
i
n
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
for
f
o
r
semiconductors
s
e
m
i
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
s
-
Interfaces
I
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
e
s
within
w
i
t
h
i
n
distributed
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
d
developments
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
s
-
Confirmation
C
o
n
f
i
r
m
a
t
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o
n
measures
m
e
a
s
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e
s
-
HW
H
W
integration
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
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and
a
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d
testing
t
e
s
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g
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a
s
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failure
f
a
i
l
u
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e
rate
r
a
t
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estimation
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
-
Production
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
and
a
n
d
operation
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
Publicly
P
u
b
l
i
c
l
y
Available
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
Specification
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
19451:1
1
9
4
5
1
:
1
discusses
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
e
s
Intellectual
I
n
t
e
l
l
e
c
t
u
a
l
Property
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
The
T
h
e
aforementioned
a
f
o
r
e
m
e
n
t
i
o
n
e
d
PAS
P
A
S
document
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
(ISO/PAS
(
I
S
O
/
P
A
S
19451)
1
9
4
5
1
)
has
h
a
s
recently
r
e
c
e
n
t
l
y
been
b
e
e
n
approved
a
p
p
r
o
v
e
d
for
f
o
r
publication
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
later
l
a
t
e
r
this
t
h
i
s
year.
y
e
a
r
.
Based
B
a
s
e
d
on
o
n
ISO
I
S
O
26262-10:2012,
2
6
2
6
2
-
1
0
:
2
0
1
2
,
Annex
A
n
n
e
x
A,
A
,
“ISO
“
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
and
a
n
d
microcontrollers,”
m
i
c
r
o
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
r
s
,
”
the
t
h
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update
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p
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t
e
has
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s
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expan-
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x
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ded
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to
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include
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d
d
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n
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l
types
t
y
p
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s
of
o
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semiconductor
s
e
m
i
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
technologies
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
e
s
and
a
n
d
topics
t
o
p
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s
surrounding
s
u
r
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
these.
t
h
e
s
e
.
Importantly
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
l
y
the
t
h
e
new
n
e
w
Publicly
P
u
b
l
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c
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Available
A
v
a
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l
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l
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Specification
S
p
e
c
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f
i
c
a
t
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19451:1,
1
9
4
5
1
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1
,
addresses
a
d
d
r
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s
s
e
s
the
t
h
e
following
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
issues
i
s
s
u
e
s
relating
r
e
l
a
t
i
n
g
to
t
o
the
t
h
e
application
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
concepts
c
o
n
c
e
p
t
s
within
w
i
t
h
i
n
the
t
h
e
broader
b
r
o
a
d
e
r
framework
f
r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
of
o
f
semi-conductors:
s
e
m
i
-
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
s
:
-
Clarification
C
l
a
r
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
application
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
to
t
o
semiconductor
s
e
m
i
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
devices
d
e
v
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e
s
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I
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
a
a
section
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
on
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n
Intellectual
I
n
t
e
l
l
e
c
t
u
a
l
Property
P
r
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p
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r
t
y
(IP)
(
I
P
)
designs
d
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s
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n
s
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General
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
considerations
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
for
f
o
r
Intellectual
I
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t
e
l
l
e
c
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Property
P
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p
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r
t
y
designs
d
e
s
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n
s
-
Safety
S
a
f
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t
y
requirements
r
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q
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m
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s
for
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IP
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of
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black-box
b
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b
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designs
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s
With
W
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Intellectual
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l
l
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c
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designs
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now
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commonplace
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Safety
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through
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proven
p
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v
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in
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use
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argument
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g
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What‘s
W
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s
more,
m
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e
,
the
t
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PAS
P
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IP
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work
w
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products
p
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in
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great
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detail:
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:
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Safety
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a
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review
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a
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p
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Analysis
A
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failures
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report
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Development
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m
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Integration
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g
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documentation
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t
a
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set
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e
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SAFETY
S
A
F
E
T
Y
&
&
SECURITY
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
-
-
Report
R
e
p
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r
t
granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true}
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
-
-
Keeping
K
e
e
p
i
n
g
up
u
p
with
w
i
t
h
design:
d
e
s
i
g
n
:
ISO26262.
I
S
O
2
6
2
6
2
.
Time
T
i
m
e
for
f
o
r
an
a
n
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
Addressing
A
d
d
r
e
s
s
i
n
g
ADAS
A
D
A
S
and
a
n
d
fully
f
u
l
l
y
autonomous
a
u
t
o
n
o
m
o
u
s
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
Greater
G
r
e
a
t
e
r
automation
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
i
o
n
brings
b
r
i
n
g
s
with
w
i
t
h
it
i
t
many
m
a
n
y
challenges:
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
s
:
For
F
o
r
example
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
the
t
h
e
risk
r
i
s
k
model
m
o
d
e
l
of
o
f
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
assumes
a
s
s
u
m
e
s
that
t
h
a
t
the
t
h
e
driver
d
r
i
v
e
r
is
i
s
a
a
part
p
a
r
t
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
control
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
loop.
l
o
o
p
.
The
T
h
e
driver’s
d
r
i
v
e
r
’
s
ability
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
to
t
o
maintain
m
a
i
n
t
a
i
n
control
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
is
i
s
a
a
fundamental
f
u
n
d
a
m
e
n
t
a
l
consideration
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
when
w
h
e
n
determining
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
n
g
a
a
risk.
r
i
s
k
.
Obviously,
O
b
v
i
o
u
s
l
y
,
greater
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
automation
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
i
o
n
has
h
a
s
the
t
h
e
potential
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
to
t
o
take
t
a
k
e
the
t
h
e
driver
d
r
i
v
e
r
out
o
u
t
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
cont-
c
o
n
t
-
rol
r
o
l
loop,
l
o
o
p
,
and
a
n
d
as
a
s
such
s
u
c
h
the
t
h
e
demands
d
e
m
a
n
d
s
on
o
n
functional
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
will
w
i
l
l
be
b
e
significantly
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
impacted
i
m
p
a
c
t
e
d
upon.
u
p
o
n
.
Although
A
l
t
h
o
u
g
h
not
n
o
t
yet
y
e
t
ready
r
e
a
d
y
for
f
o
r
publication,
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
ISO/PAS
I
S
O
/
P
A
S
21448,
2
1
4
4
8
,
will
w
i
l
l
focus
f
o
c
u
s
on
o
n
the
t
h
e
functional
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
of
o
f
ADAS-related
A
D
A
S
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
hazards
h
a
z
a
r
d
s
caused
c
a
u
s
e
d
by
b
y
“normal
“
n
o
r
m
a
l
operation”
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
”
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
sensors.
s
e
n
s
o
r
s
.
Timing
T
i
m
i
n
g
for
f
o
r
this
t
h
i
s
is
i
s
as
a
s
yet
y
e
t
undefined.
u
n
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
.
©
©
Fotolia
F
o
t
o
l
i
a
2016
2
0
1
6
As
A
s
ADAS
A
D
A
S
and
a
n
d
connected
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
e
d
functions
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
increase,
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
,
so
s
o
do
d
o
concerns
c
o
n
c
e
r
n
s
around
a
r
o
u
n
d
cybersecurity.
c
y
b
e
r
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
.
And
A
n
d
although
a
l
t
h
o
u
g
h
many
m
a
n
y
manu-
m
a
n
u
-
facturers
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
r
s
have
h
a
v
e
ad-hoc
a
d
-
h
o
c
systems
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
in-place
i
n
-
p
l
a
c
e
to
t
o
try
t
r
y
and
a
n
d
identify
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
y
functional
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
risks,
r
i
s
k
s
,
these
t
h
e
s
e
are
a
r
e
largely
l
a
r
g
e
l
y
ineffective
i
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
in
i
n
addressing
a
d
d
r
e
s
s
i
n
g
systemic
s
y
s
t
e
m
i
c
risks.
r
i
s
k
s
.
Information
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
security
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
has
h
a
s
focused
f
o
c
u
s
e
d
for
f
o
r
too
t
o
o
long
l
o
n
g
on
o
n
just
j
u
s
t
the
t
h
e
technical
t
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
elements,
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
but
b
u
t
it
i
t
is
i
s
people
p
e
o
p
l
e
that
t
h
a
t
develop
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
systems;
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
;
people
p
e
o
p
l
e
who
w
h
o
may
m
a
y
make
m
a
k
e
mistakes,
m
i
s
t
a
k
e
s
,
fail
f
a
i
l
to
t
o
follow
f
o
l
l
o
w
policies
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
and
a
n
d
sometimes
s
o
m
e
t
i
m
e
s
use
u
s
e
the
t
h
e
power
p
o
w
e
r
they
t
h
e
y
have
h
a
v
e
at
a
t
their
t
h
e
i
r
keyboard
k
e
y
b
o
a
r
d
for
f
o
r
malicious
m
a
l
i
c
i
o
u
s
purposes.
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
s
.
Ed
E
d
Savage,
S
a
v
a
g
e
,
Cyber
C
y
b
e
r
Security
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
expert,
e
x
p
e
r
t
,
PA
P
A
Consulting
C
o
n
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
Group
G
r
o
u
p
says,
s
a
y
s
,
“To
“
T
o
date,
d
a
t
e
,
most
m
o
s
t
cyber
c
y
b
e
r
security
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
related
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
best
b
e
s
t
practice
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
has
h
a
s
focused
f
o
c
u
s
e
d
almost
a
l
m
o
s
t
exclusively
e
x
c
l
u
s
i
v
e
l
y
on
o
n
methods
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
and
a
n
d
the
t
h
e
controls.
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
.
Whereas
W
h
e
r
e
a
s
instead,
i
n
s
t
e
a
d
,
the
t
h
e
newly
n
e
w
l
y
proposed
p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
PAS
P
A
S
555
5
5
5
focuses
f
o
c
u
s
e
s
on
o
n
the
t
h
e
outcomes
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
–
–
the
t
h
e
aims
a
i
m
s
and
a
n
d
impacts
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
of
o
f
security
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
processes
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
e
s
–
–
and
a
n
d
helps
h
e
l
p
s
organisations
o
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
s
identify
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
y
the
t
h
e
areas
a
r
e
a
s
that
t
h
a
t
need
n
e
e
d
protecting
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
most.”
m
o
s
t
.
”
While
W
h
i
l
e
getting
g
e
t
t
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
basics
b
a
s
i
c
s
of
o
f
cyber
c
y
b
e
r
security
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
right
r
i
g
h
t
would
w
o
u
l
d
help
h
e
l
p
significantly,
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
,
good
g
o
o
d
practice
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
needs
n
e
e
d
s
to
t
o
address
a
d
d
r
e
s
s
all
a
l
l
dimensions,
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
,
PAS
P
A
S
555
5
5
5
defines
d
e
f
i
n
e
s
all
a
l
l
the
t
h
e
dimensions
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
cyber
c
y
b
e
r
security
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
challenge
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
through
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
the
t
h
e
complete
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
lifecy-
l
i
f
e
c
y
-
cle,
c
l
e
,
including
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
risk
r
i
s
k
assessment,
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
,
protection
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
and
a
n
d
mitigation,
m
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
,
detection
d
e
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
and
a
n
d
response,
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
,
and
a
n
d
recovery.
r
e
c
o
v
e
r
y
.
This
T
h
i
s
is
i
s
the
t
h
e
first
f
i
r
s
t
time
t
i
m
e
that
t
h
a
t
this
t
h
i
s
has
h
a
s
been
b
e
e
n
achieved
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
d
and
a
n
d
no
n
o
other
o
t
h
e
r
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
is
i
s
as
a
s
comprehensive.
c
o
m
p
r
e
h
e
n
s
i
v
e
.
SAFETY
S
A
F
E
T
Y
&
&
SECURITY
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
-
-
Report
R
e
p
o
r
t
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ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
-
-
Keeping
K
e
e
p
i
n
g
up
u
p
with
w
i
t
h
design:
d
e
s
i
g
n
:
ISO26262.
I
S
O
2
6
2
6
2
.
Time
T
i
m
e
for
f
o
r
an
a
n
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
Setting
S
e
t
t
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
for
f
o
r
cyber
c
y
b
e
r
security
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
–
–
introducing
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
i
n
g
PAS
P
A
S
555
5
5
5
BSI,
B
S
I
,
the
t
h
e
UK’s
U
K
’
s
National
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
Standards
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
Body,
B
o
d
y
,
has
h
a
s
created
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
a
a
new
n
e
w
specification,
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
PAS
P
A
S
555
5
5
5
Cyber
C
y
b
e
r
Security
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
Risk
R
i
s
k
Gover-
G
o
v
e
r
-
nance
n
a
n
c
e
and
a
n
d
Management,
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
,
to
t
o
help
h
e
l
p
organisations
o
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
s
manage
m
a
n
a
g
e
cyber
c
y
b
e
r
security.
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
.
In
I
n
a
a
domain
d
o
m
a
i
n
where
w
h
e
r
e
there
t
h
e
r
e
are
a
r
e
already
a
l
r
e
a
d
y
a
a
large
l
a
r
g
e
number
n
u
m
b
e
r
of
o
f
standards
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
and
a
n
d
schemes,
s
c
h
e
m
e
s
,
is
i
s
there
t
h
e
r
e
really
r
e
a
l
l
y
a
a
need
n
e
e
d
for
f
o
r
another?
a
n
o
t
h
e
r
?
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I
n
fact,
f
a
c
t
,
it
i
t
is
i
s
that
t
h
a
t
very
v
e
r
y
thinking
t
h
i
n
k
i
n
g
that
t
h
a
t
has
h
a
s
led
l
e
d
to
t
o
the
t
h
e
creation
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
of
o
f
PAS
P
A
S
555.
5
5
5
.
The
T
h
e
truth
t
r
u
t
h
is
i
s
that
t
h
a
t
there
t
h
e
r
e
are
a
r
e
so
s
o
many
m
a
n
y
different
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
pieces
p
i
e
c
e
s
of
o
f
good
g
o
o
d
practice,
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
,
it
i
t
can
c
a
n
be
b
e
confusing
c
o
n
f
u
s
i
n
g
to
t
o
choose
c
h
o
o
s
e
between
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
them
t
h
e
m
and
a
n
d
potentially
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
l
y
very
v
e
r
y
expensive
e
x
p
e
n
s
i
v
e
for
f
o
r
any
a
n
y
organisation
o
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
to
t
o
demonstrate
d
e
m
o
n
s
t
r
a
t
e
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y
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o
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all
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to
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m
p
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s
e
c
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P
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S
555
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e
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the
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security
s
e
c
u
r
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threat
t
h
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e
a
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i
n
c
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e
a
s
e
s
;
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t
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u
s
the
t
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interest
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e
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t
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i
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d
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d
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a
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Control
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s
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4
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s
u
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Group
G
r
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and
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d
Symantec,
S
y
m
a
n
t
e
c
,
with
w
i
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other
o
t
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e
r
key
k
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y
stakeholders
s
t
a
k
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
involved
i
n
v
o
l
v
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d
in
i
n
its
i
t
s
development.
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
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.
©
©
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F
o
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2016
2
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1
6
PAS
P
A
S
555
5
5
5
offers
o
f
f
e
r
s
a
a
framework
f
r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
that
t
h
a
t
defines
d
e
f
i
n
e
s
the
t
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outcomes
o
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t
c
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m
e
s
of
o
f
good
g
o
o
d
cyber
c
y
b
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r
security
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
practice.
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
.
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I
t
extends
e
x
t
e
n
d
s
beyond
b
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y
o
n
d
the
t
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technical
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c
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l
aspects
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to
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n
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m
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s
s
physical
p
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a
l
and
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people
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o
p
l
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security
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with
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existing
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x
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s
t
a
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d
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s
.
SAFETY
S
A
F
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&
&
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-
Report
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ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
-
-
Keeping
K
e
e
p
i
n
g
up
u
p
with
w
i
t
h
design:
d
e
s
i
g
n
:
ISO26262.
I
S
O
2
6
2
6
2
.
Time
T
i
m
e
for
f
o
r
an
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n
update
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Therefore,
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f
o
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e
,
the
t
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PAS
P
A
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works
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k
s
with
w
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other
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t
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r
existing
e
x
i
s
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g
standards
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t
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n
d
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d
s
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r
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i
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,
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for
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the
t
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first
f
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t
time
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allows
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them
t
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m
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n
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h
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n
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n
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.
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n
so
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to
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m
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t
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to
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what
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t
is
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f
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of
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a
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and
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d
sometimes
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o
m
e
t
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s
conflicting
c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
i
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g
information.
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
.
Central
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
to
t
o
the
t
h
e
framework
f
r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
is
i
s
the
t
h
e
requirement
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
for
f
o
r
a
a
cyber
c
y
b
e
r
security
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
risk
r
i
s
k
assessment.
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
.
This
T
h
i
s
allows
a
l
l
o
w
s
an
a
n
organisation
o
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
to
t
o
understand
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d
its
i
t
s
cyber
c
y
b
e
r
security
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
risk
r
i
s
k
exposure
e
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
and
a
n
d
develop
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
a
a
robust
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o
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s
t
approach
a
p
p
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a
c
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to
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n
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that
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h
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r
i
s
k
,
accor-
a
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-
ding
d
i
n
g
to
t
o
its
i
t
s
business
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
context.
c
o
n
t
e
x
t
.
However,
H
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
notwithstanding
n
o
t
w
i
t
h
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
impressive
i
m
p
r
e
s
s
i
v
e
strides
s
t
r
i
d
e
s
planned
p
l
a
n
n
e
d
in
i
n
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
Edition
E
d
i
t
i
o
n
2
2
the
t
h
e
speed
s
p
e
e
d
at
a
t
which
w
h
i
c
h
new
n
e
w
technologies
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
e
s
are
a
r
e
being
b
e
i
n
g
introduced
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
in
i
n
the
t
h
e
automotive
a
u
t
o
m
o
t
i
v
e
industry
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
is
i
s
such
s
u
c
h
that,
t
h
a
t
,
already
a
l
r
e
a
d
y
Edition
E
d
i
t
i
o
n
2
2
may
m
a
y
be
b
e
outpa-
o
u
t
p
a
-
ced:
c
e
d
:
And
A
n
d
in
i
n
some
s
o
m
e
instances
i
n
s
t
a
n
c
e
s
commentators
c
o
m
m
e
n
t
a
t
o
r
s
are
a
r
e
predicting
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
n
g
that
t
h
a
t
the
t
h
e
update
u
p
d
a
t
e
has
h
a
s
not
n
o
t
addressed
a
d
d
r
e
s
s
e
d
some
s
o
m
e
lingering
l
i
n
g
e
r
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n
g
issues.
i
s
s
u
e
s
.
What
W
h
a
t
functional
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
challenges
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
s
remain?
r
e
m
a
i
n
?
With
W
i
t
h
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
designed
d
e
s
i
g
n
e
d
as
a
s
a
a
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
meant
m
e
a
n
t
to
t
o
be
b
e
applied
a
p
p
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i
e
d
by
b
y
manufacturers
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
r
s
across
a
c
r
o
s
s
the
t
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e
world
w
o
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l
d
differing
d
i
f
f
e
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approaches
a
p
p
r
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a
c
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e
s
to
t
o
interpreting
i
n
t
e
r
p
r
e
t
i
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g
and
a
n
d
applying
a
p
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y
i
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g
the
t
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standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
still
s
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l
exist.
e
x
i
s
t
.
Although
A
l
t
h
o
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g
h
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m
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c
h
improved
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
this
t
h
i
s
is
i
s
an
a
n
area
a
r
e
a
that
t
h
a
t
requires
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
s
further
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
refinement.
r
e
f
i
n
e
m
e
n
t
.
Furthermore,
F
u
r
t
h
e
r
m
o
r
e
,
discussions
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
i
o
n
s
on
o
n
cybersecurity
c
y
b
e
r
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
highlight
h
i
g
h
l
i
g
h
t
the
t
h
e
narrow
n
a
r
r
o
w
focus
f
o
c
u
s
of
o
f
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
compared
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
to
t
o
system
s
y
s
t
e
m
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
and
a
n
d
wider
w
i
d
e
r
issues
i
s
s
u
e
s
of
o
f
system
s
y
s
t
e
m
dependability.
d
e
p
e
n
d
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
Although
A
l
t
h
o
u
g
h
PAS555
P
A
S
5
5
5
is
i
s
seen
s
e
e
n
as
a
s
a
a
break-
b
r
e
a
k
-
through
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
in
i
n
improving
i
m
p
r
o
v
i
n
g
cybersecurity
c
y
b
e
r
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
functional
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety,
s
a
f
e
t
y
,
there
t
h
e
r
e
are
a
r
e
still
s
t
i
l
l
issues
i
s
s
u
e
s
related
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
to
t
o
the
t
h
e
wide
w
i
d
e
scope
s
c
o
p
e
of
o
f
the
t
h
e
problem.
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
.
Similarly,
S
i
m
i
l
a
r
l
y
,
several
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
issues
i
s
s
u
e
s
associated
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
with
w
i
t
h
autonomous
a
u
t
o
n
o
m
o
u
s
vehicles
v
e
h
i
c
l
e
s
have
h
a
v
e
been
b
e
e
n
acknowledged
a
c
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
d
but
b
u
t
it
i
t
is
i
s
unlikely
u
n
l
i
k
e
l
y
the
t
h
e
updated
u
p
d
a
t
e
d
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
will
w
i
l
l
fully
f
u
l
l
y
address
a
d
d
r
e
s
s
autonomy
a
u
t
o
n
o
m
y
in
i
n
the
t
h
e
timescales
t
i
m
e
s
c
a
l
e
s
being
b
e
i
n
g
discussed
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
e
d
for
f
o
r
their
t
h
e
i
r
deployment
d
e
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
And
A
n
d
looking
l
o
o
k
i
n
g
forward
f
o
r
w
a
r
d
to
t
o
2025
2
0
2
5
when
w
h
e
n
the
t
h
e
majority
m
a
j
o
r
i
t
y
of
o
f
cars
c
a
r
s
on
o
n
the
t
h
e
road
r
o
a
d
will
w
i
l
l
have
h
a
v
e
at
a
t
least
l
e
a
s
t
one
o
n
e
SAE
S
A
E
Level
L
e
v
e
l
1
1
(or
(
o
r
abo-
a
b
o
-
ve)
v
e
)
application,
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
one
o
n
e
needs
n
e
e
d
s
to
t
o
ask
a
s
k
the
t
h
e
question:
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
:
Is
I
s
there
t
h
e
r
e
a
a
ISO
I
S
O
26262,
2
6
2
6
2
,
Edition
E
d
i
t
i
o
n
3,
3
,
already
a
l
r
e
a
d
y
in
i
n
the
t
h
e
pipeline?
p
i
p
e
l
i
n
e
?
Sources:
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
:
-
www.iso.org,
w
w
w
.
i
s
o
.
o
r
g
,
Draft
D
r
a
f
t
26262
2
6
2
6
2
edition
e
d
i
t
i
o
n
2,
2
,
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
i
s
o
.
o
r
g
/
i
s
o
/
h
o
m
e
/
-
Christian
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
Esposito
E
s
p
o
s
i
t
o
,
,
Università
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
à
di
d
i
Napoli
N
a
p
o
l
i
Federico
F
e
d
e
r
i
c
o
II.,
I
I
.
,
Hands
H
a
n
d
s
on
o
n
the
t
h
e
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
Standard,
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
,
June
J
u
n
e
2016
2
0
1
6
(Whitepaper)
(
W
h
i
t
e
p
a
p
e
r
)
-
Helen
H
e
l
e
n
Monkhouse,
M
o
n
k
h
o
u
s
e
,
Protean
P
r
o
t
e
a
n
Electric,
E
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
,
Can
C
a
n
the
t
h
e
ISO
I
S
O
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
handle
h
a
n
d
l
e
the
t
h
e
speed
s
p
e
e
d
of
o
f
research
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
in
i
n
the
t
h
e
car
c
a
r
industry,
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
,
March
M
a
r
c
h
2016
2
0
1
6
(Whitepaper)
(
W
h
i
t
e
p
a
p
e
r
)
-
PA
P
A
Consulting,
C
o
n
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
,
Setting
S
e
t
t
i
n
g
the
t
h
e
standard
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
for
f
o
r
cyber
c
y
b
e
r
security;
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
;
introducing
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
i
n
g
PAS
P
A
S
555,
5
5
5
,
June
J
u
n
e
2016,
2
0
1
6
,
http://www.
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
paconsulting.com/our-thinking/setting-the-standard-for-cyber-security-introducing-pas-555/
p
a
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
.
c
o
m
/
o
u
r
-
t
h
i
n
k
i
n
g
/
s
e
t
t
i
n
g
-
t
h
e
-
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
-
f
o
r
-
c
y
b
e
r
-
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
-
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
i
n
g
-
p
a
s
-
5
5
5
/
-
Lauri
L
a
u
r
i
Ora,
O
r
a
,
ARM,
A
R
M
,
Functional
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety
s
a
f
e
t
y
for
f
o
r
semiconductor
s
e
m
i
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
o
r
IP,
I
P
,
February
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
2016,
2
0
1
6
,
https://nmi.org.uk/wp.../
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
n
m
i
.
o
r
g
.
u
k
/
w
p
.
.
.
/
ARM-NMI-ISO-26262-practitioners-workshop-2016-v4.pdf
A
R
M
-
N
M
I
-
I
S
O
-
2
6
2
6
2
-
p
r
a
c
t
i
t
i
o
n
e
r
s
-
w
o
r
k
s
h
o
p
-
2
0
1
6
-
v
4
.
p
d
f
-
ISO,
I
S
O
,
ISO/PAS
I
S
O
/
P
A
S
19695:2015(E),
1
9
6
9
5
:
2
0
1
5
(
E
)
,
Motorcycles
M
o
t
o
r
c
y
c
l
e
s
—
—
Functional
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
safety,
s
a
f
e
t
y
,
Dec
D
e
c
2015,
2
0
1
5
,
Whitepaper
W
h
i
t
e
p
a
p
e
r
-
Euroforum
E
u
r
o
f
o
r
u
m
interview
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
with
w
i
t
h
Stefan
S
t
e
f
a
n
Kriso,
K
r
i
s
o
,
Robert
R
o
b
e
r
t
Bosch,
B
o
s
c
h
,
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
part
p
a
r
t
11,
1
1
,
Sept
S
e
p
t
2016,
2
0
1
6
,
http://www.
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
euroforum.de/interview/
e
u
r
o
f
o
r
u
m
.
d
e
/
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
/
-
Dr.
D
r
.
Christof
C
h
r
i
s
t
o
f
Eber,
E
b
e
r
,
Vector
V
e
c
t
o
r
consulting
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
Services,
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
,
Functional
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
Safety
S
a
f
e
t
y
with
w
i
t
h
ISO
I
S
O
26262,
2
6
2
6
2
,
June
J
u
n
e
2016,
2
0
1
6
,
http://
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
vector.com/portal/medien/vector_consulting/publications/Webinar_Safety.pdf
v
e
c
t
o
r
.
c
o
m
/
p
o
r
t
a
l
/
m
e
d
i
e
n
/
v
e
c
t
o
r
_
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
/
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
/
W
e
b
i
n
a
r
_
S
a
f
e
t
y
.
p
d
f
-
John
J
o
h
n
Blyle,
B
l
y
l
e
,
JB
J
B
Systems,
S
y
s
t
e
m
s
,
What
W
h
a
t
makes
m
a
k
e
s
Automotive
A
u
t
o
m
o
t
i
v
e
Electronics
E
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
s
ISO
I
S
O
26262
2
6
2
6
2
Different
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
from
f
r
o
m
other
o
t
h
e
r
Standards?,
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
?
,
February
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
2016,
2
0
1
6
,
http://jbsystech.com/what-makes-automotive-electronics-iso-
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
j
b
s
y
s
t
e
c
h
.
c
o
m
/
w
h
a
t
-
m
a
k
e
s
-
a
u
t
o
m
o
t
i
v
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
s
-
i
s
o
-
26262-different-from-other-standards/
2
6
2
6
2
-
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
-
f
r
o
m
-
o
t
h
e
r
-
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
/
SAFETY
S
A
F
E
T
Y
&
&
SECURITY
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
-
-
Report
R
e
p
o
r
t
granularity=word tetml={elements={line} glyphdetails={all}} contentanalysis={punctuationbreaks=false dehyphenate=false shadowdetect=false} layoutanalysis={tabledetect=0 layoutdetect=3} structureanalysis={list=true}
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